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This study focuses on an underexplored subgroup of the Chinese industrial 
working class, the Third Line workers. Initiated in the late 1960s, the Third 
Line was a massive project that relocated industrial activities to inland China 
for geopolitical reasons. What sort of industrial relations could be found in the 
Third Line Enterprises? In this study, I attempt to answer this broad question 
by focusing on a more specific dimension: the group leaders’ daily control of 
workers. I argue that, in the Third Line factories, group leaders did not deal 
with their member workers’ rule-breaking behaviors by means of rigid 
enforcement of the factory’s formal institutions. Instead, they tolerated these 
misbehaviors and even made use of them to maintain the group’s production.  
 
        Group leaders’ toleration was rooted in three contextual conditions: 
geographical isolation, intensive informal social relations and the workers’ 
tactics of production control. The factory’s isolated location provided a 
precondition for the development of the intensive informal social relations and 
the workers’ tactics of production control. In the day-to-day production, the 
interconnected social relations blurred the boundary between family and 
factory and eventually made the formal institutions practically ineffective, 
while the development of workers’ tactics of production control further gave 
them significant bargaining power with their supervisors. As a result, the 
group leaders tended to tolerate rather than punish their group workers’ rule-
 vii 
breaking behaviors.  
 
        If toleration is the strategy group leaders employ, how did it manifest 
itself in daily management? In this thesis, I show that, as a governing strategy, 
toleration was not a simple attitude. Rather, it referred to a systematic 
management means. In order to better illustrate the tolerating strategy 
practiced in Jinjiang Factory, I take the group leaders’ management of 
workers’ absenteeism as an example. In this example, the tolerating strategy 
was implemented based on the following three building blocks: the 
reinterpretation of workers’ absence, the exchange among multiple actors and 
the tactics sustaining the exchange.  
 
        This study is based mainly on the author’s fieldwork in a representative 
Third Line factory, the Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory, which is located 
in a mountainous area in Chengdu municipality. The fieldwork took place 
between mid-March and mid-July of 2013. In December 2013 and January 
2015, I conducted two rounds of follow-up interviews in Shanghai and 
Chengdu. Data were collected from the following sources: in-depth interviews 
with former employees of the factory, local chronicles of Sichuan and 
Chengdu, especially the volume on the machinery industry, factory 
documents, the factory chronicle, three volumes of workers’ memoirs, and 
workers’ conference minutes and working diaries.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Located 50 miles northwest of Chengdu, the economic and trading center of 
southwestern China, is Danjingshan a small town surrounded by stretches of 
rolling mountains. This mountainous terrain not only impeded the town’s 
economic development, but also isolated it from the outside world. However, 
at this hidden and primitive spot, a group of workers from many more 
developed cities on the east coast labored in a modern factory. This is the 
Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory (hereafter referred to as “Jinjiang 
Factory”), the field site of this study.  
 
In fact, Jinjiang Factory is not the only example of this strange template. 
Similar factories and workers can be found in the remote areas of almost all 
the southwestern and northwestern provinces of China (see Figure 1). These 
factories are called “the Third Line enterprises”, and the workers are called 
“the Third Line Workers”. They are products of an immense but secret 
industrial project that began in the 1960s and ended in the 1980s. In the 
context of China’s history, it is called the Third Line Construction1. 
                                                             
1The First Line refers to the border land and the coastal area, the Second Line is the area 
between the First Line and the Third Line. The Big Third Line refers to the investment and 
construction in the central and western provinces, while the Small Third Line refers to the 
investment and construction in the central and western areas within the provinces of the First 
and the Second Line. See Li Caihua and Jiang Dayun 2005, “Woguo dasanxian jianshe de lishi 
jingyan he jiaoxun” (The Lessons of the Big Third Line Construction), Journal of Northeast 
University 216, no.4, pp. 88; Meng Tao 2013, “Kongjian bianhua, jiegou tiaozheng yu sanxian 
qiye de jiqun chuangxin” (The Spatial Change, Structural Adjustment and the Cluster 
Innovation of Enterprises in the Third Line Areas), Gaige (Reform), no. 1, pp. 35-40. 
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In the 1960s, China’s security was facing two potential threats. 
Internationally, China was not on good terms with either of the two 
superpowers. Domestically, the country’s industrial capacity and population 
were overwhelmingly concentrated in the east coast area. In order to maintain 
its industrial production in the event of war, the central government believed it 
was essential to establish an alternative industrial base in western China. Out 
of this concern for security, from the early 1960s to the late 1970s numerous 
factories and workers were transferred from cities on the east coast and the old 
northeast industrial base, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Shenyang, to 
the desolate interior. By the early 1980s, in the area of the Third Line 
Construction, more than 1,100 industrial projects had been completed,2 about 
                                                             
2See Yuan Guofeng, 2003, “Sanxian jianshe tiaozheng gaizao jinru shouwei” (The adjustment 
 3 
29,000 enterprises established3 and nearly 4 million workers were transferred4. 
The industries were mostly related to the military. Mao stipulated that the 
construction of Third Line factories should follow the principle of “by the side 
of mountains, dispersion and being caved” (靠山，分散，进洞). Hence, these 
factories and workers were covertly scattered in remote villages or mountain 
areas, isolated from the outside world. The Jinjiang Factory is just one of these 
secretly transferred factories. 
 
The Third Line factories and their workers have received scant treatment 
in the existing literature on Chinese labor politics5. Compared to the numerous 
and matured studies on urban SOEs in Mao’s era and after, studies on the 
                                                                                                                                                               
and reorganization of the Third Line industries are almost done), Renmin ribao (People’s 
daily), December, 04, p. 6; Also see Meng 2013, p. 35 
 
3See Linxi and Jiyin 1987, “Yigejuda de jingjiwutai” (A big economic stage), Renminribao 
(People’s Daily), May, 24, p.1. 
 
4Liu Yanxun, 2012, “Sanxianren de qingchun yu munian” (The youth and agedness of the 
sanxian people), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China Newsweek), April, 23, p. 66-69. 
 
5 The relevant works in English are Naughton, Barry, 1988, “The Third Front: Defence 
Industrialization in the Chinese Interior”, The China Quarterly, No. 115: p.377-380; 
Chan, C.K. Roger, 1996, “Industrial Development of the Third Line Region: An 
Evaluation”. In Roger C.K. Chan et al. (ed.), China’s Regional Economic Development, 
Hongkong: Hongkong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of 
Hongkong Research Monograph No. 30; Mel Gurtov, 1993, “Swords into Market Shares: 
China’s Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production”, The China Quarterly, 
No. 134: p. 213-241; Bachman, David. 2001, “Defence Industrialization in Guangdong”, 
The China Quarterly, No. 166: p. 273-304; Chris Bramall, Chinese Economic 
Development, London and New York: Routledge, 2009. In Chinese, the most important 
are Li Caihua and Jiang Dayun, 2005, “Woguo dasanxian jianshe de lishi jingyan he jiaoxun” 
(The Lessons of the Big Third Line Construction), Dongbei shifan daxue xuebao (Journal of 
Northeast Normal University) No.4: p.85-91.Chen Donglin, 1997, “Cong ‘chi chuan yong 
jihua” dao ‘zhanbei jihua’” (“From an eat, wear, use plan to a ‘prepare for war plan’’”) 
Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu (Research on Contemporary Chinese History) No.2: p. 65-75; 
Dong Baoxun, 2001,  “Yingxiang sanxian jianshe juece xiangguan yinsu de lishi touxi” (“A 
historical analysis of the origin of the Third Line”) Shandong Daxue xuebao (The Journal of 
Shandong University) No.1, p. 89-93. None of these deals with labor issues.  
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Third Line Construction mainly focus on its scale, influence and historical 
significance to Chinese industrial development, while few have paid attention 
to its workplace politics and sociology.   The confidentiality of the Third Line 
Construction and its remote locations may have deterred researchers. 
Published information on Third Line enterprises is scant and there are few 
archival sources. In addition, many of the factories closed in the 1990s. A 
recent development that helped the author to investigate this subject is a 
resurgence of interest among retired former workers in Third Line enterprises. 
Former participants in the Third Line are now composing memoirs, forming 
online communities, and holding events related to their history. In these 
activities the author discovered a pathway to investigate this under-studied 
topic. Drawing on untapped primary sources, this study addresses the gap in 
our understanding of Third Line enterprises. In particular, this thesis asks the 
following question: what sort of industrial relations could be found in the 
Third Line Enterprises?   
 
One important lesson introduced by the existing literature on urban SOEs 
is that even in these work units informal social ties outside the unit could 
shape management practices 6 . Geographic isolation in the Third Line 
                                                             
6  See for example, Lee, Ching Kwan 1999. “From Organized Dependence to Disorganized 
Despotism: Changing Labor Regimes in Chinese Factories”, The China Quarterly, Volume 
57, March, p. 44-71; Gallagher, Mary Elizabeth, 2005, Contagious Capitalism: 
Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press; Cai, Yongshun, 2006, State and Laid-Off Workers in Reform China: The 
Silent and Collective Action of the Retrenched. London: Routledge. 
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enterprises made the situation different – there were no pre-existing social 
relationships among workers and the social context. Under such unique 
circumstances, did managers have a freer hand in enforcing discipline due to 
the factory’s isolation? Through an in-depth analysis of a typical Third Line 
enterprise, the Jinjiang Factory, I will show that geographic isolation did not 
actually lead to a stricter and harsher management. In contrast, it encouraged 
the creation of densely interconnected social networks within the factory. 
These networks promoted workers’ control over the production process. As a 
result, isolation encouraged group managers to adapt by tolerating rule-
breaking behavior, such as absenteeism. 
 
In the analysis of industrial relations, this study mainly focuses on the 
level of group leaders. In Chinese factories, group leaders or supervisors are 
grassroots managers, who directly interact with workers on a daily basis. This 
unique position in the organizational hierarchy requires them to constantly 
juggle frequently conflicting demands of their upper managers and their 
member workers. Ideally, and according to the policies, group leaders should 
respond to the needs of their workers as a homogeneous group; in practice, 
they had to develop techniques to respond to the workers as heterogeneous 
individuals. To cope with these controversies, they make personal decisions, 
establish routines and invent tactics. All of these decisions and inventions 
eventually set the context and create informal policies for workers to follow. 
 6 
In short, group leaders are not merely passive policy implementers, but active 
policy makers and re-makers. Therefore, without detailed knowledge of the 
actual managerial behavior of group leaders, we can hardly understand what is 
really happening in the production line. 
 
        Because of this study’s specific focus on worker-leader relations in the 
factory, there is no attempt to offer a full history of the Third Line Enterprises 
from the 1960s to the 1990s. Instead, the study attempts to shed light on the 
Third Line workers’ lives during a particular period from the mid 1970s to the 
1980s. This period marks the peak of operation for many Third Line 
enterprises. In response to the perceived rising US threat, the planning of the 
Third Line Construction had emerged as early as in the mid 1960s. However, 
this construction was not widely implemented until the 1969-1971 period, 
when the threat from the USSR was seemingly more and more urgent. As a 
result, the vast majority of the Third Line Enterprises were established in the 
early 1970s. In the 1990s, as market-oriented enterprise reforms started, the 
Third Line Enterprises faced two different fates. Many of them went bankrupt 
and disappeared. Those that survived were relocated into nearby cities and 
gradually transformed into normal urban state-owned enterprises. The reforms 
of the 1990s put an end to the Third Line enterprises as a unique form of 
workplace. Therefore, the onset of reform in the 1990s provides a natural 
endpoint for this study.  
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        Although the Third Line enterprises lasted for only about twenty years, 
they had tremendous significance for Chinese industry development and 
urbanization. Taking this unique group of factories as the research subject, this 
study makes contributions in three aspects. First, based on several interviews 
and fieldwork in a Third Line enterprise, this study provides analysis of first-
hand materials on the Third Line workers who have long been unknown to, or 
maybe forgotten by, society, officials and scholars. Second, with these 
valuable materials, this study for the first time systematically documents the 
daily life and working relations in the once confidential Third Line enterprises. 
Third, by knowing the Third Line workers’ lives, this study draws attention to 
the varieties of industrial relations in pre-reform China. In a word, as an 
immense industrial project related to millions of Chinese in Mao’s era, the 
Third Line enterprises and their workers have been missing from the existing 
literature, and the significance of this study is to fill this gap. 
 
To sum up, this is a study on industrial relations in a Third Line enterprise 
with special focus on the level of group leaders’ management. It is grounded in 
observations and interviews with workers and managers of Jinjiang Factory in 
Sichuan Province. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next 
section, I review two modes of managerial control in SOEs from the mid 
1970s to the 1980s argued by previous studies. The second section explains 
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the emergence of the tolerating strategy in Jinjiang Factory. Taking the group 
leaders’ management of workers’ absences as an example, the third section 
shows how the tolerating strategy manifested itself in practice. The fourth 
section is a discussion of the methodology for the fieldwork. 
1.1 Managerial Control in SOEs from the mid 1970s to the 1980s 
Over the period from the mid-1970s to the 1980s, two modes of control in 
Chinese SOEs have been identified. Neo-traditionalism is arguably the only 
method of labor control prior to 1978, while “disorganized despotism” took 
shape in the 1980s. Do these models apply to the Third Line factories? In this 
section, I will show that due to the unique social structure in a Third Line 
factory, these modes of control are not applicable to the Third Line enterprises. 
In addition, these modes suffer from one reductive problem: the interest of 
grassroots managers is assumed to fully overlap with their upper managers’. 
As a result, the contextual differences and the analytical limitation make the 
previous studies ineffective in understanding the workplace order of the Third 
Line enterprises. It is worth noting that the point here is not to challenge or 
replace the conventional wisdom. Instead, it is to highlight the diversity of 
forms of management-labor relations in China until the early reform era. 
Neo-traditionalism: Managerial Control Before 1978 
In the analysis of Chinese industrial relations prior to 1978, the significance of 
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the work unit system has attracted many scholars’ attention. Through their 
observations in industrial, medical and technical units, 7  these scholars 
independently come to a similar conclusion that the work unit in China “is not 
merely a type of workplace, but a long-standing and multifaceted institution 
that has served many purposes for the regime.”8  
 
    By far, the most influential study on Chinese work unit politics, however, is 
Andrew Walder’s seminal work Communist Neo-Traditionalism. In this book, 
Walder provides a comprehensive analytical framework to study authority in 
Chinese industry and argues that authority relations in contemporary Chinese 
industry are neo-traditional9. Specifically, in Chinese enterprises, the workers 
are no longer dependent on the foremen but the enterprises and the party-state. 
Neo-traditionalism can therefore be seen as a new form of dependence present 
in modern economic organizations. This new pattern of industrial relations, as 
Walder argues, has two institutional features. The first is the “organized 
dependence”, 10  which consists of three sub-features. First, workers are 
                                                             
7 See for example, Yang, Mayfair, 1989, “Between the State and Society: the Construction of 
Corporateness in a Chinese Socialist Factory”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 22; 
Henderson, Gail E. and Myron S. Cohen, 1984, The Chinese Hospital: The Socialist Work 
Unit, New Haven: Yale University Press; Blecher, Marc J. and Gordon White, 1979, 
Micropolitics in Contemporary China: A Technical Unit During and After the Cultural 
Revolution, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
8 Lü, Xiaobo, and Elizabeth, J. Perry (eds.), 1997, Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace 
in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, p. 8. 
 
9 Walder, Andrew G. 1986, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese 
Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 2.  
 
10 This feature of Chinese SOEs prior to the marketization reform has been recognized by 
many other scholars studying the Chinese “danwei” system. See for example, Lu Feng, 1989. 
Danwei: A unique form of social organization, Chinese Social Science no.1, p. 71-88; Li, 
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assumed immobile and economically dependent on their enterprises; second, 
they are politically monopolized by the party and managed by the factory; and 
third, they are personally supervised by their immediate leaders with many 
conceivable needs and benefits.11Therefore, employment in the communist 
state enterprises does not reflect a market relationship, but rather the state’s 
political control over the workers.12 In these enterprises, the workers gain not 
only their livelihood, but also sociopolitical services and even social identities. 
 
This organized dependence sets up the institutional basis for the second 
feature of neo-traditionalism, the patron-client relationship in the workplace. 
This clientelist link is not widely established among workers, but between 
supervisors and a minority of workers labeled activists. With the help of these 
activist workers, the party is able to extend its control to the bottom of social 
order, and in return, these workers would receive preferential treatment from 
the management, such as greater job mobility, material benefits, and higher 
social status. 13  In practice, this patronage relationship rests on a very 
subjective and ambiguous evaluation of workers’ individual display 
(biaoxian). In the process of this evaluation, the political thinking, work 
                                                                                                                                                               
Hanlin 1993, “China’s Danwei Phenomenon and the Mechanisms of Conformity in Urban 
Communities”. Sociology Research no.5, p. 23-32; Lü, Xiaobo, and Elizabeth, J. Perry 1997; 
Frazier Mark W., The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution, and 
Labor Management, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
 
11 Walder, 1986, p. 13. 
 
12 Ibid, p. 16. 
 
13 Ibid, p. 246-247. 
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attitude, performance, and level of skill are the basic criteria used by workers 
to judge themselves and their co-workers. Based on these judgments, the 
group leader rates each worker’s individual result and reports the scores to his 
senior managers. Eventually, these scores become the workers’ evidence for 
rewards and punishments.  
 
At the heart of the two features is the Chinese workers’ intertwined 
personal and institutional dependencies; that is, the workers’ public loyalties to 
the party are mixed with their personal loyalties to the leader-patron. 14 
However, workers’ dependence on group leaders does not mean that the latter 
can willfully act without considering their members. This compromising role 
is determined by their unique intermediate positions. According to Walder, the 
group leaders are “political brokers in the fullest sense of the term”.15 In the 
workplace, they are not only the “feet” of the senior managers, relaying 
messages from above for their recognition, but also the “head” of the workers, 
yielding enough to their members’ wishes to gain their cooperation. Though 
the link between reward and work performance is indirect and flexible, Walder 
argues that, in order to gain workers’ cooperation, group leaders must ensure 
that non-work criteria do not obscure the linkage between performance and 
reward, and maintain the perception of fairness among members 16 . This 
                                                             
14 Walder, 1986, p. 247. 
 
15 Ibid, p. 103. 
 
16 Ibid, p. 112. 
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implies that, however differential the distribution of interests may be, 
perceived fairness in the group is necessary. However, in his later discussion, 
Walder focuses exclusively on the differentiating effect of the patron-client 
relationship, but remains silent on how the perceived fairness could be 
maintained. Ironically, a perceived unfairness is fully evident in his 
informant’s account:  
 
As an activist, you have to choose between supporting the party and 
the other workers. So there is no longer any trust or affection with 
the other workers…but the shop director would always support the 
activists and try to make them feel better. They call meetings to tell 
the workers to stop attacking and sabotaging the activists. (Informant 
no. 72)17 
 
This informant reveals the fact that workers are not only able to perceive 
the unfairness in the workplace, but also to tell the initiator of this unfairness. 
This raises a practical problem with the patronage-authority relationship. If the 
unfairness and its initiator can be identified, how can the group leaders 
motivate other members who are non-activists? This problem is even more 
pressing when the power of workers is taken into account. As many critiques 
have shown, the crucial limitation of Walder’s analysis is his ignorance of 
                                                             
17 Walder, 1986, p. 170. 
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workers’ strength. 18  In the communist state enterprises, permanent 
employment status has contradictory effects on the control of labor. On one 
hand, it firmly bonds the workers to their workplace; on the other, it provides 
them with influential bargaining power. Moreover, the workers can also 
employ their “weapons of the weak”, e.g. footdrag, sabotage, to resist the 
unwelcome policies19. In a word, the leaders are not as strong, and the workers 
are not as weak, as they are stereotypically portrayed. If so, how do group 
leaders appease the workers’ discontent? How will they deal with workers’ 
uncooperative misbehavior? These questions remain unanswered. 
 
In fact, compared to the urban SOEs, workers in the Third Line 
enterprises have more resources to counteract the management’s exercise of 
authority. The most influential of these is their densely interconnected social 
structure. Isolated from the outside, these industrial workers had to reconstruct 
their friendship circles and seek their marital partners among their colleagues. 
Overtime, workers become integrated by these intimate ties. Popular saying 
among workers such as “No news is news the next morning”, “One twig 
shakes and hundreds will follow” give a vivid description of the 
interconnectedness of relationships. Neo-traditionalism cannot therefore be 
                                                             
18 See for example,Womack, Brantly 1991, Transfigured Community: Neo-Traditionalism and 
Work Unit Socialism in China, The China Quarterly, Volume 126, June, p. 313-332; Zhou 
Xueguang 1999, Review on the Studies of Institutional Change of Chinese Organizations in 
Western Sociology (xifang shehuixue guanyu zhongguo zuzhi zhidu bianqian yanjiu 
zhuangkuang shuping), The Study of Sociology, (4): 26-43. 
 
19 Womack, 1991, p. 327. 
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applied to the Third Line enterprises, due to not only its theoretical limitations, 
but also the contextual differences.  
Disorganized Despotism: Managerial Control from 1978 to the 1980s 
In the 1980s, the Chinese government initiated a series of industrial reforms 
aiming to improve the factory’s performance. According to Lee Ching Kwan, 
these reforms have, like opening Pandora’s box, unleashed institutional and 
social forces that produce different factory regimes co-existing under the 
permissive banner of “market socialism”.20 Specifically, she argues that these 
reforms have eroded the institutional foundations for neo-traditionalism in the 
pre-reform days. As a result, organized dependence - the crucial institutional 
feature of neo-traditionalism - is replaced by the labor regime she calls 
“disorganized despotism”.  
 
    According to Lee, “disorganized” refers to a context in which the previously 
coherently organized state socialism begins to fall apart due to uncoordinated 
reform measures. In this context, the despotic regime takes shape and it bears 
three aspects of labor-management relations: labor’s institutional dependence 
on production work for a livelihood, the imposition of coercive methods of 
labor control, and workers’ collective apprehension of such control as being 
                                                             
20 Lee, Ching Kwan, 1999, “From Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: 
Changing Labor Regimes in Chinese Factories”, The China Quarterly, Volume 57, March, p. 
44-71: 44.  
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violations of their material interests and moral precepts.21 Under the regime of 
“disorganized despotism”, day-to-day productions on the shop floor are filled 
with an overtly coercive method of labor control, the infliction of economic 
penalties, the proliferation of conflicts and the demise of patron-clientelism22.  
 
    Lee’s argument is supported by Zhao and Nichols’ work. Based on 120 
interviews at three state cotton mills, Zhao and Nichols conclude that China’s 
industrial reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s have altered the relationship 
between party, trade union, workers, and managers at the enterprise level.23 In 
such a situation, workers are increasingly exploited by managers through a 
number of draconian practices such as longer working hours, increased quotas, 
and employing the full-load work method.24 In the words of the authors, 
some of these practices “bring to mind management techniques employed 
during the stage of capitalist primitive accumulation.”25      
 
    Based on observations in different SOEs, however, other scholars argue 
differently, and some of them even come to an opposite conclusion. Blecher26 
                                                             




23 Zhao, Minghua and Theo Nichols, 1996, “Management Control of Labor in State-Owned 
Enterprises: Cases From the Textile Industry”, The China Journal, No. 36, July, p. 1-21.  
 
24 Ibid.  
 
25 Ibid, p. 20 
 
26 Blecher, Marc, 1997, China Against the Tides: Restructuring through Revolution, 
Radicalism and Reform, London: Pinter.  
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presents a path dependent pattern of Chinese industrial relations in the 1980s. 
According to him, despite almost a decade of reform, the pre-existing work 
unit system has not yet been fundamentally overturned. In many longer-
established SOEs, managers continue to be affected by traditions formed 
during the Maoist period. They are not structurally induced to promote 
efficiency, productivity and profits; they sustain a genuine commitment to the 
welfare of the working class and avoid outbursts of radical worker militancy. 
As a result, workers continue to enjoy some de facto job security and social 
welfare benefits such as housing and health care. In a word, the industrial 
reforms of the 1980s have hardly penetrated the labor process in China’s 
SOEs.27  
 
    In stark contrast to the “disorganized despotism” argued by Lee, Walder28 in 
his later work points out that the unchanged situation in state enterprises, 
especially the good job security and a weak link between performance and 
compensation, even strengthens the workers’ bargaining power and influences 
the distributions of benefits in an egalitarian way. Gallagher29 adds that the 
development of a domestic private sectors with foreign investment provides 
workers, especially new entrants into the workforce, with more opportunities 
                                                             
27 Zhao and Nichols, 1997, p. 1. 
 
28 Walder, Andrew, 1987, “Wage Reform and the Web of Factory Interests”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 109, March, p. 22-41. 
 
29 Gallagher, Mary Elizabeth, 2005. 
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outside the state sectors. The expansion of non-state sectors in the reform 
period therefore further increases workers’ bargaining power over their 
managers.  
 
        Despite her denial of the existence of “disorganized despotism” in SOEs, 
Gallagher acknowledges that despotic management does exist in foreign- 
invested firms.30 Dorothy Solinger similarly points to an important difference 
in managerial control between SOEs and private foreign-invested firms. She 
argues that, in terms of worker welfare, state-owned firms continue to offer 
their workers major benefits, while foreign-owned enterprises represent a 
“throwback to the totally unregulated laissez-faire capitalism of the mid-
nineteenth century.”31  
 
        As shown above, the authors mentioned earlier find salient differences 
caused at least in part by the problem of case-selection bias. For example, 
Lee’s argument on “disorganized despotism” is based on her observations 
mainly in labor-intensive, non-strategic and non-state-monopoly sectors such 
as camera factories, textile mills and dyeing firms. The confirming evidence in 
Zhao and Nichols’ work is from a similar industry (three state cotton mills). In 
the large, strategic, capital-intensive and state monopoly sectors, however, the 
                                                             
30 Gallagher, 2005. 
 
31 Solinger, Dorothy, 1997, "The Danwei Confronts the Floating Population," in Lü, Xiaobo, 
and Elizabeth, J. Perry eds. Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and 
Comparative Perspective. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, p.195-222. 
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work unit system remains and disorganized despotism has not developed.32 
The different influences of the reform on a factory’s managerial control reveal 
a fact that the labor regime of the 1980s is diversified and closely related to 
the firm’s ownership and the industrial type to which it belongs. In terms of 
these two factors, the Third Line enterprises are typical state-owned 
enterprises out of strategic planning in a state monopoly sector. As a result, 
according to the logic of previous analyses, “disorganized despotism” cannot 
be properly applied to the Third Line enterprises.  
 
 
On the whole, due to the structural differences, neo-traditionalism and 
disorganized despotism are not applicable to the Third Line enterprises. 
Moreover, previous studies also have one reductive problem. In their analysis, 
the management is assumed to be uniform and well integrated, with the group 
leaders obedient to their upper level managers without any autonomy. 
Although, in discussion of the “broker” role of the group leaders, Walder has 
more or less identified the autonomy issue, he chooses to pursue a different 
path in his later discussion, for better or worse. In the analysis of neo-
traditionalism, the group leaders are merely regarded as the clients of their 
senior managers, controlling group workers by establishing new patron-client 
ties with the activists. Do these group leaders completely follow their bosses 
                                                             
32 Naughton, Barry, 1997,  “Danwei: The Economic Foundations of A Unique Institution” in 
Lü, Xiaobo, and Elizabeth, J. Perry 1997, eds. Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in 
Historical and Comparative Perspective. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
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in day-to-day production? If not, how do they find a balance between their 
bosses and their member workers? Walder’s framework is not intended to 
answer these questions.  
 
Fundamentally, this reductive problem is rooted in the assumption that 
the interest of group leaders fully overlaps with the interest of the 
organization. In Walder’s work, the ultimate goal of urban SOEs is the 
political control of workers. As for firms of disorganized despotism, their only 
aim is to come out top in the fierce market competition. However, these 
organizational goals are unlikely to be group leaders’ primary concerns. In 
fact, as the organizational goals are disaggregated and transmitted to various 
departments and groups, it is necessarily the case that the interests of the 
groups deviate from those of the organization. The clear-cut and strict 
regulations demarcating the boundaries of leaders’ responsibilities further 
encourage group leaders to prioritize their group interests, which now and then 
go against the interests of the organization as a whole. It is the existence of 
such local and departmental interests that give rise to the well-known 
“managerial dilemma”33. The interest of group leaders should therefore not be 
taken as exogenously given and defined by their top leaders. Rather, it is more 
plausibly seen as endogenous of the group leaders’ quotidian interactions with 
senior managers and the lower member workers. Simply put, it is defined by 
                                                             
33 Miller, J. Gary, 1992, Managerial Dilemmas: the Political Economy of Hierarchy, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
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the group leaders’ unique position in the organizational hierarchy of the 
factory. It is precisely from this position of power and the associated agency 
that group leaders gain their autonomy and develop their strategies and tactics 
in dealing with day-to-day production issues. As a result, without knowing 
how the group leaders – the only “managers” having immediate contacts with 
workers – maneuver their limited but influential power, it would be difficult to 
see the full picture of how day-to-day production issues are managed.  
 
The simplifying assumption reveals the dichotomous logic of the 
conventional wisdom on Chinese industrial relations. Under this logic, 
workers are regarded as either obedient or defiant, while managers are either 
oppressive or compromising. In nature, this dichotomous analytical framework 
does not go beyond the Marxist perspective that labor and capital owners are 
in conflict and their interests are hard to reconcile. A prerequisite for this 
perspective is the convergence of interest within both classes, which is 
predetermined by their material status in the production. However, as 
discussed above, the management is fragmented and each segment seeks their 
own interests through daily interactions. In this respect, the industrial 
relationship is more likely a mutually adaptive than a conflicting one. The case 
of the Jinjiang Factory shows that this adaptation is conditioned by the 
factory’s social structure and the workers’ control over production. The aim of 
such adaptation is to achieve a consensus that can guarantee the group’s 
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production and at the same time meet its members’ needs.  
 
The review of previous studies calls for a more contextualized and 
inductive-based analysis. What are the contextual features of the Third Line 
enterprises? Under these conditions, what agency do the group leaders have? I 
attempt to answer these questions in this study.  
1.2 Toleration: A Governing Strategy as A Result of Contextual Conditions  
Facing workers’ rule-breaking behaviors, such as taking a shower during 
working hours, being drunk at lunchtime, etc., group leaders of Jinjiang 
Factory did not usually punish them or report them to their senior managers. 
Instead, they were inclined to exhibit tolerance. Why did they do so? In this 
study, I argue that the group leaders’ toleration was an adaptive strategy 
cultivated by the factory’s densely interconnected social networks and the 
workers’ control on production lines in the isolated area. 
The Interconnected Social Networks in Jinjiang Factory  
Toleration was the group leaders’ choice primarily because workers in the 
Jinjiang Factory were interconnected through a series of close-knit 
relationships. The Jinjiang Factory was located in Danjing Mountains in the 
region of Chengdu, and covered 25.88 hectares. Bicycles and shuttle buses 
were the only modes of transportation linking the remote site to the outside 
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world. Living in this self-sufficient isolated site, workers had to seek their 
friends and marital partners within the factory. As a result, the workers were 
connected to each other in one way or another. However, it is worth noting 
that the construction of relationship did not occur randomly, but in a particular 
pattern deeply embedded in the social composition of the workforce. In the 
Jinjiang Factory, workers were divided into three different groups: those 
transferred from the east coastal cities or provinces (内迁职工), Returned 
Educated Youths (返城知青), and demobilized soldiers (退伍军人). With 
some exceptions, members of each group were more likely to seek their 
marital partners within that group.  
 
        If workers in the Jinjiang Factory were separated into three main groups, 
is it possible that the production group leader would be patrol his/her member 
workers of a different origin more assiduously? Such intergroup 
competitiveness was rare, although not totally absent. The reason is that the 
workers’ job niches in the factory were closely associated with their origins. 
For example, the demobilized soldiers occupied the Machining Workshop, 
while the transferred workers formed the overwhelming majority in the 
Instrument Workshop. In other words, workers and their production group 




        To sum up, the boundary among different groups of workers was 
perceived and further solidified through the constant day-to-day interaction, 
and different job niches in the factory. Eventually, these interwoven social 
relations to some extent informalized the formal relations and blurred the 
boundary between family and factory.  
Workers’ Control on Production in Jinjiang Factory  
Group leaders were inclined to give their toleration also due to workers’ 
weapons on the process of production. Fundamentally, these “weapons” were 
rooted in the workers’ permanent employment status and their lack of job 
mobility within the factory. As the case of the Jinjiang Factory shows, workers 
usually stayed in a particular job and seldom moved to another one. In an 
emergency, workers might be transferred to help out in different workshops. 
However, such transfers were temporary. Upon completion of the required 
production tasks, the assisting workers would go back to their original 
positions. It is also worth noting that the lack of internal mobility not only 
served the factory’s interest, but also was welcomed by workers. An obvious 
reason for this is that productivity grows with proficiency. More importantly, it 
enabled the workers to exert control over their pace of work. Greater 
experience in one position equipped workers with better knowledge of the 
work, such as the process of material distribution, the condition of tools and 
machines, the personality of relevant colleagues, and so on. To workers, 
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perhaps nothing is more valuable than this tacit knowledge of production.        
With such knowledge, they came up with three main methods to manipulate 
their time at work. First, they change the sequence of processing between 
different parts; second, they recalibrate their work quota between different 
tasks; third, they made use of the lack of coordination between activity or 
plans of different departments, workshops, working groups, and even 
individuals to manipulate their working time. Shielded by their permanent 
employment status, workers took advantage of these “weapons” to gain 
leverage over their dealings with supervisors. Aware of these workers 
“weapons”, supervisors were thus more willing to tolerate a certain level of 
workers’ rule-breaking behaviors.  
 
The foregoing discussion illustrates that toleration as a governing strategy 
should not be understood through a simple dichotomous framework, in which 
toleration is simply regarded as a compromise of supervisors confronted by 
powerful workers. The story of Jinjiang Factory shows that the toleration was 
due not only to powerlessness but also to personal emotion. Embedded in the 
widening informal social circles, the group leaders seemed reluctant to enforce 
the formal rules strictly. The toleration was therefore more of an 
accommodation/adaptation than a compromise to a specific social context of 
Jinjiang Factory.  
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1.3 Toleration in Practice: the Governance of Absenteeism as An Example 
How did toleration manifest itself in daily management? In this section, I 
show that as a governing strategy, toleration was not a simple attitude. Rather, 
it referred to a systematic management means. In order to better illustrate the 
tolerating strategy practiced in Jinjiang Factory, I take the group leaders’ 
management of workers’ absence as an example. In this example, the 
tolerating strategy was implemented based on the following three building 
blocks: the reinterpretation of workers’ absence, the exchange among multiple 
actors and the tactics sustaining the exchange.  
The Reinterpretation of Workers’ Absence 
Usually, absence refers to a state of being away from duty without the 
factory’s permission. In this sense, absence is rule-breaking behavior that 
should be avoided as much as possible. In Jinjiang Factory, however, workers’ 
absences were reinterpreted and justified as an understandable individual 
exceptional circumstance. Since every worker had his or her share of 
exceptional circumstances, there should be no distinction between individuals 
and all should be treated equally. On the basis of this understanding, group 
leaders maintained their production through coordinating a give-and-take 
exchange between the absent worker and the other member colleagues. 
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The Exchange among Multiple Actors 
The simplest exchange involves three parties at the same time, the absent 
worker, the other colleagues in the group, and the group leader. Among them, 
the absent worker is the “taker”, benefiting from the group leader’s tolerance 
and his colleagues’ assistance, while the colleague worker is the “donor”, 
giving his/her help to the absent worker and the group leader. Therefore, in 
this exchange, the group leader is a coordinator, acting as both a taker and 
donor. As a similar circumstance happens to the relief worker next time, the 
give-and-take relations will be reversed. This simplest exchange equilibrium is 
illustrated in Figure 3, in which “” denotes “gives to”.  
 







Note: In the exchange identified by the solid arrows, B is the absent worker 
and A is the donor of assistance, while in the exchange identified by the dotted 
arrows, the give-and-take relationships are reversed. “G” refers to the group 
leader. 
 
The simplest form of the exchange is a typical reciprocal relationship in 
G 
A B A 
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which the favor is returned to the same person who gives the help 34 . In 
practice, however, this typical reciprocal exchange does not usually happen. 
Instead, it often occurs in two more complicated ways. First, in the words of 
Ekeh, it is the “chain generalized exchange”. This form of exchange operates 
as follows: given five members (A, B, C, D, and E), ABCDEA, 
where “” denotes “gives to”35. In this exchange, each member will give 
his/her assistance to others. Even though he/she may not be able to receive 
help from the taker directly, he/she will certainly be repaid by others. Second, 
it is the “individual-focused net generalized exchange”, which can be notated 
as follows: ABCDE; ABCED; ABDEC; ACDEB; and BDCEA36. 
In this exchange, the donor is not a single person, but a collection of 
individuals. In the Jinjiang Factory, a typical example is the assistance given to 
demobilized soldiers for their farming work. Since most demobilized soldiers 
are also farmers in nearby counties, they have to go back home every spring 
and autumn for planting and harvest. To deal with their long-term absences, 
the group leaders usually motivate other member workers to provide help. 
Given that the demobilized soldiers account for almost one third of the 
workforce, this is a common exchange in the Jinjiang Factory. 
                                                             
34Wasserman, Stanley, and Katherine Faust. 1994. Social Network Analysis: Methods and 
Applications (Structual Analysis in the Social Sciences), ed. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
35Ekeh, Peter P., 1974, Social Exchange Theory: The Two Traditions. London: Heinemann 






Of course, this managerial control cannot operate with group leaders’ oral 
and spiritual support alone. They seek to accumulate two most crucial 
resources, money and time. This is done through the development of a set of 
tactics in day-to-day production.  
The Tactics for Time and Money37 
In order to carry out the exchange among members, group leaders need two 
resources in hand. For one thing, they must have enough “extra time” to be 
allocated to the absent workers for them to deal with the “exceptional 
circumstance”; for another, they also need some “extra money” to compensate 
the donors for their potential loss. In Jinjiang Factory, the group leaders seek 
to expand their allocable time in three ways: to selectively parcel out jobs to 
member workers; to cheat the attendance record and to exploit “the time of 
waiting for jobs”. To balance the economic interest among workers and 
compensate for their potential losses, they also invented three tactics. First, 
they build up the group private coffer; second, they initiate the trading of 
                                                             
37 These tactics suggest that the slack resource is necessary for exchange. Indeed, many 
scholars have already studied this phenomenon. However, the purpose here is not to show the 
author’s originality on this phenomenon, but to present that in what forms this phenomenon 
existed in the Third Line enterprises. More importantly, this is an indispensable content in this 
study illustrating how the tripartite exchange could be sustained. As for studies relevant to the 
role of slack resource in the Chinese factory’s management, see for example Lin, Kun-Chin, 
2011, “Enterprise Reform and Wage Movements in Chinese Oil Fields and Refineries”, in 
Kuruvilla and etc. (ed.), From Iron Rice Bowl to Informalization: Markets, Workers, and the 
State in a Changing China, Ithaca and London: ILR Press, p. 83-106, especially p. 86-87; 
Walder, 1987, especially p. 31-33. For the role of slack resource in other countries, see for 
example Lupton, Tom 1963, On the Shopfloor: Two Studies of Workshop Organization and 
Output, Oxford: Pergamon Press; Pravda, Alex 1979, Spontaneous Workers’ Activities in the 
Soviet Union, in Kahan, Arcadius and Blair A. Rubles, ed. Industrial Labor in the USSR. New 
York: Pergamon, p. 333-66.     
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working hours between the absent worker and the donor; and third, they adjust 
the time quota between different jobs. All these tactics are illegal under the 
factory’s formal regulations because they prevent the factory from making full 
use of its workforce. However, they provide the supervisors a great deal of 
help in solidifying their members and completing their tasks. The factory and 
workshop managers, therefore, are in a dilemma because despite the vicious 
effects of these tactics, they have to admit the necessity of their existence. As a 
result, the factory management was always equivocal about these informal 
tactics.  
 
The example of absence management reveals that the tolerating strategy 
implicitly indicated an egalitarian culture in the Third Line enterprises. This 
egalitarianism does not come from nowhere; it is deeply rooted in the 
enterprise social context.   
 
Despite the fact that the equity issue had appeared repeatedly in the 
official and factory managers’ discourse, it was not a precept in daily 
governance in the mid-1970s. According to Walder’s neo-traditionalism38, in 
Chinese workplaces prior to the reform era, workers were basically divided 
into activists and non-activists. The activists, as the clients of their group 
leaders, usually enjoyed preferential treatment and benefits more than their 
                                                             
38 Walder, 1986.  
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member colleagues. In the 1980s, as a series of market-oriented reforms began 
in Chinese SOEs, the activists’ advantageous position declined. 39  An 
unintended consequence of the reform was the rise of egalitarianism on the 
shop floor. As Walder reveals in his later work, shop directors and group 
leaders paid out bonuses relatively equally, rotated the high bonuses to 
different workers each month, and either neglected to set realistic individual 
quotas, or ignored them at bonus time.40  
 
To some extent, the shift of the factory’s distribution scheme is a result of 
the increase of workers’ bargaining power. In the-mid 1970s, the party 
organization played an important role in controlling workers. The inspectorial 
role of activists and the politicized reward system are recognized as the core 
mechanisms of party discipline41. As a result, the workforce during this period 
was dependent on the management, and an income differential is found 
between activists and non-activists. In the early 1980s, the reform to “expand 
enterprise autonomy” released managers and workers from the tight 
restrictions of the previous system of central planning and party supervision42. 
Still unable to freely dismiss individual workers or to reduce unilaterally the 
                                                             
39 Walder, Andrew, 1991, “Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political 
Crisis of 1989”, The China Quarterly, Volume 127, September, p. 467-492. 
 
40 Walder, 1987. 
 
41 Walder, 1986. 
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size of their labor force by laying off workers, managers over this period had 
to keep differences in bonuses to a minimum to win the cooperation and 
consent of labor43. In the words of Gallagher, it was “a new dependence of 
managers on their workforce.”44  
 
In view of the previous analysis, the egalitarian governing strategy in the 
Third Line enterprises can also be seen as a result of powerful workers. As 
mentioned above, the interconnected informal relations in the factory reduced 
the influence of the formal regulations; the workers’ control on production 
provided them with diverse ways to express their discontent. As a result, the 
group leaders in Jinjiang Factory treated their member workers’ exceptional 
circumstances in an unexceptional way.   
1.4 Methodology  
The empirical evidence for this study comes mainly from in-depth interviews 
with former workers of Jinjiang Factory. My fieldwork was undertaken 
between mid-March and mid-July 2013. In December 2013 and January 2015, 
I conducted two rounds of follow-up interviews in Shanghai and Chengdu. 
Overall, I gathered information from 55 informants, consisting of 42 former 
workers of Jinjiang Factory, three officials and ten scholars studying similar 
                                                             
43 Walder, 1987.  
 
44 Gallagher, 2005, p. 75. 
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topics. This section details the whole process of my fieldwork in four 
subsections. The first introduces how I gained access to the hidden Third Line 
workers. The second subsection deals with the issue how informants were 
selected. The diverse profile of the subject pool ensures a degree of external 
validity. The third subsection describes how the interviews were conducted 
and the methods employed to reduce the informants’ scope for giving self-
serving answers. The last subsection provides a brief introduction to the 
supplementary sources of data, which includes local chronicles, factory 
documents, factory chronicle, personal memoirs, working diaries, and 
conference minutes.  
Gaining Access to the Third Liners 
To obtain first-hand information on the internal dynamics of Third Line 
enterprises, the best way is to have direct access to such an enterprise and talk 
to its workers. Unfortunately, since anything related to the Third Line 
Construction used to be a top-level national secret, little information has been 
released and openly discussed through official channels. Even today, these 
enterprises remain unknown to most Chinese people. The mystery of the Third 
Line enterprises challenged this study from the very beginning. As a first 
attempt, I typed “三线企业” (Third Line enterprises) and “三线工人” (Third 
Line workers) into Baidu, the most popular Chinese search engine, in hope of 
finding some clues about these mysterious and probably forgotten people. As I 
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carefully scrolled down the webpage and filtered through the useless search 
results, a link named by “锦江厂人吧 (“Post Bar of Workers of Jinjiang 
Factory)” suddenly caught my eye.45 I was exhilarated at this good luck, but 
little did I know at that time that this factory would become the center of my 
life in subsequent months.  
Selecting Informants 
Since the subjects of this study were difficult to locate, snowball sampling was 
the most practical method of recruiting informants. I contacted a small number 
of initial informants through the abovementioned “Post Bar of Workers of 
Jinjiang Factory”. Before I left Singapore, I posted a message headed “A 
Student Asking for Help from Workers of Jinjiang Factory.” This message 
contained my biography, the aim of my study and my contact details. It did not 
take me long to get in touch with two workers who expressed their willingness 
to offer help. Although many other respondents did not promise any direct 
help, they invariably recommended a name, Ni Tongzheng. Before I had a 
chance to email him, Mr. Ni contacted me and asked a series of detailed 
questions about my citizenship and educational background, and the topic, 
aims, and outline of my study. After making sure that I was not a foreign spy 
intending to probe the former national secret, he accepted my request and 
agreed to help. 
                                                             




When I arrived in Chengdu, Mr. Ni was waiting for me at the railway 
station. We transferred at the Wukuaishi Bus Interchange to a bus bound for 
Pengzhou, the county-level city where Jinjiang Factory is located. After 
travelling for an hour by bus and another 15 minutes by taxi, we arrived at Mr. 
Ni’s home. He generously expressed his willingness to provide me with 
accommodation for the following days. The chance to eat and live with 
research subjects is undoubtedly valuable and helpful to any ethnographer. 
From a casual talk over lunch, I learned that Mr. Ni was a transferred worker 
from Shanghai. He used to teach at the factory’s technical school, and people 
therefore usually called him Ni Laoshi (“teacher Ni”). This form of address 
did not change even after he took up another post as Director of the factory’s 
General Office. In 1997, he took early retirement. Six years later, Jinjiang 
Factory went bankrupt. In memory of their beloved factory and the workers’ 
dramatic yet little-known experiences, Mr. Ni motivated as many of his 
colleagues as possible to write their personal memoirs. By the end of 2013, 
Mr. Ni and his colleagues had completed three volumes of memoirs containing 
more than one million words, and an album of more than 1,600 photos.     
 
It is Mr. Ni’s rallying capacity and his extensive and effective personal 
networks that make him the best person to serve as the key initial informant. 
With his great help, I was able to enlarge and diversify the sample of 
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informants. First, my informants had all held leadership positions at various 
levels. The bulk of the 42 informants working in Jinjiang Factory were 
production workers (14) and work group leaders (12). Meanwhile, I was also 
able to interview workshop and factory leaders. Table 1 reports the number of 
informants holding various positions. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Informants in Different Positions  
Position Number 
Factory Management 7 
Workshop Director/Party Branch 
Secretary 
5 
Section Chief 4 
Group Leader 12 
Production Worker 14 
Total 42 
Note: The “Factory management” includes two vice factory directors, four 
directors and vice directors of the factory general office, and one member of 
staff in the department of quality control.    
 
Second, my informants were also diversified in terms of their personal 
backgrounds. Eighteen were transferred workers, accounting for the largest 
proportion of informants. Of the rest, 12 were Returned Educated Youth, eight 
were demobilized soldiers and four belonged to none of these three groups. 
Third, my informants worked at a wide range of departments. Though the 
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majority worked in workshops, I did manage to interview some workers who 
worked in the transportation and quality control department (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Informants in Different Departments 
Department Number 
Machinery Workshop 13 
Heat Treatment Workshop 6 
Instrument Workshop 5 
Matching Parts Workshop  10 
Quality Control Department  1 
General Office 4 
Factory Directorship 2 
Truck Convoy 1 
Total 42 
 
In addition, the interviews also included a handful of officials and 
scholars. In December 2013, I had a chance to interview three government 
officials who had participated in the Third Line Construction. Even though 
they were not able to provide any specific knowledge on workshop 
production, their personal experiences contributed considerably to my 
understanding of the broader background to this national project. I also 
conducted some informal interviews with scholars who shared my research 
interest. Among the ten scholar informants, two focused on the 
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macroindustrial policy and the other eight, like me, studied the micropolitics 
within factories in Chongqing, Guizhou, and Yunnan. By exchanging our 
observations in different regions, I had greater confidence in the 
generalizability of the case under study. I obtained access to these officials and 
scholars via two channels. First, I searched for them online and exchanged 
emails with them. Second, when I participated as a presenter at “The Second 
Annual Conference on the Third Line Study” held at Shanghai University in 
December 2013, I met and talked to a few officials and scholars in person. 
The Interviews 
During my fieldwork in Pengzhou and Shanghai, Mr. Ni was not only my 
invaluable initial informant, but also my indispensable research assistant. He 
made initial telephone contact with every intended informant, took me to the 
interview venue and warmly introduced me to his colleagues. In almost every 
interview, he sat to one side taking notes with me and, at the same time, 
frequently intervened to interpret some tricky dialects – and, from time to 
time, refilled everyone’s tea.  
 
Almost every formal interview had to start with a clarification about me, 
not just an introduction. Although Mr. Ni had already introduced me to the 
informants and explained the main focus of my research over the phone, the 
interviewees were still very curious as to why a young man would bother to 
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come to a remote area to study an event that had occurred decades before. This 
usually led to a discussion of my family life, my research and career 
motivations, and how I got involved in this topic in the first place. No matter 
what they asked about me, I spared no effort in explaining things to their 
satisfaction. My open attitude and sincere disposition were crucial in building 
an excellent rapport and trust between us. I also explained to them that the 
interviews would be completely confidential and that I would not record their 
voices using any electronic devices. When these invited interviewees were 
satisfied with my accounts they gave their consent to the interview, and I 
moved on to the specific questions.  
 
The interviews were not based on fixed questionnaires but were semi-
structured sessions. Walder once said that “informants unfailingly illuminated 
additional, sometimes quite unexpected, dimensions of factory life, and this 
meant that new questions inevitably arose in the course of an interview.”46 The 
same thing happened in the course of my interviews. As a result, as time 
passed, my interview questions evolved a lot and became more and more 
comprehensive and targeted. Basically, I divided my questions into four broad 
sections corresponding to four topics. The first was the interviewee’s personal 
career history, which referred to the type of work, pay levels, why and how 
they joined the Third Line enterprises, etc. The second section comprised 
                                                             
46Walder, 1986, Appendix A, pp. 263–4.  
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questions on their daily life outside the workshops. In this section, 
interviewees were asked to recall how they spent their leisure time, how they 
made friends and got married, and how they made their living in such an 
isolated area. The third section mainly concerned workers’ lives in the 
workshops. I enquired about their routine process of production, relations with 
colleagues and leaders, how they speeded up or slowed down the pace of 
work, how they dealt with inspection by senior management, how bonuses and 
honors were distributed in the group, and so on. This was usually the largest 
section. The final section contained questions on connections with the outside 
world. For example, how often did they go to the nearest village market? 
Under what conditions were they allowed to go back home? Could they find 
their marital partner in the nearest village or not? Did they recruit any 
temporary farmer workers?  
 
In practice, however, the informants’ accounts often did not flow 
smoothly, which made it impossible to structure the interview sequentially in 
terms of the four sections. Therefore, as I noted their answers, I also marked 
the missed questions or topics and brought them up in an appropriate stage. 
Many times, the informants were so talkative and flexible that they led the 
conversation in irrelevant directions. However, unlike many other interviewers 
who would, perhaps, immediately steer the conversation back to the original 
topic, I just let the informants go on. Sometimes I even joined these seemingly 
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irrelevant discussions until they finished the digression themselves. I did this 
for two reasons. First, I did not want to make them feel offended by forcing 
them to stop a topic they were highly interested in. Second, the irrelevant 
topics sometimes brought about surprises. The informants’ memory was like 
an unexploited mine. It is hard to predict when and where we can find our 
treasures. Every time a new piece of information was brought to light, I would 
keep probing until it was fully extracted. This is why it always took me four to 
five hours to conduct an interview.  
 
A common problem faced by fieldworkers is how to know whether 
informants are telling the truth.47 It is believed that informants always give 
self-serving interpretations of events and practices.48 As a result, the credibility 
and reliability of the interview are compromised. In order to lessen this 
problem, “triangulation” is usually recommended. The basic premise of 
triangulation is that one can be more confident about a result if it can be 
verified across two or more sources or methods. To employ this method in 
field research, “the most important [thing] is the ability to interview many 
people about the same event or institution.”49 As discussed above, the key 
informants came from the same factory and lived in the same place; therefore, 
                                                             
47 Dean, John P., and William F. Whyte, 1969, “How do you know if the informants is telling 
the truth?” In McCall, g. and J.L. Simmons (eds.), Issues in Participant Observation, pp. 105–
14.  
 
48 Van Maanen, John, 1983, “The fact of fiction in organizational ethnography” In Qualitative 
Methodology, , pp. 37–55.  
 
49 Walder, 1986, Appendix A, p. 256. 
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the triangulation can be readily employed in this study. Generally speaking, 
this study uses triangulation in three ways: first, to compare the responses of 
different informants to the same event and topic; second, to compare the 
responses of the same informants in the first and subsequent rounds of 
interviews; and third, to compare the responses of informants with conference 
notes, working diaries, and completed personal memoirs. 
Other Sources of Data 
In addition to the interviews, this study also relies on the following 
supplementary sources to substantiate the argument.  
 
First, the Local Chronicles of Sichuan and Chengdu, especially the 
volume on the machinery industry, provided me with tremendous information 
on the history of the Third Line Construction in this region. They were 
borrowed and read in the National Library of China in Beijing. Second, 
factory documents were collected from the abandoned workshops and the 
Office of Retirement Services (退休管理站), the only remaining organization 
of Jinjiang Factory, which is responsible for basic civilian services for the 
retired workers. These documents contain a lot of information on the daily 
operation of the factory and the workshops. Third, the Factory Chronicle – 
received from Mr. Ni – introduced me to the whole history of Jinjiang Factory, 
which included much valuable information on the factory’s organization, 
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workforce profile, key products, etc. Fourth, Mr. Ni also gave me the three 
volumes of memoirs, which considerably enriched my knowledge of the 
workers’ daily life. Fifth, some workers also generously donated their 
conference minutes and working diaries to support my study. These precious 
manuscripts record many of their life fabrics from the late 1970s to the mid-
1990s, although not in great detail. Events are recorded in point form rather 
than narrative. Although these documents cannot provide any detailed 
information about a particular event, they are nevertheless useful for other 
purposes. For example, the meeting minutes and diaries allowed me to 
calculate how often a particular issue was raised. If one issue repeatedly 
appeared in the factory’s conference minutes, this is a clear indication that it 
was not a trivial one that could be ignored in the factory. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 briefly introduces the 
background to the Third Line Construction and Jinjiang Factory in comparison 
with seven other key construction projects of the Chengdu machinery industry. 
Chapter 3 demonstrates the isolated situation of Jinjiang Factory. Specifically, 
the Third Line enterprises are like “isolated islands” hidden in mountainous 
areas. Living and working in a high degree of isolation, the workers are 
dependent on the factory not only for acquiring the basic economic, political 
and social necessities, but also for constructing day-to-day social networks 
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(friendship and marriage) through the multifarious daily entertainment 
activities and a series of reciprocal interactions. Chapters 4 and 5 further 
explain why the group leaders do not strictly enact the regulation and are more 
likely to tolerate the workers’ rule-breaking behaviors. I argue that the 
toleration is due to the factory’s interconnected social structure (chapter 4) and 
the workers’ control over the production (chapter 5). Taking the control of 
absenteeism as an example, Chapter 6 and 7 present how the group leaders’ 
toleration manifests in day-to-day practice. Chapter 6 shows the phenomenon 
of absenteeism in Jinjiang Factory. Chapter 7 presents how the toleration, as a 
strategy of controlling, operates in governing absenteeism. Chapter 8 
concludes with a summary of the findings and a brief reflection on two themes 
widely discussed in the existing literature, namely the varieties of industrial 
authority and relations between the organized dependency and the workers’ 





Chapter 2 The Third Line Construction and Jinjiang Factory 
2.1 The Third Line Construction 
From the early 1960s to the late 1970s,50 a large-scale migration occurred in 
mainland China, as a result not of the Cultural Revolution but a massive 
program of investment in the region of central and western China, which is 
known as “the Third Line” (三线).51 Figure 1 shows in detail the area of the 
Big Third Line Construction, which ranges from the east of Wushao Mountain 
to the west of the Beijing–Guangzhou Railway, and from the south of 
Yanmenguan, Shanxi to the north of Shaoguan, Guangzhou. This area covers 
the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangxi, Guizhou, Sichuan 
(including Chongqing), Yunnan, Shanxi, Hunan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Henan, and 
Guangdong.52  
        This extremely influential development investment is recognized as the 
                                                             
50 There are three recognized  end dates of the Third Line program. Some argue for 1978, 
taking the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee as the mark; some opt for 
1980, which marks the end of the fifth Five-Year Plan; while others contend that 1983 should 
be the end date because in this year the central government finalized the policy for the 
adjustment and reorganization of the Third Line enterprises. See Li Caihua and Jiang Dayun, 
2005, “Woguo dasanxian jianshe de lishi jingyan he jiaoxun” (The Lessons of the Big Third 
Line Construction), Dongbei shifan daxue xuebao (Journal of Northeast Normal University) 
No.4, pp.85–91.   
 
51 The First Line refers to the border land and the coastal area, while the Second Line is the 
area between the First Line and the Third Line. The Big Third Line refers to the investment 
and construction in the central and western provinces, while the Small Third Line refers to the 
investment and construction in the central and western areas within the provinces of the First 
and the Second Line. See Li Caihua and Jiang Dayun, 2005, p. 85; Mengtao, 2013, “Kongjian 
bianhua, jiegou tiaozheng yu sanxian qiye de jiqun chuangxin” (The Spatial Change, 
Structural Adjustment and the Cluster Innovation of Enterprises in the Third Line Areas), 
Gaige (Reform), No. 1, pp. 35–40.    
 
52 Yuan Li, Juji Xiaoying Yu Xibu Jingzheng Youshi de Peiyu (The Cluster Effect and the 
Cultivation of the Competitive Advantage of Western China), (Beijing: Jingji Guanli 
Chubanshe). Beijing: The Press of Economic Management, p. 15. 
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central government’s response to a perceived external threat. 53  After the 
collapse of its alliance with the Soviet Union in 1958, China faced a potential 
threat from either or both superpowers. Without any conceivable assistance 
from either, China was left on its own in facing the non-stop invasion and 
harassment by other hostile powers. Backed by American power, the 
Kuomintang had never given up its plan of a counterattack on the mainland. 
Meanwhile, India also stirred up the border conflict in western China, which 
soon escalated into military conflict. Moreover, the escalation of the war 
between Vietnam and the US in 1964 exacerbated the central leaders’ anxiety. 
Given that China’s major industrial capacity and population was concentrated 
in a few eastern and northeastern cities, it was imperative to develop an 
alternative industrial base to maintain production in the event of war. In the 
cover note of Guangdong’s report on Third Line initiative, Mao’s concluding 
comment is that “if we do not act now, it will cause immense sorrow in the 
future” (现在不为，后悔无及).54 
 
Indeed, the distribution of China’s industrial capacity and population 
                                                             
53 Barry Naughton, 1988, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” 
The China Quarterly, No. 115, September, pp. 351–86; “Liushi niandai sanxian jianshe juece 
wenxian xuanzai” (Selected documents on the 1960s Third Line construction policy), Dangde 
wenxian (Party Documents), No.3, (1995), pp. 33–42; Chen Donglin, “Cong ‘chi chuan yong 
jihua’ dao ‘zhanbei jihua’” (From an eat, wear, use plan to a ‘prepare for war’ plan”), Dangdai 
zhongguo shi yanjiu (Research on Contemporary Chinese History) No.2, (1997) pp. 65–75; 
Dong Baoxun, 2001, “Yingxiang sanxian jianshe juece xiangguan yinsu de lishi touxi” (A 
historical analysis of the origin of the Third Line) Shandong Daxue xuebao (The Journal of 
Shandong University) No.1, pp. 89–93. 
54 Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, di shiyi ce (Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the 




concentrations was extremely uneven at that time. Northwestern China 
(including the Autonomous Region of Inner Mongolia) accounted for 45% of 
Chinese land area, but only 5% of total national industrial output; the 
southwestern, including the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 
Tibet, only produced 6% of total national industrial output, while nevertheless 
accounting for 23% of the land area. In these two vast areas, there were only 
about 300 industrial and mining factories, most of which were in the light 
industrial and repair sectors. Moreover, throughout western China, railways 
remained nonexistent and highways had been seriously underdeveloped. As a 
result, this part of the country was almost completely cut off from the more 
developed east.55  
 
        In order to balance the uneven distribution of industrial capacity and 
construct an alternative industrial base, the government initiated transfers on 
an enormous scale from east to west. Consequently, a huge number of 
factories and workers were relocated from the cities of the east coast and the 
northeastern industrial base, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Shenyang, 
to remote areas in the west.56  Taking Shanghai from 1965 to 1973 as an 
example, in the course of Big Third Line construction, 411 factories and 
                                                             
55 Xie Minggan and Luo Yuanming (eds.), 1990, Forty Years of Chinese Economic 
Development (Zhongguo Jingji Fazhan Sishinian), Beijing: People’s Press, p.69.  
 
56 In addition to Naughton, see Gurtov, Mel, 1993, “Swords into Market Shares: China’s 
Conversion of Military Industry to Civilian Production”, The China Quarterly, No. 134, June, 
pp. 213–41.  
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92,200 workers were transferred to Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, and Yunnan.57 Of these, 195 factories and 46,000 workers were in the 
mechanical engineering sector; 46 factories and 8,400 workers were in meter 
and telecommunications; 29 factories and 8,500 workers in metallurgy; 44 
factories and 8,000 workers in chemicals; 32 factories and 9,300 workers in 
textiles; and 32 factories and 6,800 workers in light industry.58 These “migrant 
workers” were tasked with at least two missions: to create an entire industry, 
beginning with mining and energy, and to further develop the defense sector.59 
Workers in non-military industries were usually moved to small and less 
important cities, some of which have today developed into larger and 
significant centers, such as Panzhihua in Sichuan province. Workers in the 
defense industry, under Mao’s direction of “close to the mountains, dispersed 
and out of sight” (靠山, 分散, 进洞), were sent to remote villages or 
mountainous areas, isolated from the outside world. The nature of this hidden 





                                                             
57 Institute of Contemporary Shanghai Study (Dangdai Shanghai Yanjiusuo), The Memorabilia 
of Contemporary Shanghai (Dangdai Shanghai Dashiji), Shanghai: Shanghai Lexicographical 
Publishing House, p. 523 
 
58 Sun Huairen (ed.), 1990, A Brief History of Socialist Economic Development in Shanghai 
1949–1985, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, p. 469. 
59 See Naughton, 1988, pp. 356–60.  
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Figure 3 Abandoned Workshop of Jinjiang Factory  
 
 
Note: Author’s pictures, March 26, 2013. 
In addition to the workers transferred from various eastern cities, the 
composition of personnel in the Third Line enterprises was gradually further 
diversified by the recruitment of Educated Youths who had returned to cities, 
demobilized soldiers, graduates of the factory’s technical schools, and 
university graduates. However diversified the workers in these enterprises 
might be, they were similar in one respect: they were supposed to be 
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politically credible. Due to the political and strategic significance of the Third 
Line enterprises in war preparation, every worker had to undergo extremely 
strict political investigation. As one scholar of the Third Line Construction 
commented:  
 
Anyone who belongs to any of the following categories is not allowed to 
transfer with his/her factory: one whose political background is landlord, rich 
peasant, reactionary and rightist; one who has a grievance against the state 
repression on his/her lineal kin; one who is susceptible because of concealing 
serious political problems; one who has committed serious embezzlement and 
theft; one who engages in any kind of illicit trading; [a] capitalist who holds the 
exploitative standing and one who has committed any other serious violations 
of law and discipline”.60  
 
         The pureness and high quality of those selected can be summed up 
succinctly by a popular saying in the early mobilization stage, “Good man, 
good horse and good sword and spear” (好人，好马，好刀枪).  
 
By the early 1980s, in the area of the Third Line Construction, more than 
1,100 industrial projects had been completed, 61  about 29,000 enterprises 
                                                             
60 Chen Donglin, 2003, The Third Line Construction: The Western Development in the Period 
of War Preparation (Sanxian jianshe: beizhan shiqi de xibu kaifa), Beijing: The CCP Central 
Party School Publishing House. p. 144. 
 
61 See Yuan Guofeng, 2003, “Sanxian jianshe tiaozheng gaizao jinru shouwei” (The 
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established,62 and the number of Third Line workers had reached 16 million, 
which constituted one third of the total number of workers in state-owned 
enterprises. 63  Among the Third Line workers, nearly four million were 
“migrant workers.”64 Even though there has been no official release of detailed 
data on financial investment during the Third Line Construction, probably due 
to its high sensitivity in the past,65  scholars estimate that the total capital 
investment was no less than 200 billion yuan. 66  Xie reports the capital 
component of the Third Line program as a proportion of total national 
                                                                                                                                                               
adjustment and reorganization of the Third Line industries are almost done), Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily), December 4, p. 6; see also Meng Tao, 2013, “Kongjian bianhua, jiegou 
tiaozheng yu sanxian qiye de jiqun chuangxin” (The Spatial Change, Structural Adjustment 
and the Cluster Innovation of Enterprises in the Third Line Areas), p. 35 
 




64 Liu Yanxun, 2012, “Sanxianren de qingchun yu munian” (The youth and agedness of the 
Sanxian people), Zhongguo xinwen zhoukan (China Newsweek), April 23, pp. 66–9.  
 
65 In “The Third Front”, Naughton provides some estimated data on capital investment in the 
Third Line. David Bachman offers some estimates of the scale of Third Line investment in 
Guangdong province, while Ding gives some data on the conversion of Third Line industries 
in Guizhou province. All of them fail to provide any data on the scale of nationwide 
investment in the Third Line. See Bachman, David, 2001, “Defence Industrialization in 
Guangdong”, The China Quarterly, No. 166, June, pp. 273–304; Ding, Arthur S. 1997, “The 
regional implications of defence conversion: the case of the ‘Third Line’ and Guizhou”, in 
Brömmelhörster, Jörn and John Frankenstein (eds.), Mixed motives, uncertain outcomes: 
defence conversion in China, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pp. 135–49. Prior to the 
1980s, there were no reports on the Third line Construction. According to the rules, copying 
any Third Line Construction documents was prohibited; neither could the term “Third Line” 
be used either orally or in writing. All information on the transfer of factories and workers was 
forbidden from being reported in newspapers, journals, and even in-house publications. 
Circular on Enhancing the Confidentiality in Support of the Inner Land from the Secrecy 
Committee of Shanghai, the Planning Committee of Shanghai and the Industrial Production 
Committee of Shanghai (Shanghaishi baomi Weiyuanhui, Shanghaishi jihua Weiyuanhui, 
Shanghaishi gongye shengchan Weiyuanhui guanyu zai zhiyuan neidi jianshe zhong jiaqiang 
baomi gongzuo de tongbao), February 5, 1965, Call no. A-38-2-792/104, Shanghai Archive, in 
Li Hao, 2010, “The Study on the Third Line Mobilization of Shanghai”, (Master’s thesis), 
retrieved from Dissertation and Theses Database of CNKI.  
 
66 See Meng Tao, 2013, p. 35; Linxi and Jiyin, “Yige juda de jingji wutai” (A big economic 
stage), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), May 24, 1987, p.1.  
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construction for each of the Five-Year Plan periods (Table 3).67 
 




Third Five Year Plan (1966-70) 52.7 
Fourth Five Year Plan (1971-1975) 41.1 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China shifted its focus from military 
preparation to economic development. As a result, the top priority of the Third 
Line program ultimately faded away and the conversion of military industries 
began.68 The purpose of this conversion was to reallocate political, economic, 
and technical resources from military to civilian sectors, as well as to convert 
the unified military production system into an integrated military-industrial 
system.69 One component of the conversion was the restructuring of the Third 
Line industries. In November 1984, The Third Line Construction Adjustment 
Reorganization Planning Office of the State Council finally agreed on a plan 
                                                             
67 Xie Shirong, 1981, “Military Industries must be brought fully into play”, Jingji yanjiu 
cankao ziliao, No. 59, p. 33.  
 
68 See Naughton, “The Third Front”, p. 364; Gurtov, “Swords into market shares”, p. 213.  
 
69 Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, 1990, Shijie junshi 
gongye gailan (Survey of World Military Industry), edited by Science and Technology 
Intelligence Agency, Beijing: National Defence Industry Publishing House, p.170. Cited by 
Gurtov, “Swords into arket Shares”, p.2. See also Frankenstein, John, “China’s Defense 
Industry Conversion: A Strategic Overview”, in Brömmelhörster and Frankenstein, Mixed 
motives Jörn, pp. 3–34. 
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to reform the Third Line enterprises. An unspecified number of enterprises 
were closed or incorporated into others.70  Workers in remote villages and 
mountain areas were relocated for the second time.71 By the end of 1996, 236 
enterprises and institutions had left their original locations and moved to 
nearby small and medium-sized cities based on the principles of proximity and 
economic suitability.72 In addition, the local government in the new location 
took over control of these factories. For example, in 1985, 24 large factories, 
including electronics, optical instruments, precision machinery, and even 
nuclear engineering, were moved to Chongqing. Urban residency status was 
also returned to workers.73 Almost at the same time, 57 “Small Third Line” 
enterprises owned by the Shanghai municipality and located in the mountain 
areas of Anhui Province were passed to the governors of Anhui and moved to 
                                                             
70 For related information, see Long Xiangchao and Chengjian, 1991, “Woguo sanxian jianshe 
tiaozheng gaizao qude zhongda jinzhan” (The Adjustment and reorganization of the Third 
Line industries has achieved great progress), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), December 4, p. 
2; see also Lin Rongqiang, 1988, “Dianzi gongye shouli daqiye jianbing” (The first case of big 
company merger in Electricity Industry), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), December 28, p. 2.  
 
71 Not all workers in remote mountain areas were relocated to nearby cities. Naughton argued 
that “some factories gradually move out of the mountains by expanding into other locations … 
some factories have been dismantled and moved to nearby cities; some remain tied to raw 
material sources and struggle to succeed in production; and others have simply been 
abandoned.” See Naughton, “The Third Front”, p. 383.  
 
72 Material-oriented processing companies moved to well-resourced cities such as Xiaogan 
(Hubei), Xianyang (Shaanxi), and Baoji (Shaanxi); companies producing appliances and 
goods for everyday consumption moved to highly-populated cities such as Xiangfan (Hubei), 
Hanzhong (Shaanxi), and Mianyang (Sichuan); while high-tech companies moved to larger 
cities such as Wuhan (Hubei), Zhengzhou (Henan), Chongqing, Changsha (Hunan), and 
Chengdu (Sichuan). See Chen Donglin, 2004, “20shiji 80niandaihou de sanxian jianshe da 
tiaozheng” (The great adjustment of Sanxian construction after the 1980s), Dangshi bolan 
(The Review of Party History), No. 5, pp. 4–11. 
 
73 Zhou Changqing, 1985, “Bring Third Line enterprises into play”, p. 2; “Enterprises in the 
deep mountains and old forests are starting to move out”, Shijie jingji daobao, 18 November, 
p. 3; “Adjustment and reform of our Third Line enterprises is effective”, Renmin ribao 
(People’s Daily), April 22, 1987, p. 1. Cited in Naughton “The Third Front”, p. 383.  
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different nearby cities.74 
2.2 Jinjiang Factory: A Typical Third Line Enterprise 
Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory is one of thousands of Third Line 
enterprises. Its establishment was prepared in early March 1966 and 
construction was eventually completed in 1972. As my knowledge of Jinjiang 
Factory and the Third Line Construction accumulated, I realized that Jinjiang 
Factory was a typical Third Line enterprise, which might well serve as a 
representative case at least in the machinery industry.  
 
First, Sichuan was the leading host province for the Third Line 
Construction. From 1964 to 1978, the government’s financial investment in 
the Third Line Construction in Sichuan amounted to 33.505 billion yuan, of 
which 20.215 billion was from the central government’s direct financial 
investment.75 During this period, one eighth of the total national industrial 
investment and a quarter of the total investment in the armaments industry 
went to this southwestern province.76 One hundred and seventeen factories and 
                                                             
74 “Anhui and Shanghai remake ‘small Third Line’ enterprises”, Renmin ribao (People’s 
Daily), March 10, 1987, p. 2.  
 
75 He Haoju, et al. (eds.), 2003, The Third Line Construction and the Western Development 
(Sanxian Jianshe yu Xibu dakaifa). Beijing: The Contemporary China Publishing House, p. 
115. 
 
76 Xin wen 1999, “The Third Line Construction and the Establishment of Sichuan Industrial 
Base” (Sanxian jianshe yu Sichuan chanye jichu de xingcheng), in Wang Chuncai (ed.), The 
Monument of the Third Line Construction (Sanxian jianshe zhu fengbei), Chengdu: Sichuan 
People’s Publishing House, pp.73–85 (p. 77). 
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thousands of workers from the east coast and the northeastern industrial base 
were transferred here.77 Jinjiang Factory is one of them.  
 
Second, Jinjiang Factory was Chengdu’s key Third Line Construction 
project. By 1980, the accumulated government investment had reached 25.6 
million yuan. Compared to the seven other key projects at the time, Jinjiang 
Factory was undoubtedly the largest and of greatest importance in terms of 
financial assistance from the government and size of workforce. Basic 
information on the key construction projects in Chengdu’s machinery industry 
during this period is shown in Table 4. 
                                                             
77 The Committee of Local Chronicles of Chengdu, 2010, The Local Chronicles of Chengdu: 
Chronicle of Events (Chengdu shizhi: dashiji), Beijing: Fangzhi Publishing House, p. 751. 
There is no specific figure for transferred workers in Sichuan from 1964 to 1978. It is only 
recorded that in 1964 and 1965, 37,000 ordinary workers and technicians were transferred 
from the east coast area and the northeastern industrial base to Sichuan; see The Chronicles of 
the Federation of Trade Unions of Sichuan Province (Sichuansheng zonggonghui zhi), 
Beijing: The Contemporary China Publishing House, p. 34.  
 
 55 




Accumulated Investment by 
1980 
No. of Workers by 
1989 
Sichuan Gear Factory 1964 1643 3304 
Chengdu Fittings Factory 1965 840 1633 
Jinjiang Factory 1966 2560 2538 
Minjiang Gear Factory78 1966 2148 - 
Hongqi Instrument and Meter Factory 1966 379 634 
Chengdu Hongqi Tractor Factory 1969 2063 2383 
Sichuan Hongqi Diesel Engine Factory 1971 2144 2888 
Chengdu Tractor Operated Machine Factory 1971 134.5 - 
                                                             
78The Minjiang Gear Factory was merged with the Sichuan Gear Factory; the Chengdu Tractor Operated Machine Factory was merged with the Chengdu Fork Truck Factory. 
As a result, there is no comparable record of their number of workers; see The Committee of Chengdu Local Chronicles, 1995, The Local Chronicles of Chengdu: The 
Chronicle of Machinery Industry, Chengdu: Chengdu Publishing House, p. 15.   
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        Third, like other Third Line enterprises, Jinjiang Factory was built in a 
concealed mountain area. Figure 4 indicates the exact location of the eight key 
construction projects. The smallest, thick circle at the center of the map 
indicates the entire urban area of Chengdu city in the 1960s, which was within 
the yihuan (literal meaning “the first ring”) area of present-day Chengdu. 
Outside the urban area were vast stretches of farmland and rolling mountains. 
From this map it can be seen that, with the exception of the Hongqi Instrument 
and Meter Factory, all the key construction projects were located far from the 
urban area of Chengdu, and even away from highways and railways. Jinjiang 
Factory, marked by the black star numbered 3, is one of the furthest from the 













Figure 4: Location of the Key Construction Projects 
 
Note: Stars numbered 1 to 8 show the exact locations of the eight key 
construction projects: respectively Sichuan Gear Factory, Chengdu Fittings 
Factory, Jinjiang Factory, Minjiang Gear Factory, Hongqi Instrument and 
Meter Factory, Chengdu Hongqi Tractor Factory, Sichuan Hongqi Diesel 
Engine Factory and Chengdu Tractor-Operated Machine Factory. 
 
Fourth, unsurprisingly, transferred workers accounted for a large 
proportion of the workforce at Jinjiang Factory. Specifically, the transferred 
workers in Jinjiang Factory and the other seven factories were mostly from 
Wuxi Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory, Shanghai Baochang Piston Factory, 
Hangzhou Gear Case Factory, Tianjin Internal Combustion Factory and 
Tianjin Tractor Factory, numbering in total around 1,642.79The number of 
workers transferred by 1966 in these factories is shown in Table 5.  
                                                             




Table 5: Number of Transferred Workers in Key Construction Projects by 
1966 
Factory Transferred Workers by 1966 
Sichuan Gear Factory 340 
Chengdu Fittings Factory 156 
Jinjiang Factory 444 
Minjiang Gear Factory80 n/a 
Hongqi Instrument and Meter 
Factory 
n/a 
Chengdu Hongqi Tractor Factory n/a 
Sichuan Hongqi Diesel Engine 
Factory 
n/a 
Chengdu Tractor Operated 
Machine Factory 
n/a 
Note: n/a = not available 
Source: The Local Chronicles of Chengdu: The Chronicle of Machinery 
Industry, pp. 14–21. 
 
In Jinjiang Factory, the personnel was even more diversified. By the early 
1980s, there were 305 workers transferred from Shanghai Diesel Engine 
Factory, 137 from Wuxi Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory, 354 recruited from the 
technical schools of Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory and Shanghai 
                                                             
80 The Minjiang Gear Factory was merged into the Sichuan Gear Factory; The Chengdu 
Tractor Operated Machine Factory was merged into the Chengdu Fork Truck Factory. As a 
result, there is no record of their number of workers by the year of 1989, see The Committee 
of Chengdu Local Chronicles 1995, The Local Chronicles of Chengdu: The Chronicle of 
Machinery Industry, Chengdu: Chengdu Publishing House, p. 15.  
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Construction Mechanical Engineering Factory, eight from the Eighth 
Machinery Ministry School of Industrial Accounting in Tianjin, 12 from 
Tianjin Agricultural Machinery Manufacture School, 35 from the technical 
school of Luoyang Tractor Factory, 11 from Guizhou Diesel Engine Factory, 
and  five recruited from Shanghai Xinhua Nurses School.81 This is shown in 
graphic form in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Composition of Workers in Jinjiang Factory 
 
Source: The Office of Factory Chronicle, Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle 
Factory, Factory Chronicle: 1966-1985, p. 2. 
 
Last but not least, Jinjiang Factory’s functional organizations appeared no 
different from others. The factory’s multifarious organizations can be 
generally divided into three categories: for production, logistics, and 
education. The production organizations constituted the largest share. 
                                                             
81 The Office of Factory Chronicle, Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory, Factory Chronicle: 
1966–1985, p. 2. 
Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory
Wuxi Oil Pump and Oil Nozzle Factory
Technical school of Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory and
Shanghai Construction Engineering Mechanic Factory
School of Industrial Accounting in Tianjin
Tianjin Agricultural Machinery Manufacture School
Technical school of Luoyang Tractors Factory
Guizhou Diesel Engine Factory
Shanghai Xinhua Nurses School
New supply of labor
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According to The Local Chronicles of Chengdu, until 1989 the production 
system of factories in the machinery industry consisted of organizations in 
three layers: the factory headquarters, workshops and groups. Large and 
medium-sized enterprises had an additional layer between workshops and 
groups, called sections.82 As a large enterprise, Jinjiang Factory’s production 
system had four layers. In the second layer, besides its seven workshops, there 
were 22 other departments administratively parallel to and functionally 
complementary with the workshops, such as the Sales Department, Design 
Office, and Quality Control Office. Figure 6 shows the organizational structure 












                                                             
82 The Committee of Chengdu Local Chronicles 1995, p. 226. 
 61 
Figure 6: Organizational Structure of Jinjiang Factory 
 
Notes: 1) Following the reform of Factory Director Responsibility, the Factory 
Director no longer came under the Party Committee. Instead, the position sat 
alongside the Party Committee and took on total responsibility for production. 
The “7-21” Workers’ University and “Office of Three Studies” were closed 
after 1978.  
2) As shown in the diagram, there were five deputy directors in the Jinjiang 
Factory, each in charge of a different aspect of the factory’s affairs. Deputy 
Directors 1 to 5 were respectively responsible for production, technology, 
operations, livelihood, and education and personnel matters.  
Source: The Office of Factory Chronicle, Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle 
Factory, p. 28. 
 
Overall, in comparison with the other seven enterprises in the machinery 
industry, Jinjiang Factory did not differ in any major respect. As a key project 
in Chengdu, the factory was concealed in the mountain area, made up of many 
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transferred workers and operated with multifarious organizations. It thus 
conformed to the typical template of Third Line enterprises in almost all 
aspects. Although no single case can fully represent the whole picture, the 
typicality of Jinjiang Factory makes it at least a decent case to study.  
 
As a significant economic program derived from direct political 
intervention, the Third Line Construction is undoubtedly a crucial event in 
China’s industrial history. The assessment of its merits and demerits has 
already become a hot topic of scholarly debate.83 Yet, looking through the 
numerous existing literatures on Chinese labor, few scholars have carried out a 
systemic study on Third Line workers so far.84 The present study represents an 
effort to bridge this lacuna based on the experience of a typical Third Line 




                                                             
83 For instance, Bramall, Chris, 2009, Chinese Economic Development, London and New 
York: Routledge; Chan, Roger C.K. et al. (eds.), 1996, China’s Regional Economic 
Development, Hongkong: Hongkong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University 
of Hongkong Research Monograph No. 30; Li Caihua and Jiang Dayun, 2005, “The historical 
experiences and lessons of the Big Third Line construction” (woguo dasanxian jianshe de lishi 
jingyan he jiaoxun), Journal of Northeast Normal University (Philosophy and Social 
Sciences) (4): pp. 85–91. 
 
84 Nearly all works on the Third Line focus on the origin, scale, and legacy of this massive 
program. The “relocated workers” are not taken as their subjects. Studies on labor in China do 
not differentiate these workers from workers in other SOEs. William Hurst is one of the few 
scholars who took these workers as a group with a unique historical experience. Nevertheless, 
in his work The Chinese Worker after Socialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009) he did not point out the scale of these workers.  
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Chapter 3 The Context of Toleration (1): Isolated Life in Jinjiang 
Factory 
 
Today, Ni laoshi (teacher Ni) introduced me to the vice director of the Jinjiang 
Factory, Yu Xuehui, and the Party Branch Secretary of the of Heat Treatment 
Workshop, Tan Yi … We walked in the rain for no less than 20 minutes and 
finally arrived at the downstairs of Yu’s apartment. From outside the building, Ni 
laoshi shouted loudly, “lao Yu (old Yu)!” “Who is it?” asked Yu.  “Me!” Ni 
replied.  
From the author’s fieldwork notes 
 
Residing in a remote mountainous area, workers at Jinjiang Factory were 
isolated from the outside world. As a result, the factory was the only source of 
their economic, social, and political necessities. Moreover, it was the only 
circle within which they could establish their social relations. Living in this 
isolated factory and seeing almost the same group of colleagues for an 
extended period of time, Jinjiang Factory workers developed the ability to 
recognize each other merely by their voices. As in the case recorded in the 
author’s fieldwork notes above, Mr. Ni did not even need to say his name for 
identification.  
         
        This chapter depicts the workers’ isolated life in five respects. It starts 
with an introduction to the transportation connecting the Jinjiang Factory with 
Chengdu city. The second section discusses how the workers are supplied with 
enough food and drink. Section 3 details the factory’s affiliated education 
units. The fourth section describes how the workers enriched their 
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entertainment on their own in such an isolated area. Section 5 points out the 
workers’ social interaction and social relationships in the factory.  Specifically, 
due to the separation from kin and circles of friends in their hometowns, 
colleagues were the main source of workers’ social support. As a result, 
Jinjiang Factory workers were in a reciprocal relationship and they established 
their social networks through friendship and marriage with their colleagues. 
Obviously, the workers’ isolated life in the factory shows their high degree of 
organizational dependency. In order to distinguish the workers’ dependency in 
the Third Line enterprises from that of their urban counterparts and the rural 
collectives, in the final section, I make a broad comparison between these 
three different economic entities. 
3.1 Transportation 
Following Mao’s instructions, Jinjiang Factory was built in a concealed 
mountainous area. Specifically, it was situated on the mountainside in 
Longfeng Village, Peng County, administered by Chengdu city. In total, the 
factory occupied 25.88 hectares, almost evenly split into production and 
residential sites. The production site was located against the mountain facing 
the plain, running 400 meters east to west and 200 meters north to south. It 
consisted of three layers, the lowest of which was 700 meters above sea level. 
The residential site was located southwest of the production site, on a long and 
narrow slope, between 722 and 745 meters above sea level. The residential site 
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was 50 meters wide and 700 meters long.85 The pictures in Figure 8 clearly 
show that Jinjiang Factory was isolated and surrounded by mountains.   
 
Figure 7: Jinjiang Factory at Danjing Mountain 
 
                   
Upper left: remnants of workers’ dormitory and workshops. Upper right: 
remains of factory club and hospital. Bottom: abandoned workshops. Author’s 
photos, March 2013. 
 
        In this isolated area, a “shuttle bus” was the only vehicle connecting the 
factory with the nearby city. In the mid-1970s, Jinjiang Factory bought its first 
                                                             
85 The Office of Factory Chronicle, Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory, Factory Chronicle: 
1966–1985, p. 1. 
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“shuttle bus” for its workers, “Liberation” (解放) truck. At 7 am every day, the 
factory’s shuttle bus departed for Chengdu city. About one and half hours later, 
it arrived at its destination, the North Chengdu Railway Station, and workers 
transferred to other urban transportation as their individual needs required. 
Workers were usually given six hours to deal with personal matters in the city, 
and had to return to the factory’s shuttle bus at about 3 pm. Going back to the 
prosperous and lively city was enjoyable and attractive, but the three-hour 
round trip in the “shuttle bus” was torture. Sitting in the truck’s load-bed and 
holding on only to a hemp rope, workers struggled to balance themselves as 
the truck jolted and rattled over the rough mountain roads. Rain and wind 
would make this experience even harder because the truck carrier was shielded 
only by a rippling canvas roof and sitting inside was therefore extremely 
uncomfortable in bad weather. Even though the factory’s transportation was 
simple and crude, the service was actually not a free lunch. Throughout the 
1970s, every passenger would be charged 40 cents for the round trip. This 
Liberation truck was in service for almost ten years. To improve its 
transportation capability, in the mid-1980s the factory appropriated some 
funds from the technological transformation budget and bought two 45-seater 
coaches, one a Huanghai and the other a Huanghe.  
 
        The provision of the shuttle bus was also very helpful in satisfying the 
workers’ needs beyond the immediate scope of the factory’s service. For 
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example, it could take workers to see the doctor in the event of serious illness, 
to buy clothes in department stores, to visit museum exhibitions and so on. 
However, such special needs occurred only rarely and even when they arose 
and some workers needed to leave for cities, such trips first had to be 
approved by the factory. As a result, living in isolated mountain areas and with 
inconvenient transportation, Jinjiang Factory workers had to rely primarily on 
themselves within the factory to fulfill their daily living and entertainment 
needs. 
3.2 Food and Drink 
In addition to the state food ration, Jinjiang Factory and its workers sought 
many other ways to supplement their living. The provision of pork by the state 
was insufficient throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s. Fully aware of this 
situation, the factory built up a very good relationship with the Food Company 
of Peng County by offering several job opportunities in the factory for 
relatives of the company’s leaders. In return, Jinjiang Factory gained the 
privilege of collecting its pork before the company’s other customers. By so 
doing, the factory was able to deliver almost the best-quality pork to its 
workers. Moreover, thanks to the good relationship with the company’s 
leaders, Jinjiang Factory could also gain some additional pork.  
 
        Vegetables were provided by three means. First, workers planted 
 68 
vegetables in some empty land in the factory’s resident sites on their own 
initiative, such as garlic, spring onion, potato and tomato. However, these self-
planted vegetables were few in quantity and lacked variety, and so could only 
provide a marginal supplement to the workers’ daily needs. By contrast, the 
vegetables provided in the periodic market in the nearby village were 
numerous and various. In this market, workers could buy not only vegetables 
and fruit, but also eggs, chicken, honey and many other foods for everyday 
consumption. As a result, going to this local market periodically became an 
important feature in the workers’ lives. This activity was called by the workers 
ganchang. Besides the local market, there was actually a small vegetable 
market about 200 meters from the factory gate. This formed spontaneously, 
with some nearby peasants coming to sell their crops. Though this only 
partially met the workers’ daily needs, it was indispensable to the workers 
living isolated in the mountain. As an interviewee recalled, “In those days, 
even though we all knew it [the small market] could be taken as the tail of 
capitalism, no one was willing to suspend it and it just continued to exist.”  
 
        Since the workers at Jinjiang Factory came from many different regions, 
their dietary habits differed greatly. In order to satisfy the wide-ranging 
workers’ dietary needs in such an isolated area, the factory had to diversify the 
food in the canteen and to learn how to cook it. It assigned special workers to 
figure out how to make bean products, bread, mooncake, rice cake and so on. 
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The factory either allocated funds to buy the machines and tools necessary to 
make these dishes, or just made them itself. For example, the oven and baking 
tray were designed and made by the factory’s electrical engineer; the mold for 
making mooncake was made with the help of the director of the Machining 
Workshop; the yeast for bread and buns was made by fermenting potato water. 
Through the efforts of the whole factory, workers were able to get access to 
the food of their hometown, even in this remote mountain area. 
3.3 Education 
Jinjiang Factory established its own schools to educate its workers’ children. 
In 1972, the chief of the personnel section was assigned to take charge of the 
construction of the factory’s affiliated primary and high schools. From their 
inception, these schools were reputable in Peng County. First, they acquired a 
local reputation for their high-quality teachers. Even though there were few 
teachers in these schools, their average educational background was above 
high-school degree level. Some of the teachers were even technicians or 
engineers in the factory with polytechnic or college degrees. Second, the 
schools were equipped with incomparable teaching devices and relevant 
support facilities. Laboratory apparatus and sporting equipment were all 
purchased in Shanghai. The schools were even equipped with a water filter 
system to provide students with safe drinking water. With such outstanding 
teachers and facilities, many students in these schools got good results in high-
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school and university entrance examinations.  
 
        Besides the primary and high schools, Jinjiang Factory also established 
its own technical school and “7-21” Workers University. 86  The factory 
technical school did not only recruit students who were the children of factory 
workers, but also qualified candidates from neighboring villages. The teachers 
were skillful workers with comparatively superior educational background. 
Usually, the students from the factory technical school were the main labor 
pool for the factory’s annual recruitment. From 1976 to 1989, Jinjiang Factory 








                                                             
86 The “7-21” Workers’ University was the product of Mao’s instruction on the cultivation of 
technicians, delivered on July 21, 1968. In this instruction, Mao recognized the experience of 
cultivating technical know-how in the Shanghai Machine Tool Factory and emphasized the 
necessity of cultivating technicians from experienced workers and farmers in other factories. 
As a result, many factories established their own “7-21” Workers’ University.  
 
87 The Committee of Chengdu Local Chronicles, 1995,  p. 215. 
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3.4 Entertainment 
Figure 8: The Helicopter View of Jinjiang Factory 
 
Legend: 1 Front Gate; 2 Heat Treatment Workshop; 3 Instrument Production 
Workshop; 4 Matching Parts Workshop; 5 Master Cylinder Workshop; 6 
Machining Workshop; 7 Laboratory Shop; 8 Casting and Forging Workshop; 9 
Preparation Workshop; 10 Dining Hall; 11Truck Convoys; 12 Warehouses; 13 
5-7 Cooperative; 14 Kindergarten; 15 Back Gate; 16 Factory Hospital; 17 
Lighting Courts; 18 Workers’ Club; 19 Dormitories; 20 Longgui Road; 21 
Dormitories; 22 Cinema; 23 Dormitories; 24 School for Workers’ Children; 25 
Factory Technical School; 26 Laboratory Field. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 9, the production and residential sites were located 
close together in the Danjing Mountains, separated by the Longgui Road. The 
buildings marked 19 in the picture were the oldest workers’ dormitory, the 
walls of which were made of timber, with clay used to seal gaps. Bricks were 
usually attached to the walls from the outside to consolidate the whole 
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construction.88 Shortly before 8 am every day, the factory loudspeaker played 
a tune that sounded exactly like the bugle call in the army. Its sound was loud 
enough to be heard in every corner of the factory, and it was usually at this 
time that workers poured out of their dormitories. Jinjiang Factory workers 
had good memories of this loudspeaker because it was not only a symbol of 
discipline, but also an important channel of entertainment and emotional 
exchange: 
 
… Even now, I can still clearly remember the sound of that loudspeaker. 
We started and ended our work to the bugle call every day. To us, it was 
just like a strict command. But actually, it also had some other functions. 
For example, to celebrate the birthday of a colleague, we usually ordered a 
song for him or her, with some spoken good wishes, of course. Sometimes, 







                                                             
88 This method of building, called Gandalei, was popular throughout the 1960s and 1970s due 
to savings of wood and bricks.  
 
89 Interview with Chen Youbai. 
 73 
Figure 9: Loudspeaker Hung on a Pole at the Back Gate  
 
Note: Author’s photo, March 21, 2013. 
Figure 10: Back Gate 
 
Note: Author’s photo, March 21, 2013. 
 
The residential and production sites were connected by some zigzag 
gravel footpaths hidden under lush green vegetation. Sports and recreation 
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facilities were located along these paths, as well as the eight workshops and 
other auxiliary production facilities. The football court was probably the 
largest open area in the factory. After the disbanding of the factory football 
team, this large area was subsequently transformed into several basketball 
courts. These courts could even be used at night, thanks to electric 
incandescent lamps hanging high above. It was precisely for this reason that 
Jinjiang Factory workers named it “the Lighting Court.”90 As long as weather 
conditions permitted, workers would come to this one place for outdoor 
activities to relax at the end of the day’s work. Some would pursue strenuous 
sports here, while others might come only to take a stroll.  
 
Next to the court was the Workers’ Club, a complex for indoor activities 
(marked 18 in Figure 9). Here workers could read in the factory library and the 
periodicals room, exercise in the table-tennis room, play in the chess and card 
room and relax in the TV room, art room and even a karaoke room. Apart from 
the Lighting Court, the Workers Club served as the only functionally 
comprehensive place for workers to spend their daily leisure time.  
 
Watching movies was an event of great interest that no one wanted to 
miss. Although they were not shown frequently, they did considerably enrich 
the workers’ lives. News of an upcoming movie was always spread very 
                                                             
90 Interestingly, other Third Line enterprises I visited all had basketball courts and they were 
all named “the Lighting Court.”  
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quickly among workers, and on the release date the movie usually became one 
of the hottest subjects of conversation in the workshop during working hours. 
The cinema was thus another paradise in which workers could spend their 
spare time, though it was used much less than the Lighting Court and the 
Workers’ Club. 
 
Figure 11: Abandoned Lighting Courts 
 
Note: Author’s photo, March 21, 2013. 
 
With these sports and entertainment facilities, Jinjiang Factory developed 
a range of group events (see Figure 13). The many sport events were usually 
given high priority, among which the Annual Athletics Meeting was 
undoubtedly the foremost. The tug-of-war between two workshops was 
perhaps the event held most frequently, and it was also the favorite of many 
workers. Moreover, volleyball, football, basketball, table tennis, and 
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badminton matches, and even Chinese chess, for both men and women, were 
also frequently held. To make full use of the cinema, Jinjiang Factory also 
organized many cultural and artistic activities, such as singing contests, 
poetry-reading contests and festival parties. The formation of Jinjiang Factory 
orchestra was another embodiment of the factory’s enthusiasm for artistic 
events. Workers were very proud of their orchestra, which never failed to meet 
their expectations. The orchestra once won first prize in the Playing 
Competition among all the enterprises in the same industry in the entire region 
of Chengdu.  
 
In addition, the factory also supported many events initiated by the 
factory-affiliated organizations. For example, every autumn, the Factory 
Workers’ Children’s School usually held a kite competition. Materials for 
making a kite, such as wire and cotton paper, were only available in some 
production workshops. Besides supplying materials, the factory workshops 
also made financial contributions to these activities. Because of the factory’s 
involvement and support, activities for the children always served as activities 
for the whole factory. In his meeting minutes, Tan Yi wrote a brief record on 
the donation of each workshop for Children’s Day.  
 
May 13, 1989. Fundraising Meeting for Children’s Day 
Machining Workshop 280 workers, 280 yuan; Matching Parts Workshop A 
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220 workers, 220 yuan; Assembly Workshop, 100 workers, 100 yuan; 
Instrument Production Workshop 90 workers, 90 yuan; Forging and 
Casting Workshop 82 workers, 82 yuan; Heat Treatment Workshop 78 
workers, 80 yuan; Preparation Workshop 57 workers, 57 yuan; Matching 
Parts Workshop B 198 workers, 200 yuan. 
 
Minimum Requirement: 1 yuan per person  
Actual Total Amount: 1,240 yuan 
Allocation Plan: Workers’ Children School 800 yuan; Kindergarten, 300 
yuan 













Figure 13: Sport and Entertainment Activities in Jinjiang Factory 
 
Top left: tug-of-war match. Bottom left: women’s volleyball match. Top right: 
opening ceremony of the fourth Jinjiang Factory sports meeting. Bottom right: 
Jinjiang Factory orchestra.   
 
Thanks to the comprehensive recreational facilities, Jinjiang Factory 
workers did not live a boring life. They helped workers form a life in sharp 
contrast to the surrounding rural area. Some may argue that the activities held 
in Jinjiang Factory could be also found in other, urban factories. It is true 
enough that, in terms of the type of activities, there might not be a vast 
difference between Third Line enterprises and urban factories. What 
distinguished the former from the latter, however, was the accessibility of the 
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alternatives. For the Third Line workers in remote mountain areas, the factory 
site was almost the only place they stayed in and their factory colleagues were 
the only people with whom they could form social relationships. As a result, 
the life of workers and the structure of the working class in Jinjiang Factory 
was fundamentally shaped by the workers’ frequent interactions with the same 
group of people in an isolated location.    
3.5 Social Interaction and Social Relationship 
A typical feature of Third Line workers was their separation from their kin and 
previous circles of friends. As a result, whenever they encountered any type of 
emergency, their factory colleagues were the only people they could turn to for 
help. In other words, colleagues, rather than their relatives, were the main 
source of workers’ social support. Workers at Jinjiang Factory were thus in a 
reciprocal relationship with their colleagues.  
 
Many scholars have argued that workers in urban factories were also 
living in a relatively closed system. Each enclosed unit was like an 
independent island in the city, separated from the others. Members of the unit 
were in a quasi-ethical relationship with the organization and their immediate 
colleagues. In almost all the factories, a system for conveying sympathy was 
well established when accidents of any kind occurred. Subjected to these 
special considerations, workers in urban factories were able to mentally and 
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physically enjoy the corporate assistance to some extent. But this corporate 
assistance should not be exaggerated. According to an interview conducted by 
Henderson and Cohen in a socialist hospital of Wuhan, members of the 
hospital insisted that the social meaning of the work unit was nothing but an 
administrative designation.91 It was people’s ties to their traditional seat of 
family and kinship that played the dominant role in their social life. Indeed, 
though workers in the city were allocated to different work units, they had 
never been cut off from their kin and previous circle of friends. 
 
The situation of workers at Jinjiang Factory was exactly the opposite. 
Even many local Sichuan workers were far from their birthplaces, not to 
mention those workers transferred from the eastern and northeastern 
provinces. Moreover, many of the workers recruited were young unmarried 
men and women in their early twenties. As these young workers gradually got 
married to each other in the factory, the social structure of the Third Line 
factories was characterized by nuclear families. At the time of the bankruptcy 
of Jinjiang Factory, about 30 years after its establishment, , not a single family 
had three generations living under one roof except for a few transferred 
technicians who were much older than the others.  
 
Living first as atomized individuals and then in nuclear families, workers 
                                                             
91 Henderson, Gail E. and Myron S. Cohen, 1984, The Chinese Hospital: A Socialist Work 
Unit. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
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felt a strong and persistent need to acquire help from their immediate 
colleagues. According to the experiences of workers in Jinjiang Factory, the 
need concerned almost every aspect of life, especially in an emergency: 
 
… We were living together like a real big family. I remember once there 
was a female colleague who had a serious ectopic pregnancy problem. We 
sent her to the Peng County Hospital in the factory hospital’s ambulance. 
On that day, she bled too much, and unfortunately there was not enough 
blood stored in the Peng County Hospital. It was already very late at night. 
I heard the loudspeaker broadcasting for a long time, emphasizing how 
dangerous a situation our colleague was in and calling on us to have a 
blood test in the factory hospital and donate blood to find a match. At least 
more than a hundred people went to take the blood test.92  
 
Of course this kind of life-and-death emergency did not occur often, and 
certainly did not happen to everyone in the factory. But many workers would 
need to be accompanied when they were hospitalized. If a patient relied solely 
on their spouse, it would not only exhaust the spouse, but also delay his/her 
production progress. Taking these real problems into account, the factory 
usually assigned some other workers to take turns to accompany the 
hospitalized patient with his/her spouse. For those who were assigned, all the 
                                                             
92 Interview with Zhu Guiqin. 
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hours spent looking after the patient would be counted as their working hours 
and they would be paid the hourly average wage of the whole workshop:  
 
In our factory, there was an unwritten rule that as long as someone was 
hospitalized and needed to be accompanied by our colleagues, every 
workshop must assign someone to shoulder the duty together with the 
patient’s spouse. Actually, I was assigned once to accompany the head of 
the finance department. He fell ill with acute appendicitis and needed to be 
sent to Chengdu. His child was still very young at that time, so his wife 
definitely could not deal with this problem all by herself. All the expenses 
in Chengdu, including the trip and accommodation, could be reimbursed. 
Even more happily, the days I spent in Chengdu were counted as paid 
leave!93  
 
          In Jinjiang Factory, some lucky demobilized soldiers whose home 
villages were located in nearby areas were envied much by others, because 
they were able to get home in only one or two hours by bicycle. But this did 
not set them apart from the social relations in the factory. This group of 
people, in fact, received additional assistance from their colleagues. Every 
year during the rice transplanting and harvest seasons, every workshop would 
assign some workers to provide these demobilized soldiers with help in their 
                                                             
93 Interview with Ni Tongzheng. 
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farm work. The section chief in the Instrument Production Workshop, Huang 
Limin, explained the rationale of this assignment: 
 
Every spring and autumn, the demobilized soldiers would ask for leave for 
at least a week. We knew they had their farmland at home, and in these two 
busy seasons, they had to go back. But the problem was that some of these 
workers were in charge of key steps in the production process, or some of 
them operated a machine that no one else could. As a result, the whole 
section might have to halt production merely due to the absence of one 
person. It was a dilemma, actually. At that time, unlike present private 
enterprises, you know, the factory could not freely fire workers. So we 
thought the only way to solve the dilemma was to help them complete their 
farm work as quickly as possible. That was why every workshop would 
send some workers to go home with the soldier worker. For those assigned 
workers, all their hours spent doing farm work would be counted as their 
working hours, and they would be paid at the hourly average wage of their 
workshop. Actually those demobilized-soldier workers also benefited from 
this arrangement. On one hand, they could finish their farm work in time; 
and on the other, they would not lose too much of their salary. In addition, 
through this process, we also hoped to strengthen the solidarity of workers 
in the same workshop.94  
                                                             
94 Interview with Huang Limin. 
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For the majority of workers at Jinjiang Factory, moving house was more 
frequent than one would expect. From single quarters to married quarters, and 
then to the nuclear-family quarters, every worker had to experience moving at 
least three times within five to ten years. In the course of each move, they 
were well assisted by their colleagues and the factory transportation facilities:  
 
… Our workshop was also responsible for assisting workers to move 
house. In Jinjiang Factory, every worker would experience moving several 
times. Small apartment, medium-sized apartment, medium-large apartment 
and large apartment … Every time the worker needed to move house, our 
workshop would assign some trucks and our colleagues to help us.”95  
 
         The different types of social support listed above were by no means the 
whole picture of workers’ life in Jinjiang Factory, but they may serve as an 
example of the broad reciprocal relations among workers. As a result of 
intensive contact over a long period, the Third Line enterprises gradually 
evolved into an acquaintance society that was more like traditional Chinese 
rural society. Workers living in this society, despite being away from friends 
and families in their birthplaces, were nonetheless able to restore their social 
relationships by making friends with and marrying their immediate colleagues. 
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As Roger Gould once argued, “an unintended consequence of formal 
organizations … is the creation of social ties that encourage the recognition of 
commonalities on a scale considerably broader than would be expected on the 
basis of social networks alone.”96 The social tie in  Jinjiang Factory, as an 
unintended consequence, was widely created in the process of day-to-day 
entertainment and reciprocal interactions.  
 
The effect of leisure activities on forging social networks has been 
mentioned repeatedly by social capital scholars. In an in-depth study of 
Shanghai’s Bank of China in the early 1930s, Yeh found that the daily group 
sports and physical exercises such as tennis, ice hockey, horseback riding, 
basketball and soccer played an indispensable role in strengthening the 
workers’ solidarity. 97  In this respect, workers at Jinjiang Factory were no 
exception. The various aforementioned entertainments within the isolated 
factory compound offered a platform for communication among the mixed 
group of people from all corners of the country. In the process, numerous 
subgroups among workers were gradually formed and strengthened. This was 
especially the case with team activities, such as basketball and volleyball, 
whereby friendships were relatively easier to form in the course of training 
and matches. 
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In Jinjiang Factory, we made many new friends here. Take my experience 
as an example. Liu, Li, Tan, He and I were all working in the Heat 
Treatment Workshop. Even though we were working in different job 
positions, we usually played together in our leisure time. Sometimes we 
played basketball or badminton, and sometimes we played chess. Tan was 
really a big fan of chess! He even established a chess hobby group in the 
factory … In addition to the entertainment inside our factory, we also had 
some happy times together outside. Not far from Jinjiang Factory, there are 
some streams and brooks, where we occasionally went on Sundays to catch 
crabs, frogs, and eels. So Sunday was the time when our meals got 
better!”98  
 
Chen’s experience of making friends in the course of day-to-day activities was 
only part of the story. Besides friendship, bonds among Jinjiang Factory 
workers were also reinforced through marriage.  
 
In our factory, we almost had no communication with nearby villages. 
After all, there was a huge gap between them and us in many aspects, such 
as educational background, living habits, and our thoughts and way of 
thinking. Hence, we stayed with our colleagues every day and we knew 
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each other very well. You know, love will come in time. So actually the 
problem of marriage was always solved internally. Ah, some beautiful 
women usually had many pursuers … In the 1980s, except for some 
demobilized soldiers who had already married before they came to the 
factory, the overwhelming majority of families had both members working 
in our factory.99 
 
Mr. Ni’s statement is not far from the truth. Among all the interviewees, only 
three had spouses who were not working in Jinjiang Factory. One was a 
housewife staying at home, and the other two were peasants living in villages 
miles away. The internal marriages further increased every individual’s scope 
for social interaction in the factory; not only did workers make friends by 
playing together, but also by getting acquainted with their spouses’ friends. As 
explained by Parkinson, formal organization plays a role in shaping one’s 
social world.  
 
In this world, A meets B outside of her daily social interactions (e.g. 
family, friends, neighbors) because of the ideological and organizational 
ties that place them in each other’s spheres for the first time. B becomes 
part of A’s regular circle; perhaps they get to know each other’s families 
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and friends, establishing an entirely new set of social network ties.100 
 
In sum, the factory was a closed, self-reliant society in terms of both 
subsistence and finding a partner. Due to its isolation, workers at Jinjiang 
Factory were firmly attached to their workplace in order to access daily 
entertainment, acquire social support, and restore day-to-day social 
relationships. In other words, workers of the Third Line enterprises were 
highly dependent on their workplace. The organizational dependency has 
already been widely recognized as the main feature of Chinese urban SOEs 
and rural collectives. What, then, distinguishes the dependency of Third Line 
workers from that of the other two categories? This is the question I now turn 
to. 
3.6 Urban Factories, Rural Collectives and the Third Line Enterprises in 
Perspective 
In the analysis of state and society relations in communist China, scholars 
have identified two distinctive social organizations exercising control over 
different sectors of Chinese society: factories in urban areas and collectives in 
rural ones. Strongly enforced workplace dependency is often conceived as one 
of the most influential elements that result in the state’s domination over 
                                                             
100 Parkinson, Sarah Elizabeth, 2013, “Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-risk 
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workers and peasants. As Andrew Walder notes, the workplace dependency 
could be comprehensively understood through two angles: what the actor 
could acquire from the workplace on one hand, and whether any alternatives 
existed, on the other. 101  Drawing on this explanation of dependency, this 
section shows that the Third Line enterprise differed from urban factories and 
rural collectives due to its unique location in an isolated mountain area. 
Deprived of other alternatives, workers in these factories exhibited a feature of 
“double dependency”: they were dependent on the factory, first, for their 
economic, political, and social necessities, and, second, for establishing and 
expanding their social relationships.  
 
The organizational dependency of workers in urban factories is a result of 
the danwei (work unit) system. Danwei, generally speaking, is a general name 
for all the micro-organizations in communist China. In a city, a factory, a shop, 
a school, a hospital, a research institute and a party organ, all can be called a 
danwei.102 The danwei system is usually considered a social organizational 
system unique to China due to its substantial influence on an individual’s 
everyday life. In addition to its function based on the division of labor in 
society – for a school to educate, or a factory to manufacture – a work unit 
also plays a role in providing social services and protecting individuals against 
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risks.103 In communist China, workers not only received their wages and ration 
coupons for major consumer durables and daily necessities from their work 
units, but also subsidies for food, staple goods, and residences. Moreover, the 
work unit also provided state labor insurance, welfare, and social security, and 
some social services such as medical care, daycare, and kindergarten for 
workers’ children. Even so, the numerous material benefits are only one aspect 
of danwei functions. As Li Hanlin argues, it took on an even wider range of 
political, judicial, civil, and social functions.104 As a result, it would be an 
exaggeration to assert that people in cities could survive without belonging to 
a work unit. In addition, the fact of workers’ immobility within factories 
further enhanced their dependence on the work unit; with the very rare 
exceptions of skilled workers and people who had good relationships with 
leaders, the large majority of workers could not expect to transfer from one 
factory to another.105 In a word, a worker was tied to his/her work unit for life.  
 
Virtually all China specialists agree that since the implementation of the 
danwei system, workers in urban areas were in fact living in a relatively 
isolated place and highly dependent on their workplace.106 Bray even asserts, 
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from a spatial perspective, that “each danwei became a financially 
independent economic unit with very little structural relationship to the rest of 
the city space that surrounded it. The wall enclosing the danwei simply 
reinforced, through symbolic representation, the actuality of this 
independence.”107 Indeed, the isolation of a work unit and the dependency of a 
worker is quite clear when seen from the party leader’s blueprint. Yet, it is 
much less so when we evaluate the degree of isolation and dependency based 
on the real everyday life of ordinary workers. As I have shown above, 
previous studies often illustrate the extent of workers’ dependency by listing 
various necessities distributed by their workplace. All of these works take on a 
common perspective by focusing on the material provision of the work unit. 
Since this provision is not available to outsiders, it has been assumed in the 
literature that the more necessities a factory provides, the more dependent its 
workers will be. While the material provision of the work unit did shape 
workers’ dependency in one respect, the resultant level of dependency is 
nevertheless the net effect of both the work unit’s material supply and the 
workers’ demands of their workplace. Due to the existence of alternatives, the 
two vectors do not move in the same direction.  
 
One can broadly identify three categories of benefit conferred by the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Organization and the State in the System of Social Control (danwei zhongguo: shehui 
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work unit: direct economic benefits, social services, and social relations. 
Workers might be able to find substitutes for the second and third of these in 
the city. Taking medical care as an example, even though it was commonly 
provided in every factory, workers – especially those in small and medium–
sized ones – were more likely to seek medical services in public hospitals 
because the hospitals at their factories were usually small. In fact, they would 
more appropriately be called “clinics” than hospitals, because the medical 
services provided were limited and extremely rudimentary.  
 
The establishment of social relationships is another aspect in which 
workers might not necessarily be dependent on their work units. An obvious 
reason is the workers’ freedom in finding a spouse. Indeed, some scholars 
have argued that interventing in workers’ marriage and divorce was one of the 
multi-functions of the danwei. This was a formal power of the work unit, 
written on paper. However, the real impact of power on a person’s life is 
determined not by whether it is written down but by the extent to which the 
power-holder is able to and wishes to use it. As a common Chinese saying 
goes, “Better to destroy ten temples than to destroy one marriage” (宁拆十座
庙，不毁一桩婚); no leader was willing to damage a marriage as long as the 
bride and groom had acceptable political backgrounds. As a result, it was very 
common for a worker in one factory to find his or her spouse in other 
factories. Similarly, within a factory’s living quarters, workers did not only 
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come from one work unit.  
 
Married urban workers, then, were subject to the influence of at least two 
work units: their own workplace and the one to which their spouses belonged. 
If their children were serving in a third factory, it made the problem even more 
complicated. Conventional wisdom has repeatedly emphasized the 
significance of living quarters and partially attributed workers’ dependency 
and common identity to the independency of this spatial realm. 108 
Unfortunately, the diversity of residents in the living quarters has been 
overlooked. This limitation is rooted in the stereotypical notion of social 
atomization and neglecting the role of family. Once family is taken into 
account, the work unit is no longer isolated from the rest of the city and 
becomes structurally embedded in the society that surrounds it.  
 
Not only could the establishment of new social relationships go beyond 
the control of the unit, but existing social relationships could also displace 
workers from their unit life. After all, “people’s deep ties to their traditional 
seat of family and kinship had not been severed in a matter of decades.”109 
Moreover, workers conceived friends with whom they had grown up or former 
classmates from school as more intimate companions than their current 
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colleagues working on the same production line. Dittmer and Lü’s study 
confirms this weak relationship with colleagues in the same unit.110 Through 
interviews conducted in Shanghai and Shijiazhuang, they found that the real 
friends to whom one could express one’s innermost thoughts only existed 
outside the unit. Just as their informants said, “one should not mix guanxi 
[relationship, connection] with those you work with every day.”111 Simply put, 
in terms of material provision, workers were highly dependent on their work 
units since they provided nearly all necessities. However, from the perspective 
of workers’ demands in their everyday life – especially when taking into 
account the availability of alternatives in the city and their freedom in 
establishing social relationships – the workers’ dependency on their workplace 
deserves a second thought. Henderson and Cohen make a fair comment on the 
role of work unit in urban areas:  
 
The danwei system is, of course, not the sole force affecting the lives of 
work unit members. Other factors include the family, relationships with 
people outside the danwei, membership in neighborhood organizations, the 
power of the professional within a bureaucratic organization, constraints on 
middle-level leaders, and the influence of the communist party and other 
national organizations. Nevertheless, the danwei has an extraordinary 
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influence on its individual members and (in our case) on the formal and 
informal relations among the hospital administrators, doctors, nurses, and 
patients. This influence does not lessen the importance of the other factors, 
but rather interacts with them and provides an additional layer of control 
with which Chinese citizens must cope in their daily lives.112 
 
As for peasants’ dependency on rural collectives, Vivienne Shue maintains that 
the rural politics of China had been dominated by a local particularism that 
predated the revolutionary.113 Even under Mao’s communist regime, this pre-
modern characteristic in rural China had never been destroyed. In a way, the 
people’s commune movement launched in 1958 can be seen as an experiment 
in putting the rural populace under the control of the state. The spatial 
arrangement for mass mobilization is to collectively position the peasants in 
areas like the work units in cities. Lu indicates that, at the outset of the 
people’s commune movement, many planners and architects were sent to the 
countryside and numerous fantasies about the new settlement were created.114 
Due to the intertwined effects of natural calamities, policy deviation, the 
economic role of agriculture, and Soviet pressure for the repayment of debts, 
this utopian design eventually failed. As a result, the state’s power had not 
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been extended into the villages as far as was expected during the people’s 
commune movement. It was, in fact, even further weakened by the 
decentralization of authority throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As Shue argues, 
“… by the mid-1960s … the Chinese system of governance, planning, and 
administration had evolved into a curious amalgam in which decision-making 
authority was shared by center, region, and production unit.” 115  Local 
solidarity was also strengthened by the criss-crossed nature of Chinese 
administrative structures. Local cadres in this interlocking structure of 
horizontal and vertical units had to keep floating back and forth between the 
interest of their superiors and of their local constituents in order successfully 
to mobilize resources. Otherwise, they would sooner or later lose the game in 
a competitive system.  
 
Since the state’s power had never managed to destroy rural peripheral 
parochialism, the peasants were tightly bounded to their villages. This strong 
tie between peasants and villages was due to several things. First and foremost 
was the issue of subsistence. To use Oi’s language, it was the problem of “how 
the harvest shall be divided.”116 In Mao’s era, as Oi argues, even though the 
state attempted to dictate the division of the harvest through an elaborate set of 
regulations, such as the closing of grain markets, institutionalization of the 
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unified purchase and supply, and the system of grain rationing, the state’s 
authority was in fact dissolved by the patron–client relationship formed 
between the peasants and village cadres.117 In the Chinese rural periphery, 
therefore, the peasants’ economic well-being was directly dependent on the 
corporate village. Oi’s argument insinuates the relative autonomy of the rural 
periphery, but she does not extend this autonomy beyond the economic 
domain. In this respect, Vivienne Shue offers a more comprehensive picture. 
Besides peasants’ economic dependency, their social interactions also took on 
an inward-looking character. On one hand, people usually gave priority to 
those in the same commune or the immediately neighboring one in their 
selection of marriage partners.118 In the 1970s, as noted by Shue, it was more 
and more common to match young people from the same brigade or village.119 
On the other hand, however, peasants tended to make friends with those from 
their home commune as well. No matter how large the population was, the 
most meaningful social relationships for the peasants were only found within 
their own rural units. This important fact, together with three other 
integrations illustrated by Shue – political, economic and normative – 
explained the strong tie between peasants and the communities they belonged 
to, which also differentiated the patterns of dependency between peasants and 
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urban workers. 120,121 The cellular form of the rural units with high population 
density eventually gave rise to a honeycomb pattern in the social organizations 
of rural China.122  
 
        The characteristics of urban workers’ and peasants’ patterns of 
dependency help us put the dependency of the Third Line workers in 
perspective. The dependency of the Third Line workers was similar to that of 
urban workers in that the enterprises were self-sufficient in providing direct 
material benefits and social services. But they differed in two fundamental 
respects. First, though most of the Third Line enterprises had their own shuttle 
buses or even small trains to the nearest cities, the workers did not leave their 
factories except in special circumstances such as home leave or serious 
accidents. The factory sites were consequently the only place where workers 
and their children made a living. In their day-to-day life, the workers had no 
access to alternative social services or entertainment facilities beyond those in 
the factory. Second, and more importantly, in making friends or seeking their 
marriage partners, workers at Third Line enterprises had no choice but their 
colleagues, due to the remoteness of their factory’s location. This was 
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especially the case for transferred workers. Unlike some demobilized soldiers 
and the Educated Youths whose homes were in nearby towns or villages, the 
transferred workers were almost completely cut off from their relatives and 
previous circles of friends. As a result, being stuck within those enclosed 
communities, they essentially had no opportunities to establish or expand their 
social relationships. In this sense, the dependency of Third Line workers was 
more like that of peasants in rural collectives. Nevertheless, in terms of the 
linkages to other surrounding communities, the Third Line enterprises had a 
greater degree of discreteness because they were spread out and remotely 
situated, while the communes, brigades, and villages were contiguous to each 
other. Rather than the honeycomb pattern typical of rural collectives, the 
geographical distribution of Third Line enterprises was jokingly described by 
the workers as “Goat Manure” to emphasize their separateness. The foregoing 























Angle 1 √ √ √ √ 
Angle 2 × √ √ √ 
Rural 
Collectives 
Angle 1 √ √ √ √ 
Angle 2 × × × √ 
Third Line 
Enterprises 
Angle 1 √ √ √ √ 
Angle 2 × × × × 
Notes: Material benefits refer to major consumer durables and daily 
necessities; social services include healthcare, education etc.; entertainment 
facilities include museum, cinema, swimming pool etc.; social relationships 
mainly refer to friendship and marriage. According to Andrew Walder, Angle 1 
refers to “what the actor can acquire from the workplace”, and Angle 2 to 
“whether any alternatives exist”. See Walder, 1986, Communist Neo-
Traditionalism, pp. 14–5. 
 
As the table shows, in terms of the angle of “what actors can acquire 
from the workplace”, there seems to be no difference between urban SOEs, 
rural collectives, and Third Line enterprises. However, if we compare them 
according to the second angle, “whether any alternatives exist”, the differences 
are obvious. In essence, within the spectrum of members’ dependency on their 
working communities, Third Line workers are at one extreme and urban 
factory workers at the other, with the peasants in rural collectives in between. 
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The assertion that workers in Third Line enterprises were living in the most 
isolated and independent situations is by no means imaginary, but a hard truth. 
Hidden in the mountains, these workers spent their lives in a limited space, 
sharing happiness and sadness with their immediate colleagues day after day. 
They were the workers who really embodied the slogan “Take the factory as 
home.” In this respect, Jinjiang Factory is a good example. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that 
organizational dependency leads to the compliance of the Chinese working 
class, the higher degree of dependency in Jinjiang Factory did not give rise to 
a group of more obedient workers. Instead, the factory’s production was 
constantly interrupted by the workers’ absences. 
Conclusion: City in the Village 
The above account of Jinjiang Factory reveals that the Third Line 
Construction brought to life a number of remote, wild, and uncultivated spots 
in mountainous areas. In each of these newly created spots, a group of well-
educated people were gathered and put in their efforts for the sake of industrial 
production. Transferred from leading cities, these people maintained their 
habits of urban life, which was in a sharp contrast to the surrounding rural 
areas. With the development of the factory and the provision of essential 
supporting facilities, these previously uncultivated spots gradually developed 
into many “mini-cities” independent from the surrounding villages. It was 
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precisely this unique characteristic of isolation that carved the featured 
relationship of workers and their workplaces.  
 
Admittedly, to say that workers at Jinjiang Factory lived in an isolated 
situation does not mean that they had no connection with the surrounding rural 
areas and nearby cities in an absolute sense. As discussed in the above 
sections, peasants frequently dropped by to sell their vegetables or fruit.123 and 
workers also went to Chengdu city and the regularly convened local market in 
the nearby villages.124 But these activities did not have much impact on the 
internal social structure of Jinjiang Factory because they always occurred in an 
occasional and fleeting way. As a result, it was precisely their lives within the 
factory that led Jinjiang Factory workers to develop their particular social 
structure. 
 
The story of Jinjiang Factory shows that workers in Third Line 
enterprises were highly dependent on their workplace. They relied on the 
factory not only for acquiring the basic economic, political, and social 
necessities, but also for building the day-to-day social networks (friendship 
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and marriage ) through the multifarious daily entertainment activities and a 
series of reciprocal interactions. I do not deny the existence of social networks 
of this type in urban factories. However, I do want to emphasize that this 
phenomenon was quintessential to the Third Line enterprises rather than urban 
SOEs, simply because workers in mountainous areas had no alternatives 
outside their factories. If isolation and the high degree of dependency were 
features of Jinjiang Factory, then how did they affect the group leaders’ 
governance? This is the question I turn to in the following two chapters.   
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Chapter 4 The Context of Toleration (2): Interconnected Social 
Networks 
 
This chapter reveals the emotional basis for the tolerating governance in the 
Jinjiang Factory: interconnected social networks. I will argue that the 
interconnected social networks complicated inter-personal relationships in the 
workshop. In particular, the formal relationships between workers and 
managers were intertwined with informal ones such as friends, relatives or 
even husband and wife. Over time, the boundary between the family and the 
factory was blurred. In such circumstances, the group leaders had less 
incentive to reinforce the formal rules strictly. In the following sections, I first 
introduce the three groups of workers in Jinjiang Factory. I then show how 
these groups were fixed in the workshop and how they perceived each other in 
their day-to-day interaction. In the fourth section, I illustrate how these 
fragmentations produced the interconnected social networks in Jinjiang 
Factory. The fifth section distinguishes the interconnected social networks in 
Third Line enterprises from that in urban state-owned enterprises. The sixth 
section concludes.    
4.1 Three Groups of Workers 
There were three groups of people among the workers at Jinjiang Factory. 
Each group was identified by a common name indicating its workers’ 
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similarities in training, salary, educational background and skill level. The 
three names (labels) were: transferred workers (支 内 职 工), Returned 
Educated Youth (返城知青) and demobilized soldiers (复原军人) 
 
“Transferred workers” were workers from the coastal provinces in the 
East. In the early days of Jinjiang Factory (1970–73), hundreds of workers in 
Tianjin, Shanghai, Wuxi, Hangzhou and Luoyang were transferred to the 
factory and formed the majority of its labor force. Among these transferred 
workers of diverse origins, natives of Shanghai overwhelmingly outnumbered 
workers from other places simply because the factory was built to a contract 
with the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory. By the end of the early 1980s, 659 
of the total 840 transferred workers came from Shanghai. It is noteworthy that 
there were also divisions among the transferred workers in respect of the 
salary policies applied to them. Taking Shanghai workers, the largest group of 
transferred workers, as an example, 429 workers were previously employed by 
the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory or Shanghai Construction Mechanical 
Engineering Factory, while the other 230 were not formally employed but 
worked as interns or apprentices. As a result, the former group could be paid 
according to the standard of Shanghai (though their residence registration, 
Hukou, was also transferred to Chengdu), while the latter group had to be paid 
according to the local Sichuan standard, which was usually 3–5 yuan per 
month less. Since these 230 workers all graduated from the technical school of 
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the Shanghai Diesel Engine Factory, people gave them another label, as 
Jixiaosheng (“students of the technical school”).  
 
In the mid- and late 1970s, the recruitment of Returned Educated Youth 
further diversified the labor profile of Jinjiang Factory. As Gold and McLaren 
described, in the late 1970s, thousands of Educated Youths who had been sent 
to the countryside were repatriated to their home city of Shanghai. 125 
However, the widespread unemployment of these Returned Educated Youths 
immediately became one of Shanghai’s biggest problems. In the nationwide 
“Current of Returning to the City”, the problem of unemployment of the 
returned youths in Chengdu was no less serious than that in Shanghai. Jinjiang 
Factory, as one of the 30 provincial large-scale enterprises, was one of the 
major employers of these Returned Educated Youths.126  In the late 1970s, 
Jinjiang Factory continuously hired about 900 Returned Educated Youth in 
total, which constituted almost one third of the factory’s workers at the time. 
Before being formally employed as a permanent worker, all these Returned 
Educated Youths were assigned for three years as apprentices to the 
“Construction Team” (基建队), in which they were paid at 17.5 yuan per 
                                                             
125 Gold, Thomas B. 1980, “Back to the City: The Return of Shanghai’s Educated Youth”. The 
China Quarterly, no. 84, December, pp. 755–70; McLaren, Anne 1979, The Educated Youth 
return: the poster campaign in Shanghai from November 1978 to March 1979, The Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 2, July, pp. 1–20.  
 
126 It was officially recognized as a large-scale enterprise in 1985 by Sichuan Provincial 
Department of Machinery Industry. A Report on the Recognition of 30 Large-scale Enterprises 
in the Machinery Industry of Our Province (guanyu jiang wosheng jixie hangyezhong 
sanshige qiye queding wei daxing qiye de baogao), Sichuan Provincial Department of 
Machinery Industry, document no. (85) 059. 
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month. At the end of the apprenticeship, if shown by testing to be qualified, 
they would become permanent workers at the factory and start work in the 
first grade (一级工).127 At that time, their salary would be increased to 21.5 
yuan. In this respect, the transferred workers were much better off. Even the 
Jixiaosheng did not need to undergo the three years of apprenticeship in the 
newly established factory, and could be directly placed in the second grade (二
级工), with a monthly salary of 31.5 yuan.  
 
The demobilized soldiers, who were usually considered highly politically 
credible, constituted the third group of Jinjiang Factory’s labor force. 
Admittedly, the recruitment of demobilized soldiers was not unique to Third 
Line enterprises. Perry notes that demobilized peasant soldiers accounted for a 
large proportion of workers in Chinese state-owned enterprises. 128 
Nevertheless, few urban enterprises had as many demobilized soldiers as 
Jinjiang Factory, where they could even act as an independently influential 
group. After all, urban enterprises had to absorb the numerous laborers who 
were city dwellers first. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, more than one sixth 
of the workers at Jinjiang Factory were demobilized soldiers from nearby 
                                                             
127 From 1951 to the late 1980s, Chinese state-owned enterprises applied the Eight-Grade 
wage system to workers and the Twenty-Two-Grade wage system to managers. Workers were 
classified in different grades according to their seniority and skill level. The first grade 
indicated the most inexperienced and lowest skilled worker, while the eighth grade referred to 
the most experienced and highest skilled. In practice, every worker could be upgraded step by 
step in a certain (fixed) number of years.  
 
128 Perry, Elizabeth J. 1994, “Shanghai’s Strike Wave of 1957”, The China Quarterly, 137 
(March), pp.1–27. 
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villages. Compared to the transferred workers and the Returned Educated 
Youths, who at least had finished high school, these demobilized soldiers were 
mostly illiterate peasants. However, their poor educational background did not 
restrict their entitlement to privileges. Like their colleagues the Jixiaosheng, 
they could skip the apprenticeship stage and enjoy the pay of first-grade 
workers. Even though they were paid 10 yuan per month less than the 
Jixiaosheng, their access to land somewhat alleviated their burden in raising a 
family. Some would even give up their extra award and save more of their 
time to take care of their crops, as the following conversation illustrates:   
 
“To be honest, I did not care about the extra award. For those at most 5 to 
10 yuan, I had to exhaust myself every day. Then who would take care of 
my land in the village? I need to ride for two hours to the land by bicycle!” 
 “Why did not you hire someone?” I asked. 
 “How could I afford that? Besides, the person I hired might not be better 
than me. It was not worthwhile to sacrifice my harvest just for a few 
yuan!”129 
 
In a word, due to their different backgrounds, workers in each group had a 
different name indicating the shared origins and features associated with it. 
When someone was mentioned as a transferred worker, it usually implied a 
                                                             
129 Interview with Lan Qingshan. 
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skilled, well-educated person living an urban life style; if categorized as 
Returned Educated Youth, he/she was usually considered educated but 
unskilled. The term “demobilized soldiers” had a variant in the factory, 
laozhuan (“the elder demobilized”), a somewhat belittling name usually 
referring to the most illiterate and unskilled segment of the labor force.  
 
There are exceptions to these generalizations, of course. For example, my 
interviewee Ye Xingjian was one of the Educated Youth workers. Through 
assiduous work and study in the Machinery Workshop as an ordinary worker, 
he not only outperformed many transferred skilled workers in practical 
operations, but also published several journal articles dealing with difficult 
technical problems. Since Jinjiang Factory’s bankruptcy, he has been hired by 
a university in Chengdu as a lecturer. Ye Xingjian is not the only one who does 
not fit in the above broad categories. On the whole, however, some common 
features could be identified for the majority of workers in each group. 
4.2 Group Belonging and Job Opportunity in Jinjiang Factory 
In her analysis of workers’ fragmentation in Shanghai, Perry showed that the 
workers’ occupational opportunity was intimately associated with their place 
of origin. 130  Interestingly, a similar phenomenon also occurred in Jinjiang 
Factory in that workers from the same group congregated in a particular job 
                                                             
130 Perry, 1993. 
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niche in the factory. Occupational segmentation by groups thus further 
fostered and solidified the separation of workers. How, then, were workers’ 
groups in Jinjiang Factory associated with different job niches? To answer this 
question, it is necessary first to clarify the concepts of “the front” and “the 
rear”, a general categorization of occupational opportunities in the factory 
coined by the workers themselves.  
 
        The terms “the front” (前方) and “the rear” (后方) were actually 
borrowed from their usage in warfare, referring to the front (battlefield) and 
the rear (support) respectively. Hence, “the front” of the factory generally 
included those departments, workshops and offices which took part in the 
production process, while “the rear” referred to those sections providing 
support services. It is noteworthy that this bifurcation was made by workers at 
different levels of the factory’s hierarchy. At the highest level, the division 
existed between the workshops and the factory management departments as 
well as other logistics sections, such as the team of trucks (车队). At the 
intermediate level, “the front” and “the rear” categorized different workshops. 
The Machinery, Matching Parts, Heat Treatment, Casting and Forging, and 
Preparation workshops were all front workshops involved in production, while 
the Instrument Production Workshop and the Machine Fixing Workshop were 
regarded as the rear ones., the Division between the “front” and the “rear” 
could also be found in each workshop, at the lowest level. For example, , the 
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Matching Parts Workshop had the most workers of any workshop at Jinjiang 
Factory. Every worker in it belonged to one of five groups: planning, 
technology, production, washing, and assisting. The production group, which 
accounted for 295 of the 393 workers in the workshop, was the only group not 
categorized as “rear”.131  
 
The occupational opportunities in “the front” and “the rear” at different 
levels were filled with workers from particular groups. Since the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, a general pattern of occupational segmentation among 
workers had gradually appeared in the factory: the transferred workers 
accounted for the majority in the rear sections, while the demobilized workers 
and Returned Educated Youths made up most of the labor force in the front. 
Specifically, through the 1980s and the early 1990s, the transferred workers, 
especially those from Shanghai, mostly worked in the factory’s management. 
Those who failed to become members of the factory staff usually transferred 
between or within workshops from the front to the rear. Two things might 
explain such a pattern. First, compared to the Returned Educated Youths and 
demobilized soldiers, the transferred workers were on average more senior, 
more skillful and more experienced, and it therefore seemed more proper to let 
them take charge of the work on planning, managing, supervision and so on.         
Second, since the Retuned Educated Youths and most of the demobilized 
                                                             
131 Documents of the Report on the Reorganization of the Enterprise, December, 1983, 
Jinjiang Oil Pump and Nozzle Factory. 
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soldiers were younger than the transferred workers, it was reasonable to let 
them shoulder the burden of heavy work in the front positions. As a result, the 
Returned Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers constituted the 
overwhelming majority of the labor force in the front job slots of the front 
workshops. But again, the distinction in practice was not as neat and stark as 
this. Typical outliers were the demobilized soldiers who had previously held 
positions above Platoon Leader. These former military officers usually 
assumed the position of Party Branch Secretary in the factory workshops. This 
group was, however, small in numbers, and not big enough to change the 
association of workers’ occupational opportunities with their group belongings 
in general.  
 
Conventional wisdom has repeatedly emphasized the role of gender in 
weakening the labor force as a whole.132 Jinjiang Factory was no exception, as 
the gender variable indeed affected the differentiation of workers’ jobs in the 
factory. After the Matching Parts Workshop (393 workers), the Machinery 
Workshop was the second-biggest in the factory, with 246 workers. The 
production of these two workshops was in stark contrast to their skills 
requirements. The task of the Matching Parts Workshop was to accurately 
match the nozzle needle with the needle housing, to a level of precision of 
                                                             
132 See, for example, Glickman, Rose, 1984, Russian Factory Women: Workplace and Society, 
1880–1914, Berkeley: The University of California Press; Tilly, Louise A. 1986, “Paths of 
Proletarianization: Organization of Production, Sexual Division of Labor, and Women’s 
Collective Action”, in Leacock, Eleanor and Helen I. Safa (eds.), Women’s Work: Development 
and the Division of Labor by Gender, South Hadley MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1986; Perry, 1993. 
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microns; while the work in the Machinery Workshop, on the other hand, 
mainly consisted of grinding, fitting, lathing and so on. The former task thus 
required extreme patience and care, while the latter needed sufficient physical 
strength to operate and lift perhaps the heaviest machinery and units in the 
factory. Female workers therefore became the majority in the skilled 
workshop, while male workers dominated the relatively less-skilled ones. This 
was in contrast to the pattern described by some previous studies. 133  The 
difference between these two workshops can be better understood from Figure 
14 (a) and (b). It can be seen that the machines in the Matching Parts 
Workshop were much smaller than those in the Machinery Workshop. With 
these small machines, however, workers could not perform their jobs without 
light from lamps even in daylight, which hinted at the degree of precision and 
difficulty in their job. As a result, “more than 60% of workers in my workshop 







                                                             
133 In many previous studies, women were usually seen as an unskilled group of labor 
compared to their male counterparts. See, for example, Perry, 1993, Chapter 7; Deyo, Frederic 
C. 1989, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industrialism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989.  
 
134 Interview with Cao Mingshen. 
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Figure 13: The Matching Parts and Machinery Workshops 
 
 
Above: Workers in the Matching Parts Workshop. Below: a section (工段) of 
the Machinery Workshop. (Pictures taken from Jinjiang Factory brochure.   
 
Over time, segmentation according to group belongings became more 
established by the nature of the workers’ job assignments. The transferred 
workers sat in the rear as managers, production planners, quota setters, 
technology supervisors, timers etc., while the Returned Educated Youths and 
demobilized soldiers were on their feet in the front and shouldered the 
majority of the production work. Gender also played an important role in 
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determining workers’ assignment to workshops. It further divided the front 
workers and gave different workshops unique recruitment preferences. If 
labels, as well as occupational niches in the factory, have well delineated 
distinctions among workers, in what way did they affect the relationship, 
friendly or unfriendly, among workers? After all, the group belonging and 
occupational positions per se have played no part at this point. To answer this 
question, we need to go beyond abstract theoretical inference and focus on the 
specific and clear day-to-day activities of workers.  In next two sections, I 
argue that, through the workers’ day-to-day interactions outside the workshops 
as well as the activities inside them, group belongings were transformed from 
abstract names to real practices. Different labels signified differences not only 
in appearance, such as clothing styles and hobbies, but also in mutual 
perceptions and attitudes. 
4.3 Fragmentation in Daily Lives  
Life Outside the Workshop  
Differences can be observed and seen to expand in the details of workers’ 
daily life. By studying women workers in cotton mills in Shanghai, Emily 
Honing found that dress style, eating habits, marriage customs and dialects 
constituted the basis of the most important divisions and antagonisms among 
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workers.135 Perry also observed similar phenomena among the women cotton 
workers in the Jiangnan and Subei areas.136 In Jinjiang Factory, these details of 
workers’ daily life played the same role in shaping the mutual impressions of 
workers.  
 
Dacron (transliterated to Chinese as diqueliang) may be the most popular 
fabric in the 1970s and the 1980s. It was imported from overseas and first sold 
in Guangzhou, before quickly becoming a precious fabric in the cities of 
eastern provinces. Due to its scarcity in the market, clothes made of Dacron 
were usually much more expensive than cotton ones. At the time, owning a 
Dacron shirt could even be regarded as a symbol of high status. Dacron 
clothes were rarely seen in the local stores of Chengdu, however, let alone the 
Supply and Marketing Cooperative (供销社) in the villages. The high price 
also prevented the Returned Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers from 
buying their much-desired Dacron clothes. As a worker recalled, in the 1970s, 
a Dacron shirt would cost no less than 5 yuan with clothing coupon, while his 
basic salary was a mere 21.5 yuan. In the factory, therefore, workers who were 
Returned Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers usually wore clothes 
made of coarse materials in subdued colors. The attire among transferred 
workers, especially those from Shanghai, was much smarter. Many of them 
possessed Dacron clothes in bright colors, which were easily recognized by 
                                                             
135 Honing, 1986, p. 5. 
 
136 Perry, 1993, p. 59.  
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others in the factory. One of my informants, a transferred worker from 
Shanghai, explicitly expressed her pride in her dress:  
 
We had shirts made of Dacron! Those local workers were not able to buy 
them and they envied us very much. When you were walking in the factory, 
you could even identify the transferred workers from others merely by their 
clothing. In the late 1980s, as they [Returned Educated Youth, demobilized 
soldiers, and some other local workers] got richer and richer, they always 
entrusted us to buy these smart clothes from Shanghai. So every time I 
came back from my home leave in Shanghai, I took several large packages 
with me, full of all the stuff they wanted. The most popular items were 
leather shoes and shirts of new designs.137 
 
Dacron clothes were quite novel for local workers, but they were by no means 
the only thing brought by the transferred workers that attracted the attentions 
of their local colleagues. Many transferred workers also moved their furniture, 
beds, shelves, wardrobes and even coal stoves, from the eastern cities to the 
mountain area. Each of those new-fashioned designs always gave rise to a 
surge of imitation. A typical example was the popularity of the design called 
“Tiger Claw” (老虎脚). This was originally a design for the legs of wardrobes 
used by Shanghai workers. Local workers later imitated this design and 
                                                             
137 Interview with Zhu Guiqin. 
 
 118 
applied it to their tables, beds and other pieces of furniture. As one informant 
recalled as she guided me to her room and pointed at the wardrobe: 
 
Do not look down upon this wardrobe. You could only apply for one at the 
time you registered [your] marriage. When we moved it here from 
Shanghai, the local workers were amazed by its design. … (She bent 
down) … Look at this. It was called Tiger Claw and many locals once 
came to look at it and measure it. Soon after, it became one of the most 
popular designs for local furniture. But their imitation was never as 
beautiful as ours from Shanghai.138 
 
Thanks to their unbroken links with the eastern cities, the transferred workers 
could enjoy access to many daily necessities not available to local workers. In 
order to ensure the continual provision of these, the transferred workers had to 
take all possible opportunities to go back to their home cities and took as much 
as possible of these items each time: 
 
Many things we needed were not available here. Some of them could 
not even easily be found in Chengdu. Soap, sugar and the type of 
dried noodle which was my son’s favorite, for example, were all 
brought in from Shanghai. That was why I had to go back, even 
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though the train ticket was very expensive. In 1976, the ticket for a 
hard-cushioned train from Chengdu to Shanghai was 34.2 yuan; the 
hard berth was 58 yuan, while my salary was only 31.5 yuan per 
month. Basically, I went every 18 months and, every time I came 
back, my hands were full of bags. We always laughingly said that 
our salaries all contributed to the construction of our nation’s 
railways.139 
 
The differences between workers could also be observed through their daily 
recreational activities. Generally speaking, board games, physical exercise, 
and artistic and cultural activities were the most popular in the factory. Among 
these, most transferred workers would choose to be involved in artistic and 
cultural activities, such as practicing calligraphy, playing musical instruments, 
reading books, writing poems and carving seals, while the Returned Educated 
Youth workers preferred to play board games, of which Chinese chess, bridge 
and mahjong were the most popular. Some of the peasant demobilized soldiers 
had to do their farm work after their work in the factory, while the others were 
more likely to join the Returned Educated Youth workers for board games. 
Sports and physical exercise appeared to be the common interest of the three 
groups of workers, but the players would usually partner with workers from 
the same group. The different hobbies among workers were clearly identified 
                                                             
139 Interview with Zhu Guiqin. 
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by one informant: 
 
People from this region [Sichuan Province] liked playing mahjong and 
cards very much. Those Educated Youth workers and some of the 
demobilized soldiers even arranged to meet up during working hours in the 
workshop. They invited their mahjong and cards partners and discussed 
whose home they would go to after dinner. They knew how to enjoy their 
lives. We transferred workers did not like playing mahjong. In our spare 
time, we usually played badminton, read books or newspapers, wrote 
diaries and some essays, drew pictures or did seal carving.140 
 
This informant’s observation could be corroborated by some common patterns 
among workers in Jinjiang Factory. All the transferred workers interviewed 
reported reading books and playing ball games as their most preferred 
pastimes, while more than 80% of the Returned Educated Youth and 
demobilized soldiers reported chess and various card games as their favorite 
leisure activities. 141  Pierre Bourdieu once argued that the probabilities of 
practicing different sports (used as a general term) were contingent on one’s 
economic capital, cultural capital, spare time and family tradition as well as 
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141 Interestingly, none of the workers mentioned mahjong as their favorite game in their leisure 
time. One reason might be that, in the official discourse of the factory, mahjong was regarded 




early training, the distribution of hobbies among workers at Jinjiang Factory 
revealed their distinguishing characteristics along these lines, which delineated 
the boundaries between one group and another.142 
 
Clothes, daily necessities, furniture and hobbies were indeed minor 
details of life, but as a form of culture in the factory they became outward 
manifestations of different labels, distinguishing one group of workers from 
another. Moreover, this culture gave rise to a public image of those transferred 
workers as fashion-conscious, well-educated people with cosmopolitan tastes, 
which further enhanced their sense of superiority and strengthened their self-
identification of the label “transferred workers”: they were missionaries from 
the country’s most developed region coming to Chengdu to evangelize. 
Life in the Workshop  
Workshops were another crucial site shaping workers’ perceptions towards 
others. In the production process, workers’ interactions characterized their 
relationships, competition or cooperation in a particular way. 143  Frequent 
                                                             
142 Bourdieu, Pierre, 1991, “Sport and Social Class”, in Chandra Mukerji and Michael 
Schudson (eds.), Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 369–70.  
143 The scholars of production politics associate labor politics with the labor process. See, for 
example, Burawoy, Michael, 1979, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process 
under Monopoly Capitalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Edwards, Richard, 1979, 
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frictions due to differences in working skills, seniority and working attitude 
made the division among workers visible and relevant to all. It was through 
day-to-day interactions in the workshop that the label of each group was 
bestowed with meanings beyond a common name or identity, which in turn 
shaped the workers’ impressions and attitudes toward each other and 
ultimately affected their mutual relationships.  
 
Whenever the production task in the “front” workshops was intensive, the 
factory mobilized workers in the rear to provide help. This policy was 
supposed to be a win-win game for both camps of workers. On one hand, 
workers in the rear could get some extra pay; and on the other, the workload of 
workers in the front could be reduced. However, instead of strengthening the 
worker’s solidarity, the support provided by “the rear” workshop – mainly 
made up of transferred workers – to “the front” ones – mainly Returned 
Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers – turned out to have exacerbated 
the division among workers.  
 
Why did a supposedly mutually beneficial arrangement lead to greater 
fragmentation? The key was that the temporarily relocated workers in the front 
workshops were motivated by financial and reputational incentives and tended 
to exceed their production quota. Among, The excess bonus might be the most 
straightforward and effective of the various incentives because, for many 
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workers in the rear shops, this bonus was very hard to obtain.  
 
As mentioned above, the rear workshops were not directly involved in 
manufacturing, but offered various forms of assistance to the front workshops 
so as to make production smoother and more efficient. The nature of the work 
in the rear workshops was therefore different from that in the front ones. Let 
us take the Instrument Production Workshop and the Machinery Workshop as 
examples for comparison. Workers in the former mainly worked on the 
production of special tools needed for some specific processing procedure but 
which could not be found in the market. Cutters were one type of such tools 
required for component processing. Besides some normal cutting, the 
multifarious design of the components required distinctive cutting work to be 
performed with uniquely designed cutters. These unconventionally shaped 
cutters were the “products” of the Instrument Production Workshop. Usually, 
as each particular instrument was only required by one workshop, one section, 
or sometimes even one production group, the total number of such products 
required was no more than a few dozen, sometimes even fewer than ten. In 
stark contrast, workers in the Machinery Workshop had a much heavier 
workload. They took charge of the basic processing job, such as cutting, 
grinding, fitting and lathing. Even though they did not have to be bothered by 
making tools in strange shapes, they were required to fulfill their monthly 
production quota. The Instrument Production Workshop and the Machinery 
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Workshop could therefore be classified as “technology intensive” and “labor 
intensive” respectively. In other words, workers in the rear shops such as 
Workshop of Instrument Production Workshop were doing technologically 
complicated but small-scale work. It was therefore very common for the 
workers in this shop to have almost completed the required number of their 
“products” (e.g. special tools) shortly after they became proficient at their 
production. Exceeding the quota was therefore out of the question. In contrast, 
jobs in the front shops were technologically simple but quantitatively large, 
and were undoubtedly easier for workers to increase their income by receiving 
the excess bonus. This was especially the case for the workers called up from 
the rear, who were more skilled than those in the front.  
 
Besides the formally established material incentives, some informal 
cultural factors, such as the concern about mianzi (“face”) and personal 
dignity, also played a role in motivating the temporarily located workers to 
exceed their quota. Workers in the rear shops were mainly transferred workers, 
who were supposed to be more experienced and skilled than the Returned 
Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers. When they were moved from the 
rear to the front, if they had failed to do their work better than others in terms 
of quantity and quality, they would have felt shamed and worried about being 
mocked by their colleagues. Zhu Guiqin described her experience of 
supporting workers in the Machinery Workshop: 
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When the production task was heavy, the factory always mobilized the 
workers in the rear to give support to the front. When we were moved to 
the front shops, we usually worked very hard. But many people just wanted 
to show off and tried very hard to outperform others. Actually, this kind of 
act was very likely to create resentment among workers in the front shops. 
I did not do this … Every time I finished my quota, I would stop and wait 
for others. Once, a young worker came to me after work and said, “Zhu 
shifu (Fellow Zhu), you did it so fast!” I replied “Actually, I could even 
save another one and half hours!” Even though I would not exceed them in 
production, I think I needed to tell them the truth and let them see the gap 
between them and us. After all, most of us workers from the rear shops 
were more experienced, more senior, and more skilled than them. If our 
working speed could not exceed theirs, we would lose face and they would 
mock us behind our backs.144 
 
As Zhu mentioned, workers in the front shop were not grateful for the support 
of the workers from the rear. On the contrary, they were more likely to be 
irritated by their hard work and blame the helping workers. It was not because 
the moved workers took the bonus that should have had belonged to them. No 
matter how much extra money the moved workers earned during the month(s) 
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in the front shops, they were working on a temporary basis and would sooner 
or later go back to their original workshops. In fact, what worried the front 
workers a lot was that their production quota was very likely to be increased in 
future due to the hard work of the rear workers. In every workshop, the quota 
setters (ding e yuan) adjusted the quota of each procedure and each component 
every month according to the workers’ monthly performance. If many of the 
moved workers were able to complete the same production quota in a much 
shorter time, the quota setters would think that the existing quota in fact 
underestimated the workers’ productiveness. Surely, large quota adjustments 
could not be made casually and easily, but the working records of the moved 
workers would certainly be an important benchmark for future quota 
increases. Moreover, the production quota was also rigid in nature and, once 
increased, would never fall back. In other words, the hard work of the moved 
workers could have a permanent effect on the workload of the workers in the 
front shops. When I asked my informant Zhu Guiqin why she did not exceed 
the production quota as others did, she answered: 
 
Some shifted workers’ hard work could possibly increase the production 
quota of the whole section they were in. It was not a big deal for us shifted 
workers because we only worked there for a while, but the front workers 
had to work there for their whole life!145 
                                                             
145 Interview with Zhu Guiqin. 
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In a word, in the process of supporting the front workshops, the horizontal 
division among workers was entrenched. On one hand, the moved rear 
workers were motivated, formally and informally, to exceed their production 
quota; on the other, the front workers were very likely to be burdened in the 
future with higher production targets. On the surface, this seemed to be a 
division between the rear and the front workshops. Looking deeper, however, 
it was in fact a division between workers with different labels. Ironically, 
though some transferred workers indeed appeared more considerate than 
others, like the informant Zhu Guiqin, their explicit claims of superior skills 
and strong desire to distinguish themselves from others achieved an effect no 
less than their colleagues in separating themselves from the front workers.  
 
It is worth noting that the tension between the front and rear workers 
discussed here is different from that between the temporary and permanent 
workers discussed earlier. 146  According to Blecher, temporary contract 
workers are “peasants who have been hired by urban state/collective sector 
industrial enterprises through contracts with their rural collectives. Although 
temporary contract work is often not very temporary at all … the contract 
workers retain the official status of rural householders, and maintain their 
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permanent home in their villages.” 147  The tension between front and rear 
workers is therefore different from that between the temporary and permanent 
workers in at least two respects. First, the former occurs among all permanent 
workers, while the latter occurs between workers of different employment 
status. Second, the former happens intrinsically because of the discrimination 
of one group of workers against another, while the latter is a consequence of 
discriminatory state policies. As a result, the former is more likely to worsen 
the relationship among workers than the latter.  
 
The sense of skills superiority also gave rise to a discriminatory attitude 
by the transferred workers toward their local colleagues. The worst victims 
might be the demobilized soldiers. In Jinjiang Factory, the transferred workers 
gave them a new group name, laozhuan (“the elder demobilized”). The 
demobilized soldiers were, on average, actually no older than the transferred 
workers; on the contrary, they were in fact much younger. The name laozhuan 
was used to express the transferred workers’ dislike and belittlement of the 
demobilized soldiers’ illiteracy, lack of skills, and nonchalant working 
attitudes. The informant Liu Chengmin complained that: 
 
Those demobilized soldiers and some Returned Educated Youths were 
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illiterate and unskilled. Most importantly, I think they had the peasant 
mentality, that is, they were calculating and unwilling to make even the 
smallest sacrifice. Also, they did not do their work carefully and seriously. 
In the foundry, when we were making the models, any foreign substance 
was not acceptable. But many of those workers in the shop were not as 
responsible as us. Several times, I clearly saw some sand in the mold, but 
they still poured the molten iron into it. I tried to stop them and asked them 
to clean the mold first. But they just ignored me.148 
 
It goes without saying that there were many demobilized soldiers who worked 
carefully, and some were even technologically outstanding. However, the 
discriminatory perceptions held by the transferred workers toward the 
demobilized soldiers were pretty stubborn once they were labeled laozhuan. 
As the informant Lan Qingshan recalled, 
 
Those transferred workers and Jixiaosheng always looked down on me. I 
started my work in this factory under the tutelage of a Shanghai master 
worker. On the first day he instructed me, he said to me “When you finish 
your study with me, as long as there is no one laughing at you behind your 
back, you should be satisfied.” To be honest, that really struck me. Since 
then, when others completed their work and went to play elsewhere, I 
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stayed on to read the learning materials. I would not leave even when they 
invited me to play with them. I actually became quite skillful in two years. 
Once there was a test for the skill of grinding, and 200 workers in total 
registered for the test. The workshop director asked me “What ranking do 
you expect?’” I answered “Maybe the top six.” The director laughed and 
said, “Top six? Don’t even think about it!” At that time, there was also 
another Shanghai worker standing beside the director. He sneered and 
pointed his little finger at me. Seeing their reactions, I changed my goal 
immediately and said, “I will be in the top three”. When the test had 
finished, the director asked how I had done. I told him I got 90-plus in the 
theoretical test, and thought I could score full marks in the practical test. 
He questioned this and said, “Impossible, no one can get full marks!” Then 
he ran to the lathe I operated and carefully checked my work. After 
checking for a while, he claimed that I had not cleaned the machine very 
well after using it and deducted two points. So in the end, I got 98.149 
 
This was not the first time that Lan Qingshan experienced discrimination, and 
unfortunately it was not the last time either: 
 
The factory frequently held skills examinations. Once, a Shanghai worker 
asked me “Do you want to get the awards for this examination?” I asked, 
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“How much is the first prize?” “30 yuan”, he said. “OK, then I want to 
come top.” He laughed and said, “Are you kidding? You think you can be 
the first, with your poor skills?” I felt offended and responded, “If I am not 
in the top three, I will give up my basic wage. Or your workshop can treat 
me to a meal – deal?” When I knew I was the top scorer in the 
examination, I went to his workshop and asked him to deliver on his 
promise. The director gave me another 30 yuan and asked me to buy the 
meal myself. They were very smart and knew they had to spend a lot more 
on treating me because I was certain to invite dozens of my friends to enjoy 
the meal with me!150 
 
After Lan Qingshan completed his studies with the master worker, he worked 
independently in the Instrument Production Workshop. But the misery did not 
end with his appointment in the factory’s “technology intensive” section:  
 
Once they asked me to make an eccentric cutter (偏心刀牌). As I saw 
the design drawing, I found some mistakes in the basic technical 
specifications. I told the designer, a Shanghai master worker, but he 
ignored my suggestions and just asked me to do it strictly according 
to his design. I declined, and asked him who would be responsible if 
in the end all the cutters turned out to be useless. He said he would 
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take the responsibility. But I think he could not afford it, because it 
would be a great waste of materials. Even worse, it might slow down 
the pace of production in the front workshops. Then he turned to 
someone else for help. They made eight in total, and seven of them 
were discarded because they could not be used. That designer came 
to me again and tried to persuade me to make it. I told him I could 
not do it unless he followed my suggestion and revised those wrong 
specifications. I did it for him till 11 pm and only one out of the eight 
failed.151 
 
Fellow Li (Li shifu) was a fitter at the factory. Once he needed me to 
process a component for him. He told me the basic technical details 
orally. I tried three times and they all failed. Then I approached him 
and asked him if there might be a problem with his technical data. 
He insisted that his data was correct and said scornfully, “What the 
hell would you know about it?” I was so annoyed and refused to do 
it anymore. He did the work himself many times and all of them 
failed. He was so angry that he forcefully smashed a useless one onto 
the floor. Finally, he invited the workshop director to negotiate with 
me and wanted me to offer help. At the time, I was still angry and 
said to him satirically, “Just smash the lathe machine, if you dare! 
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You are a Jixiaosheng. But I am afraid you cannot even read the 
caliper!”152 
 
It must be said that Lan Qingshan’s unhappy encounters were probably 
extreme examples because people were more likely to keep their negative 
attitudes toward others to themselves rather than making them explicit. 
However, these unspoken perceptions and attitudes would not disappear just 
because of efforts to hide them. It was an insidious source of fragmentation 
deep in the minds of the workers, strengthening the intra-group recognition 
and diminishing the prospect of inter-group solidarity in the process. Once a 
trigger appeared, such as the quarrel that Lan Qingshan encountered, the 
concealed disharmony among workers of different labels was exposed in 
public.  
 
Wage increases are a typical trigger of that effect. From 1963 to 1977, 
Chinese workers’ wages were virtually unchanged in numerical terms and 
workers entering the labor force during this period received the lowest levels 
of pay.153 Although workers in Third Line enterprises were paid a little more 
than others due to the policy privilege, their wages had also been frozen since 
their recruitment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was not until the end of 
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the Cultural Revolution that workers finally had their wages increased for the 
first time. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Jinjiang Factory initiated four 
wage increases in total, in 1979, 1983, 1985 and 1987. None of the increases, 
however, covered all employees at the factory. Each time only 40% of the staff 
was entitled to the salary increase. The factory usually set the level for each 
department (various administrative departments, workshops, the factory 
hospital and the factory-affiliated schools were all included) in proportion to 
its share of total employment, and devolved the power of selection down to the 
lower organizations. In the course of competing for selection, workers 
immediately split up when making their claims in order to become one of the 
beneficiaries. As Tan Yi, who was the Party Branch Secretary o in the Heat 
Treatment Workshop, recalled:  
 
In the Working Conference on Wage Increase, the representatives started 
quarrelling with each other very easily. The demobilized soldiers claimed 
based on their laborious work in the front; the transferred workers claimed 
for their seniority. As for the Returned Educated Youth workers, according 
to the national policy, the period for which they went to the countryside 
and became members of production teams was also counted toward their 
length of service. Accordingly, even though they entered the factory some 
years later, they were not considered less senior than others and, based on 
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that, they also claimed their wage increases.154 
 
As the interviewee informed me, similar phenomena could also be observed in 
the Matching Parts, Machinery and Instrument Production workshops.155 In 
order to avoid conflicts among workers, many of these sub-organizations drew 
up their selection list by secret ballot. Unfortunately, this did not ameliorate 
the fragmentation of workers as expected, due to the prevalent practice of 
private canvassing. Ni Tongzheng recalled his experience working in Jinjiang 
Factory Technical School:  
 
“It was around 1982 or 1983 when we had the chance of a wage 
increase. The wage increase could only cover 40% of us, but for 
someone who had made great contributions to the factory, his/her 
wage could be increased by two grades. At that time, besides my job 
in the factory technical school, I also worked as the director of the 
internship workshop (实习车间). Actually I did a lot more. For 
example, I did a lot of secretarial work for the school principal and 
helped to promote cooperation between factory workshops and 
external organizations. Given all that I did for the school and factory, 
the school principal, vice-principal and even the Party Branch 
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Secretary, they all wanted to increase my wage by two grades.” 
 
“Where did they come from?” I asked. “Were they all from 
Shanghai, like you?”  
 
“Yes, they were all from Shanghai. At the time, I was competing 
with a demobilized soldier, who was much older than me and was in 
charge of ideological and political work in the school. To be honest, 
he worked very conscientiously, but his position in the school 
belonged to the rear section, which was considered unimportant. In 
order to make sure I could have my wage increased by two grades 
successfully, we did a lot of work in private. All those leaders who 
supported me helped me to win the votes. They persuaded all the 
other teachers and staff workers who came from Shanghai to vote for 
me. When the result was released, that demobilized soldier was very 
angry. He even went to question our leaders. Soon afterwards, he left 
our school and transferred to the factory’s propaganda 
department.”156 
 
Ni’s experience shows that, due to the existence of private canvassing, the 
secret ballot did not help to avoid the segmental effect in the course of 
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competition between workers for the wage increase. In fact, mutual support 
based on personal relationships further strengthened the internal solidarity of 
the existing subgroups and made the difference among groups more visible.157 
As the informant Mr. Yin Qiming summarized, “in my opinion, the 40% 
policy had a very negative effect on the workers’ solidarity. It unintentionally 
led to a series of conflicts among workers, between workers and leaders, and 
also among leaders (群众斗群众，群众斗干部，干部斗干部).”158 
 
        To sum up, over an extended period of day-to-day interaction inside and 
outside the workshops, Jinjiang Factory workers had developed their 
perceptions and attitudes of one group toward another. In other words, through 
their daily activities, the notion of “group belonging” gradually materialized as 
a visible boundary differentiating and dividing the working class in the 
factory. As a result, workers in each group were more willing to build their 
social relationships within the group they belonged to.  
4.4 Interconnected Social Networks in the Jinjiang Factory 
Living in a relatively isolated site, Jinjiang Factory workers were highly 
dependent on the factory in building social relationships. A good example is 
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the informant Tan Yi’s kinship network: 
Figure 14: Tan Yi’s Kinship Network in Jinjiang Factor 
 
Notes: In this figure, all the capital letters are the first letter of people’s family 
name. “=” denotes a marital relationship; “…” denotes siblings; “_” linking 
different capital letters indicates people across generations, but not necessarily 
a parent–child relationship.   
 
        As Figure 15 shows, ten families were included in Tan Yi’s kinship 
network and each is denoted by the first letter of their family name. My 
interviewee Tan Yi and his wife are denoted by T1 and W1. T2 and T3 are two 
brothers of Tan Yi and they married the daughters of the heads of the finance 
department and quality inspection department respectively, who are denoted 
by D1 and S2. S2 had a brother, S1, who married the daughter of a senior 
worker L; he was the nephew of Q, both of whom worked in the Matching 
Parts Workshop. Q’s daughter Q2 was working in the dining hall, and her 
husband was a cadre working in the general office. Q2’s elder brother Q1 was 
a worker in the Machining Workshop. His wife Z1 was working with her 
father Z in the Heat Treatment Workshop. Tan Yi’s wife W1 was working in 
the factory’s kindergarten, and her younger brother, W2, was in charge of 
marketing in the of Instrument Production Workshop. W2’s wife, F1, worked 
in the Assembly Workshop. Her elder sister, F2, working in the Forging and 
Casting Workshop, got married to a worker, C1, in the Machining Workshop. 
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C1’s elder brother C2 married the daughter of the deputy director of Jinjiang 
Factory. C1 and C2’s father was a senior worker transferred from Shanghai.  
 
        The example of Tan Yi’s kinship network may, of course, show an 
extreme case in Jinjiang Factory and not all workers were in kinship networks 
like this. But it was certainly not exceptional either. Otherwise, the workers 
would not have felt so strongly the tangled relationships among families.  
 
The social relationship in the factory was so complicated! Every family had 
twisted roots and gnarled branches (盘根错节). It was true that if you pulled one 
hair, the whole body would be affected (牵一发而动全身). So you had to make 
any decision with great caution. You would never know who would be affected in 
the end.159  
 
Living together for a long time, every family in our factory had a close relationship 
with each other. Workers always laughingly described it as “one twig shakes, 
hundreds would follow” (一枝动，百枝摇)”160. 
 
Chen and Fu vividly illustrated that no worker in Jinjiang Factory was an 
atomized individual. Instead, each belonged to a family group composed of 
different nuclear families. As a result, the initially atomized working class in 
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the factory was gradually transformed into a corporate organization by 
interfamily marriages. 
 
        However, these social relationships were not built at random, whereby 
any two workers were able to establish ties with each other. Specifically, in 
Jinjiang Factory, friendships and marriages were more likely to occur between 
workers of the same group. As some sociologists have argued, “friends assess 
others in a similar way. If A and B have positive feelings about each other, and 
person B has positive feelings about person C, then person A will also know 
and have positive feelings about person C.” Over time, the interconnected 
social networks were weaved in each group of workers. This phenomenon can 
be roughly illustrated as in Figure 16. In this figure, workers were divided in 
terms of their group belongings. In each group, the social relationships were 
intensive and thus workers were connected to each other one way or another. 









Figure 15: Interconnected Social Networks in Jinjiang Factory 
 
Notes: “=” denotes marriages, “_” denotes friendship or relatives beyond 
immediate family members (husband and wife); “N” represents the husband of 
Zhu Guiqin (“Z”); “L” represents the interviewee Lan Qingshan; “F2” and 
“C1” are the members in Tan Yi’s kinship network shown by Figure 15. 
 
        The interconnected social networks were found during the interviews as 
well. In the process of snowballing interviewees, I noticed a tendency for the 
nominators and the nominees to share the same group belongings in the 
factory. It was very rare to get a transferred worker to recommend a 
demobilized soldier or a Returned Educated Youth worker, and vice versa. 
Based on the assumption that people are more likely to nominate the person 
with whom they had the closest relationship, I infer that the building of 
friendships mainly happened among workers of the same label. To check the 
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robustness of this inference, I asked interviewees to list the friends who they 
contacted and interacted with most frequently. All the names provided by each 
interviewee in the end belonged to people with the same background. For 
example, Liu Chengmin mentioned five men in total, all of whom were 
Jixiaosheng who graduated from the same technical school as him in 
Shanghai.161 One possible way to bring the transferred workers together with 
the Returned Educated Youths and the demobilized soldiers was through the 
master–apprentice relationship. But the results of the interviews indicate that 
the effect of such a relationship needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
Almost all the workers interviewed expressed respect for their masters, and 
some reported that they would send good wishes and gifts to their masters at 
every festival. But only one admitted that such relationships would eventually 
develop into close friendship. In some cases, on the contrary, the master–
apprentice relationship could even reinforce the existing stereotypes of a 
particular group. The aforementioned Lan Qingshan’s experience was a typical 
example.  
 
        Marriages were also more likely to occur within the group of a certain 
label. Among all the interviewees, only three had cross-group marriages.162 
The rest, except for the demobilized soldiers, all married colleagues with the 
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same background. Most of the demobilized soldiers had already been married 
prior to their employment in the factory, and their wives stayed at home doing 
farm work. In reality, of course, the pattern of marriages among workers was 
not as neat as it seems in theory. If we look at the whole family tree of a 
worker in the factory, it is not surprising to find a distant relative coming from 
a different group. Take Tan Yi’s kinship network as an example again: Tan Yi 
is a demobilized soldier but his wife’s brother’s wife’s sister’s husband’s father 
is a senior worker transferred from Shanghai.  
 
        In fact, there were similar exceptions in respect of the building of 
friendships. The close relationship between two of the interviewees, Lan 
Qingshan and Zhu Guiqin, was a good example. As mentioned earlier, Lan 
Qingshan was a demobilized soldier who frequently encountered friction with 
the transferred Shanghai workers. But he had quite a good impression of Zhu 
Guiqin. He told me that “Fellow Zhu (Zhu shifu) was not like other Shanghai 
workers. She was kind to me and taught me a lot in the Instrument Production 
Workshop.”163 Given Lan’s frequent unpleasant experiences with many other 
Shanghai workers, his friendship with Zhu appeared especially precious. Lan 
visited Zhu regularly even after their retirements, though his home was more 
than an hour away by car. 
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        In a word, even though there were occasionally “strong ties” across the 
boundary of different groups, these do not challenge the general pattern that 
workers of one group were reluctant to establish kinship and intimate 
friendship with colleagues from another. 
4.5 Contrasting Social Relations in Urban SOEs and Jinjiang Factory 
The phenomenon of clanization in urban work units has been discussed in 
some previous studies. However, the features of clanization mentioned in the 
existing literature are quite different from those in the Third Line enterprises. 
In his pioneering work, Lu Feng conceptualizes clanization in terms of the 
relationship between individual and organization. 164  According to Lu, the 
work unit shared many similarities with traditional Chinese families. First, 
members of the work unit must be subordinate to the paternal authority of the 
organization; second, an individual’s obligation to the organization was more 
important than his/her rights; third, the organization should take full 
responsibility for taking care of their members’ welfare. These three features, 
mentioned by Lu, could actually be found in every factory, including the Third 
Line enterprises. As a result, even though Lu offers an insightful 
conceptualization of clanization, this concept is not very meaningful because it 
is essentially a constant.  
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        One way to address this limitation is to shift the focus from the 
relationship between individual and organization to that between individuals. 
Dittmer and Lü have made a significant contribution in this direction. 165 
According to these authors, clanization is a relatively new form of informal 
relationship in the post-Mao period, which typically occurred in state agencies 
and other administrative organs.166 In these clanized work units, many cadres 
were working with their direct family members or people with lineage ties in 
the same department.  
 
        We can basically identify two features of clanization from the work of 
Dittmer and Lü. First, clanization is a political phenomenon, created by the 
holding of power, as in the evidence provided by the authors shows: 
 
… In the county government agencies of a remote northern province, 68 of 148 
cadres who held important positions had relatives working in the same agencies; 
of these, 27 children worked with their parents, four couples shared the same 
office, and 23 people had cousins, uncles, brothers-in-law, or godchildren 
working in the same agencies.167 
 
For the powerless ordinary workers, the phenomenon of clanization is 
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relatively rare. According to the authors, except for instances of 顶替 
(replacement of retired workers with their children or relatives) or 内招 
(recruitment of the children or relatives of internal workers), ordinary workers 
had almost no opportunity to get their family members a job in the same 
factory.  
 
        Second, clanization among cadres took on a single-centered hierarchical 
structure with the family member holding the highest power at the top. 
Usually, the member at the top of the hierarchy would hire employees based 
on kinship. As a result, different families were relatively independent from 
each other with clear demarcation lines between them. This structural feature 
was vividly described by the popular satire: “pop-son bureau, hubby-wife 
section, son pours water for dad, grandson drives for granny, spouses share an 
office desk” (父子处, 夫妻科, 儿子倒茶老爹喝, 孙子当司机, 鸳鸯共用办公
桌).168  
 
        Nevertheless, clanization in the Third Line enterprises differed from 
Dittmer and Lü’s account. First, clanization in these enterprises was not a 
political phenomenon based on power. Instead, it was by and large a social 
phenomenon based on the marriage between two workers and, later, two 
families, regardless of the power of their positions in the factory. In other 
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words, it was not a nepotistic but a marital relationship. Hence, if clanization 
in urban work units was an intentional consequence of power, then clanization 
in the Third Line enterprises could be considered an unintended result of 
isolation. 
 
         In fact, the factory’s isolated location was not the only factor causing 
clanization. The political ends of the Third Line enterprises further intensified 
this phenomenon. Due to their high level of secrecy, unlike the factories in 
cities, the Third Line enterprises relied more on the neizhao policy for 
recruitment in order to guarantee the political credibility of new workers. 
Candidates related to current workers, in the form of brothers, sisters, brother-
in-law, sister-in-law, nephews, nieces and cousins, were prioritized for 
recruitment by internal recommendation (内部推荐). As a result, in the latter 
stages of the Third Line Construction, marriage between two workers was 
actually a marriage between two big families.  
 
        Clanization due to intermarriage among families produced the second 
different feature of the social structure in Third Line enterprises. The structural 
difference of clanization between urban factories and Third Line enterprises is 
illustrated in Figure 17. In the single-centered hierarchical structure seen in 
Figure 17 (a), every family is an independent interest community, centered 
around the member who possessed the greatest power. In the multi-centered 
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radiant structure shown in Figure 17 (b), every family is situated in an intricate 
and complex social network, its boundary demarcated not in terms of each 
independent family but by the group labels. As a result, compared to their 
urban counterparts, Third Line workers were living in a bigger and more 
compact net, like the gentle but mobile surface of water in a deep pond. Once 
any part of the pond was disturbed, ripples would spread out. 
 
Figure 16: Social Relations of Two Different Structural Features 
 
                    Figure 16 (a)                             Figure 16 (b) 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the emotional basis for the toleration. Living in the 
mountains, isolated from the outside world, workers at Jinjiang Factory sought 
their friends and marital partners within the factory. In this process, they 
became interconnected in one way or another. However, this interconnection 
did not occur in a random manner. It was constrained within the subgroup that 
the worker belonged to. Generally speaking, workers in Jinjiang Factory were 
divided into three groups: transferred workers, Returned Educated Youths, and 
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demobilized soldiers. This division of workers was strengthened by their 
occupational niches in the factory and reinforced in day-to-day interactions 
inside and outside the workshop.  
 
        A direct consequence of the interconnected social networks was the 
complication of inter-personal relationships in the factory. The formal 
relationships of colleagues or between superiors and subordinates were at the 
same time intermingled with informal ones, such as friends, relatives or even 
husband and wife. In this sense, the boundary between family and factory was 
blurred. In this context, group leaders and managers in the workshop tended to 
implement the formal policies loosely. 
 
        Admittedly, the relatives of managers sometimes could be placed in an 
easier and more confortable position at the workplace. However, this 
preferential treatment did not impede the development of group leaders’ 
toleration. From Tan’s family tree, it can be seen that the social networks in 
Jinjiang Factory were so interconnected that even an ordinary worker could be 
somehow related to a director or a party secretary of a workshop.  
 
        It is worth noting that the segmentation of workers at Jinjiang Factory 
could not be fully explained by Perry’s “politics of places”.169 According to 
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Perry, workers in Shanghai prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China were divided in terms of their respective places of origin. In Jinjiang 
Factory, however, both the Returned Educated Youths and the demobilized 
soldiers were natives of Sichuan, but were separated into two different 
subgroups. These two groups of people shared the same origin, but had 
different backgrounds due to state policy. In this sense, the segmentation of 
Shanghai workers was in fact a result of societal mobilization, which was 
realized through two intermediate social actors – the guild and gangs – while 
the segmentation of workers at Jinjiang Factory was a consequence of state 
mobilization. The transferred workers, Returned Educated Youths and 
demobilized soldiers were respectively related to a particular state-initiated 
political movement, and these identities were being continuously strengthened 
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Chapter 5 The Context of Toleration (3): Workers’ Control on 
Production  
 
In Jinjiang Factory, the tolerating strategy was also a compromise on the part 
of the group leaders. This compromise was a result of workers’ control over 
production, rooted in two institutional features: the workers’ permanent 
employment status and the occupational immobility within the factory. The 
compromise between group leaders and workers at Jinjiang Factory reveals 
that the style of management is not merely a product of macro-structural 
conditions. It is also a reflection of the group leaders’ subtle maneuverings in 
their handling of various circumstances in day-to-day activities. Simply put, it 
represents the leaders’ accommodation of the combined and intertwined 
effects of the state, the production process and social relations. 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the permanent employment 
status. I will argue that it is this status that provided the institutional basis for 
the workers’ ability to violate the formal rules. In the second and the third 
sections, I will introduce two direct consequences of occupational immobility 
within the factory – the group leaders’ preferences to maintain personal 
reputations and friendly relationships with others, and the development of 
workers’ control over daily pace of production. Basically, the workers’ control 
contained three elements. First, workers were autonomous in ordering the 
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sequence of processing among different parts. Second, they also had the 
autonomy to balance their quota tasks among different parts. And third, 
workers could expand their autonomy over the rate of production by making 
use of the uncoordinated actions or plans among different factory departments, 
workshops, working groups and even individuals. The final section offers 
some conclusions.  
5.1 Permanent Employment Status 
On a fundamental level, permanent employment status provided the 
institutional basis for workers’ violations of the formal rules. Conventional 
wisdom associates permanent employment status with the low efficiency of 
Chinese state-owned enterprises. According to these works, workers in SOEs 
had no incentive to work hard because their performance had little effect on 
their income, and the factory management even had no right to fire employees 
unless they committed a crime. 170  In Jinjiang Factory, the permanency of 
employment status provided the workers with the leverage for dealing with the 
managers. 
 
The permanent employment status of workers at Jinjiang Factory lasted 
until 1999, when the first round of lay-offs was carried out. Prior to that, it had 
long been one of the most crucial factors impeding managers’ discretion in the 
                                                             
170 See Walder, 1986; Lu Feng, 1989; Li Hanlin, 1993; Liu Jianjun, 2002. 
 
 153 
workshop. In Tan Yi’s working diary, Ma Jie was perhaps the biggest 
troublemaker and gave the factory’s management a big headache. No matter 
what he did in the factory, including shirking, bullying and vandalism, the 
management could do nothing but try to educate and reeducate him. Even 
though he was diagnosed with a mental illness, the factory lacked any better 
ways to deal with his problem. The following lengthy extract from Tan Yi’s 
working diary records the factory’s difficulty in dealing with this 
troublemaker.  
 
July 6, 1987, Monday (Factory Friday171) Sunny 
Ma Jie beat up Wang Yongxin. The workshop decided to give him administrative 
sanction and sent him to the hospital for treatment of his mental illness.  
 
July 21, 1987, Tuesday (Factory Saturday) Cloudy 
I talked to Ma Jie and asked him to acknowledge his mistake, write a self-
criticism and make an apology.  
 
August 8, 1987, Saturday (Factory Wednesday) Sunny 
I talked to Ma Jie. He agreed to write a self-criticism and make an apology in the 
group meeting. 
 
                                                             
171 “Due to local electricity shortages, factories in certain areas usually had their ‘weekend’ 
days in turn. That is why the factory had its own unique weekly calendar.” Explanation by 
interviewee Ni Tongzheng.  
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August 9, 1987, Sunday (Factory Thursday) Partially Cloudy 
Ma Jie beat up Xu Yingshi. The workshop decided to return his personnel calmly 
to the Department of Human Resources and ask them to transfer him to another 
position in the factory. 
 
August 15, 1987, Saturday (Factory Wednesday) Sunny 
I talked to Ma Jie together with factory deputy director Yu and the factory’s 
Party secretary, Zhang. He did not acknowledge his mistake but blamed the 
leaders of the workshop and other colleagues. After two hours of heart-to-heart 
talk, he decided to make a self-criticism in the workshop tomorrow morning. The 
workshop made a decision that, as long as he did not make the mistake again, the 
workshop would keep him in his present position.  
 
August 22, 1987, Saturday (Factory Wednesday) Cloudy 
Ma Jie’s mother arrived at the factory today. We exchanged our opinions on the 
problem of Ma Jie. We also talked to him patiently in an attempt to make him 
aware of his mistakes.  
 
September 19, 1987, Saturday (Factory Wednesday) Cloudy 
Ma Jie quarreled with some workers in the Machining Workshop.  
 
September 21, 1987, Monday (Factory Friday) Sunny 
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I talked to Ma Jie and tried to educate him and help him. 
 
November 24, 1987, Tuesday (Factory Saturday) Cloudy 
Ma Jie fought with Liu Hanji. According to the factory’s investigation, Ma Jie 
landed the first blow on Liu Hanji. Then Liu Hanji fought back. The cause of the 
fight was that Ma Jie smoked in the workshop and Liu attempted to stop him. 
The factory leaders will talk to Ma Jie next Monday.  
 
December 4, 1987, Friday (Factory Tuesday) Cloudy 
For no reason, Ma Jie struck the door of the Quality Control Room in the 
workshop with an iron bar. The door was badly damaged, with a one-foot crack 
on it. Nobody seems to have set him off, actually. According to Ma Jie himself, 
“There was a fire within my body and I just wanted to release it”. It seemed that 
the workshop could not have him anymore. 
 
Ma Jie’s case showed that the factory could not easily fire any of its permanent 
workers. Womack also recognized the empowering effect of permanent 
employment. He responds to Walder by pointing out that his “over-
concentration on state power overlooks the concrete limits on leadership 
discretion, ignores the informality of power in small-scale, stable situations, 
and produces a skewed and unrealistic view of workplace 
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interrelationships.” 172  The crucial concrete limit on leadership discretion, 
argued Womack, is “the context of permanent employment in state 
enterprises”, which “has been seen as a benefit by the workers, and it limits 
the leadership in its choice of sanctions.”173  Hence, the constrained group 
leaders were barely capable of exerting their power in a coercive way and it 
would be unrealistic for them to expect full obedience from their workers. If 
any request was perceived as unsatisfying, it was very likely to be contested 
by their members through a series of acts of non-cooperation. As Liu 
Chengmin, who used to be the group leader in the Heat Treatment Workshop, 
recalled:  
 
The job of being a group leader was quite difficult … Many demobilized 
soldiers and Returned Educated Youth were not well-educated and their 
skills were also poor. So the leaders of our workshop always encouraged us 
to organize some skills training activities. I used to attempt to initiate some, 
but all of them failed. My group workers refused to participate in the skill 
training activities. They said I started these activities just out of my 
personal interest. They speculated that it was my way to accumulate 
political capital, by which I could be promoted in the future. Besides, they 
did not want their leisure time to be taken up by these boring activities.”174 
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173 Ibid. p. 322.  
 
174 Interview with Liu Chengmin. 
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Liu Chengmin’s experience can also be found in Tan Yi’s working dairy. 
Interestingly, Tan’s record of this anecdote is more dramatic than Liu’s oral 
description: 
 
23rd December, 1987 Sunday (Factory Thursday) Rainy 
Morning: The Director [of the Heat Treatment Workshop] and I had a 
heart-to-heart talk with Liu Chengmin. Liu submitted his resignation 
application in the morning. He felt it was too difficult to be a group leader. 
He felt very aggrieved at not being understood by his member workers. He 
cried bitterly. The Director and I consoled him first, and went on to analyze 
and explain the difficulties he encountered. Liu’s experience revealed some 
common problems that existed in our workshop: the cooperation between 
different groups, the cooperation within the group, the implementation of 
the group regulation and the management skills of the group leaders and so 
on. Next year, the workshop should focus on the project of working group 
improvement.  
 
Tan’s diary shows that Liu’s experience was by no means an uncommon 
occurrence in Jinjiang Factory. In these working groups, member workers had 
never been a powerless group subordinating to their immediate leaders.  
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5.2 Job Immobility and Preference for Personal Reputation 
The balancing effect of member workers was further strengthened by the 
relative immobility across jobs within the factory. As in the case of inter-firm 
transfer, mobility across different jobs within the factory was also rare in 
Jinjiang Factory. This phenomenon can be seen in Zhu Guiqin’s explanation of 
her pace of work when she temporarily provided help in another workshop.  
 
Some shifted workers’ hard work might increase the production quota of 
the whole section they were in. It was not a big deal for our shifted workers 
because we only worked there for a while, but the front workers had to 
work there for their whole life!175 
 
Job immobility defined the nature of the game between the group leaders and 
their member workers. Essentially, it was an infinitely repeated game over an 
infinite horizon. In this game, even though the group leaders theoretically had 
the authority to implement the regulations issued by the upper level 
management regardless of their members’ feelings, as mentioned above, in 
practice they had to face the challenges of non-cooperation from their member 
workers whenever those measures were perceived as unsatisfying. In other 
words, in this repeated game, the group leaders and member workers were 
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playing a form of “tit-for-tat”. As predicted by the models of repeated 
games, 176  cooperation can constitute a stable equilibrium in such games 
because future gains from mutual cooperation can counter the short-term 
incentive to cheat. Indeed, the group leaders at Jinjiang Factory usually had 
their own ways of compromising the interests of their bosses and member 
workers, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.177 
 
The job immobility in the factory defined not only the nature of the game, 
but also the players’ preference structure. Previous studies on Chinese labor 
policy have failed to consider group leaders’ preferences within concrete 
social structures. Usually, they simply equate the group leaders’ preferences 
with those of the factory managers – namely, the factory’s output or profits – 
and have overlooked the independent role of the group leaders. Of course, the 
group leaders’ strong preference would be to meet and even exceed the 
production target. But it had never been their single most important 
preference, especially when we take into account their specific situations. Due 
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177 This internal cooperation of working groups should be viewed with caution. Burawoy 
recognized the positive effect of immobility within a firm on the development of cooperation 
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it might be necessary to further clarify that the trusting relationship in the working group 
might not necessarily be related to altruistic values. The trust between group leaders and their 
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to the job immobility in Jinjiang Factory,  the group leaders greatly valued the 
reputations they held among others. Furthermore, their isolated condition and 
relatively closed life also increased the weight of reputation, which was not 
necessarily any less important than their completion of the production task: 
 
You could not apply the formal rules very strictly. Otherwise, you must be 
resented by your member workers. In such a small factory site, we met 
regularly and frequently, and some of us were even neighbors. It was 
unwise not to get on well with your colleagues.178 
 
It was not much good talking about formal discipline or the Thoughts of 
Mao Zedong to your workers. That would quickly stimulate their antipathy 
against you and ultimately destroy your prestige in the working group. If 
that happened, how could your work get done? So the first lesson of being 
a group leader is to learn how to get on well with your member workers.179 
 
Fu and Cao’s descriptions suggest the importance of the relationship inside the 
working group. In fact, the group leaders’ authority was sometimes also 
constrained by the complicated social ties outside the working groups, as Chen 
Youbai recalled: 
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…You had to make any decision with great caution, because you would 
never know who would be affected in the end. Let me give you an example 
to show the complexity. In our Heat Treatment Workshop, the most regular 
number of workers was around 40. But do you know what was the 
maximum number of workers we ever had? It was more than 80! People all 
knew that the work in our workshop was relatively less laborious than the 
other front workshops, so many of them liked to send their brothers, sisters, 
sons or daughters to our workshop. Eventually, there were so many 
relationships in the workshop you need to think about. I must admit that the 
complicated relationships in the workshop did affect my work and even the 
factory’s regular production.180 
 
According to other informants, Chen had the reputation in the factory of lao 
hao ren, meaning that he avoided offending anybody. Chen’s easy-going and 
gentle personality probably made him more constrained by social ties than 
others, which in a way called into question the relevance of his experience to 
others. However, in light of the other two informants’ statements, it would be 
difficult to deny that the complicated social relations constrained the workshop 
managers.  
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5.3 Job Immobility and Workers’ Control on Production  
The group leaders’ discretion over the production line was also greatly 
challenged by the workers’ autonomy over their day-to-day pace of work. This 
important leverage of labor had, however, been overlooked in previous studies 
of Chinese labor. In analyzing workers in state-owned enterprises, previous 
studies concentrated on either their obedience under the socialist authoritarian 
regime,181  or their sporadically organized protests ignited by major policy 
changes, such as the policy to repatriate the Educated Youths and the market-
oriented reforms. 182  In the studies focusing on the workers’ obedience, 
scholars attempt to discover the various means of control in the factory, while 
those focusing on protests endeavor to find the opportunities for and 
organizational resources in the course of protest mobilization. The truth is, 
however, that Chinese workers in socialist enterprises were neither obedient in 
nature, nor only troublesome in sporadically organized movements. They 
could express their dissatisfaction by employing their “weapons of the weak” 
in everyday production. “It is commonplace that, even under slavery, workers 
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have means of slowing down the pace of work.” 183  This autonomy 
undoubtedly existed in socialist factories as well. Moreover, it was 
strengthened by the workers’ job immobility in the factory, as mentioned 
earlier.  
 
An unintended consequence of job immobility was the strengthening of 
workers’ autonomy over the pace of work. During apprenticeship, workers 
were usually trained in skills that were specific to a particular machine shop, 
or even a particular section. Thus, by matching workers trained in a particular 
skill to specific positions in the workshop, the factory could not only reduce 
the costs of retraining, but also enhance the efficiency of production. However, 
the factory was not the only party that benefited from this policy. According to 
the interviewees, they also preferred to stay in one job, not only because they 
had limited skill profiles, but also because it enabled them to have better 
control over the working process. Seniority in one position provided them 
complete knowledge of every detail of their work: the process of material 
distribution, the condition of tools and machines, the personality of colleagues 
and so on. All of this “tacit knowledge” related to production could not have 
been more valuable to the workers because it earned them more salary and 
more free time.  
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Overall, the workers’ autonomy over their daily production could be 
viewed from at least three perspectives. First, they were autonomous in 
ordering the sequence of processing for different parts. Take workers of the 
Machining Workshop as an example: except for the fuel-injection nozzle, 
which was produced in the Matching Parts Workshop, the Machining 
Workshop was in charge of processing more than 400 different parts, such as 
the pump, camshaft, and front and back covers. These different products were 
assigned to ten production groups, and workers in each group were assigned 
specific tasks in terms of types of work – such as lathing, grinding, drilling, 
milling and planing – rather than the type of parts. Therefore, although the 
workers were assigned specific tasks, it did not mean that they were merely 
responsible for processing a particular part. Every month, as long as they were 
able to meet the required quota, the group leaders would not interfere with 
their processing order; it was entirely the workers’ own business. This 
autonomy of workers caused a lot of trouble for the group leaders, as the 
leader of the camshaft group complained: 
 
We were assigned tasks in terms of type of work. For every type of work, a 
worker usually had more than one type of part to work on. You see, this 
raised the important issue of processing order. In the workshop, we did not 
have a rule specifying each worker’s processing sequence, and I think it 
was actually impossible to make such a rule because the actual situations 
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were usually very flexible and changeable. Sometimes you had to speed up 
your production of some parts for the Assembly Workshop; sometimes you 
could even slow down your work on some parts, since no time slot for heat 
treatment was available. The responsibility for coordination always fell on 
our shoulders;  the member workers could not be bothered to think about 
this. They were more willing to first process the parts that had a less strict 
quota time, or with a low risk of wastage, and they usually attempted to 
avoid or procrastinate those otherwise. How to effectively mobilize them, 
to be honest, completely depended on whether you had the talent.184 
 
Second, the workers also had the autonomy to vary their quota task between 
different parts. On paper, only the director and the leader of the workshop’s 
planning group had the right to adjust the quota between different products in 
response to the changing production situation. In practice, however, the rank-
and-file workers used this autonomy to take advantage of the rules’ 
limitations. According to factory regulations, every worker had a standard 
requirement to work 208 hours per month, and bonuses would only be given 
for extra working hours over 208.How much bonus a worker could earn 
therefore mostly depended on how many extra hours he/she could work. The 
implementation of this regulation hinged on the feasibility of calculating the 
workers’ actual working hours. Generally speaking, the calculation was based 
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on the number of different parts workers actually completed. As mentioned 
earlier, workers assigned a specific task usually had more than one type of part 
to process. The different structures and designs meant that, although workers 
were doing identical work, the processing time for each type of part was 
nevertheless very different. Thus, the actual number of working hours was the 
sum of the working time on each type of part, which was defined by the 
“quota time”. For example, if a worker lathed 200 front covers and 300 back 
covers a month, and the determined standard times for lathing a front cover 
and back cover were respectively 20 and 30 minutes, then this worker’s actual 
working hours in a month were [(20×200)+(30×300)]/60=216.7. 
 
The quota time for each process on each part was determined by the 
factory. In December every year, based on the factory’s production records and 
with reference to other factories’ standards, the Department of Human 
Resources determined the quota time for each part for the following year’s 
production. In this way, the quota time for regularly produced parts could be 
more precisely determined, taking into consideration the time necessary for 
production preparation and physical recovery. As for newly developed parts 
and products, due to the lack of previous production records, the quota time 
was less precise and usually longer than what the technological prediction had 
suggested. As mentioned above, the factory’s determined quota time was 
subject to change. In fact, it could be readjusted by the workshop quota setters 
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according to the specific conditions in their workshops.  
 
As can be seen, the method used to calculate the actual working hours 
only took account of the total amount of time a worker eventually spent on the 
task and failed to take into consideration the type of part being worked on. The 
workers were therefore able individually to vary their working hours between 
different parts. An effective ratio method could not only help them complete 
the required 208 basic working hours as quickly as possible, but also allow 
them to earn more bonuses than others. Driven by this potential economic 
interest, many workers at Jinjiang Factory were from time to time tempted to 
make use of this autonomy. This can be seen from the following statement by 
the Director of the Machinery Workshop: 
 
In 1984, I was transferred from the factory’s General Office and became 
the Director of the Machinery Workshop. For quite a long time, this 
workshop, despite being one of the most important, had failed to complete 
the production task assigned by the factory. This was why my leaders 
transferred me from the office to the front line of production. Before I 
came to this shop, I guessed something inappropriate might exist in the 
quota–setting process. After a period of close contact with the group 
leaders and workers, I realized that my previous guess was completely 
wrong. There was nothing inappropriate with the quota requirement, and 
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there was no problem with the workers’ production capacity either. It was 
our problematic incentive system that resulted in the production failure. 
The only thing that worried the workers was their ultimate working hours. 
They did not care about the problem of coordination with others or whether 
the workshop could meet the factory’s requirements. As a result, the 
workers were very likely to produce 600 or even more of some easily 
processed part only 500 of which were enough to meet the target. This was 
a rational choice for them because, if they produced more of the easily 
processed parts, then they could save much effort on the difficult ones. For 
the factory, however, this was damaging. On one hand, they wasted a lot of 
precious materials and, on the other, they also delayed the subsequent work 
of another workshop.185 
 
Third, workers could also expand their autonomy over the pace of production 
by taking advantage of the uncoordinated actions or plans of different factory 
departments, workshops, working groups and even individuals. The factory 
workshops were not operated separately, but in a coordinated way. The 
progress of production could be slowed down due to delayed supply of raw 
materials, no available time slot for heat treatment, or tardiness in the making 
of required instruments. Any uncoordinated action would definitely harm the 
factory’s interests, whereas it provided the workers with opportunities to seek 
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free time. This was because they could use these organizational defects as 
reasonable excuses for slowing down the pace of production.  
 
Although uncoordinated actions between different departments seldom 
occurred, those between different workers were frequent. One fact that could 
not be ignored was that it was not possible for workers doing different types of 
work to finish their work at the same time. This led to the very natural 
consequence that, for example, when a lathe worker finished his work on the 
bases of delivery valves and was prepared to lathe the joint screws, the screws 
would, however, still be being processed by another drilling worker. This 
uncoordinated action between workers created a production-free period for the 
faster workers while they waited for the next work. This period in the 
workshop was known by workers as “waiting for a job time” (denggong 
shijian). In cases where this delay was quite long due to particular 
organizational problems in different groups or sections, these faster workers 
could even gain a day or half a day off.  
 
This coordination problem was especially serious in the Machining 
Workshop. As mentioned above, more than 400 parts (excluding standard parts 
such as the screw and screw cap) were processed in this workshop, and each 
required a certain number of processing steps. For example, the processing of 
a camshaft consisted of 43 steps. Efficient coordination of the 43 steps among 
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different groups and workers had been always a big challenge for both the 
section chiefs and the group leaders. To make thing worse, as the number of 
parts awaiting processing increased, coordination became more challenging 
than ever before. This ever-present challenge to the management, however, 
benefited the workers as it gave them more opportunities to seek free time. 
This phenomenon was indirectly recalled by the Director of the Machining 
Workshop: 
 
“Before taking up my post in the workshop, I actually carried out some 
investigations into the conditions of the place where I was about to work. I 
did this because I did not have much working experience in the front 
production workshops. I knew almost nothing about it. Privately, I was told 
by the previous workshop director that the end of every month was a really 
difficult time. At that time, many workers would come to the previous 
director’s office and hurl the question ‘On what basis did you give me so 
much less bonus than the others?’ As they asked, some of them even glared 
fiercely and pounded the desk angrily.”  
“Why did this problem happen?” I asked. “Wasn’t there the record of 
working hours as the basis [for calculation]?”  
“Working hours were just one determinant of one’s ultimate bonus, 
actually. The quality of their work, the maintenance of the machine and the 
safety of production and so on would also be considered. In addition, they 
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could also bargain with the director, claiming that it was the interrupted 
provision of work that slowed down their own pace. It was therefore a 
management problem, but not the workers’.”186  
 
It is worth mentioning that the workers in the Instrument Production 
Workshop and the Heat Treatment Workshop exploited their autonomy 
differently, due to their respective ways of production organization. In the 
Instrument Production Workshop, workers were independently responsible for 
the production of a certain set of instruments and did not have to coordinate 
with others within the workshops. This independence did not actually reduce 
their autonomy over their production, rather it had the opposite effect. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, workers in this workshop mainly produced 
special tools for a specific processing procedure which were required by 
certain other workshops. Usually, these unconventional tools were new to both 
the designer and the producer. Those workers therefore often had to make 
suggestions to revise the nature of raw materials, the machine conditions and 
any other technical details related to production. In other words, given that the 
workers had better knowledge of the operational aspects of production, the 
novelty of these tools entitled them to a greater right to question the original 
design. It was this right of questioning that gave them the autonomy over their 
pace of work, whereby they were able to attribute the causes of delay to other 
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parties, as long as they could provide some seemingly justifiable reasons. The 
quarrel between Lan Qingshan – a worker in the Instrument Production 
Workshop – and the tool’s designer, which was described in detail in the 
previous chapter, is a typical example of the workers’ autonomy in production.  
 
The Heat Treatment Workshop represented a different example of the 
workers’ exploitation of their autonomy. In contrast to other workshops, 
workers here worked not individually but in groups. This particular form of 
production organization was determined by the nature of the work in this shop. 
Unlike other shops, such as those processing parts or producing tools, the main 
task of this shop was to move a large number of parts at a time, usually 
measured in tons, to the furnace for heat treatment according to a 
predetermined sequence. Unlike the work of other workshops, it took the 
entire team to get the task done. As a group of workers together moved the 
heavy parts, it was hard to tell who worked harder and who shirked. Within a 
team, however, each worker was credited with the arithmetical average of the 
total work completed. Teamwork combined with egalitarian distribution of 
credits inevitably bred free-riding behavior, which were in fact an indirect but 
intentional exploitation of the autonomy through the workers’ manipulation of 
the formal institutions. The uniqueness of production organization in the Heat 
Treatment Workshop was summarized by the leader of the planning group in 
this shop:  
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We were not individually working in the shop, but working as a team. Each 
team consisted of six or seven member workers, some of whom assumed 
the main role, shouldering more work, while others – usually women 
workers – assisted. Due to the need for teamwork, the production task, 
which was measured by the required working hours, was calculated for the 
team, rather than for the individual. Within the team, the working hours 
were credited equally to member workers. Every morning before work 
started, a brief meeting would be held (banqianhui), at which I assigned a 
specific part of the day’s work to each group leader. Of course, in our 
workshop, the women workers were usually in an advantageous position in 
team, because they worked less but received the same.187 
 
In a word, regardless of the workshop, the form of production organization, 
and the kind of work, the rank-and-file workers were all able to seek their 
autonomy over their daily pace of production without explicitly challenging 
the formal institutions. Working in these circumstances, the group leaders 
never enjoyed fully-fledged authority and had to work under the constraints of 
their members’ potential “weapons” in the process of production.  
 
 Is there any difference between transferred workers, demobilized 
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soldiers and the Returned Educated Youths in their autonomy over production? 
To an extent, the differences between these groups could be seen as 
differences between different workshops. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
workers’ job opportunities were associated with their group belongings. 
Transferred workers, who were more highly skilled than the other two groups, 
occupied positions in the Instrument Production Workshop, while demobilized 
soldiers and the Returned Educated Youths mainly occupied the Heat 
Treatment Workshop and the Machining Workshop. In fact, the way in which a 
worker could gain his/her autonomy over production was largely affected by 
the nature and demand of the work of a particular workshop. Therefore, due to 
the fact that the assignment of jobs in Jinjiang Factory was closely associated 
with the workers’ origins, the overlapping of inter-group differences with the 
differences between workshops was by and large a coincidence. 
Conclusion 
In view of the discussion above, the toleration of group leaders was also a 
compromise derived from their own preference and the capacity of the 
workshop. The job immobility in the factory meant that they cared more about 
their reputations and friendships with others. In addition, the job immobility 
also enabled the workers to develop a series of ways to control over their daily 
pace of work. Underpinned by permanent employment status, these 
autonomies provided the workers with influential leverage over their relations 
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with the group leaders. In a word, working in these circumstances, the group 
leaders were not completely willing and able to control strictly.    
 
        To some extent, the group leaders’ tolerance indicated the importance of 
the intra-group stability in the factory. Some may argue that the intra-group 
stability was highly valued because the top priority of factory managers at that 
time was social stability rather than marginal profitability. This was indeed a 
factor in the Third Line enterprises as well. However, this argument ignores 
the fact that, although marginal profitability was not the pursuit of the factory, 
the scheduled production plan was the task that managers at all levels had to 
complete. In these managers’ eyes, to fulfill the scheduled production plan 
and complete the required basic production task might be no less important 
than the maintenance of intra-group stability, simply because the former was 
directly related to their individual income. As a result, the concern for 
stability itself may not be able to fully explain the group leaders’ tolerant 
attitude. Instead, as discussed above, the tolerance was a response by 
managers to the context they were in.  
 
The story of Jinjiang Factory also showed that the “managerial 
dilemma”188 had existed widely in Chinese socialist enterprises, because the 
behavior of group leaders was conditioned not only by the macro-structure in 
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which they were situated, but also by the micro-circumstances coming from 
the mundane daily life they were embedded in. After all, their member 
workers were not merely passive recipients of the formal institutions, but 
active agents who were able to accommodate and even, in a way, change the 
existing constraints by their understanding and manipulation of state policy, 
social relations and working experiences. In this sense, the central problem for 
managers under socialism was not fundamentally different from that under 
capitalism. That is, “not to wrest knowledge of the production process from 
the worker but to persuade workers to co-operate in their own exploitation.”189 
In the course of “manufacturing consent,” 190  therefore, the role of group 
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Chapter 6 Toleration in Practice (1): the Phenomenon of 
Absenteeism  
 
During the late 1970s and the 1980s, persistent and rampant absenteeism had 
been a serious problem for Jinjiang Factory’s management. It was a problem 
not only in one or two workshops, but in the whole factory. I choose the issue 
of absenteeism as an example to show the tolerating strategy for two reasons. 
First, it is perhaps the most common problem that management needs to deal 
with in the day-to-day routine. As Edwards and Whitston say, “the problem of 
persuading workers to attend work regularly is as old as capitalism.” 191 
Second, and more importantly, it is intrinsically linked to order in the 
workplace. Numerous critiques have argued that absenteeism is not merely a 
reflection of inadequate career satisfaction of individual employees. Rather, as 
part of a conflict-laden relationship between employers and workers,192 it is 
closely related to its organizational setting193 and has very different social 
meanings.194Absenteeism is thus a window through which the wider issue of 
order and relationships in the workplace can be understood. 
 
                                                             
191 Edwards, Paul and Colin Whitston, 1993, Attending to Work: The Management of 
Attendance and Shopfloor Order, Oxford: Blackwell, p. 5. 
 
192 Edwards, Paul and Hugh Scullion, 1985, “Absenteeism and the Control of Work”, 
Sociological Review, Vol. 32, August, pp. 547–72.  
 
193 Marcus, Philip M. and Catherine B. Smith, 1985, “Absenteeism in an Organizational 
Context”, Work and Occupations, Vol. 12 , August, pp. 251–68. 
 
194 Johns, Gary, and Nigel Nicholson, 1982, The Meaning of Absence, in B. M. Staw and L. L. 
Cummings (ed.), Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 4, Greenwich, Conn: JAI. 
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        In this study “absence” means a state of being away from duty without 
the factory’s permission. “Absenteeism” refers to the habitual pattern of this 
state. Usually, the absenteeism carries connotations of the conscious violation 
of formal factory rules, but it does not necessarily refer to the workers’ 
deliberate defiance or non-overt resistance. What distinguishes the former 
from the latter is the action’s potential purpose towards the status quo. An 
action that is a simple violation of the rules, though it occurs consciously, does 
not necessarily represent the desire of workers to change existing 
circumstances. It occurs only because of certain individual needs, such as 
housework, family illness, etc. In contrast, a resisting action usually expresses 
the workers’ dissatisfaction with the status quo and their desire for change. In 
Jinjiang Factory, workers’ absenteeism takes many different forms. It includes 
not only the most common cases of arriving late and leaving early, but also 
many more covert behaviors that are effectively the equivalent of physical 
absence, such as false sick leave, chatting or carrying on personal business 
during working hours, deliberately slowing down the pace of toilet visits, 
collecting water, etc. 
         
        This chapter aims to present an overview of absenteeism in Jinjiang 
Factory in two sections. The first illustrates the severity of the factory’s 
absenteeism in a quantitative way. In the second section, I briefly describe two 
categories of situation leading to workers’ absences:  misbehavior in work and 
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periodic and impromptu personal matters.  
6.1 Discussion of Absenteeism in Conferences  
Conferences play an indispensable role in the factory’s management process. 
They deliver instructions from above, collect information from the grass roots, 
and absorb useful opinions from all sides. As a result, what is discussed in the 
conferences, by and large, is a mirror of what is happening in the factory. 
Following this logic, this section uses the proportion of conferences that 
discussed absenteeism to indicate the degree of absenteeism in general. Using 
this indicator has at least three advantages. First, it reflects the absenteeism 
problem in the whole factory rather than in one or two workshops. Second, 
since the factory’s conferences are scheduled to a routine, with only a few 
exceptions, the proportion can be compared across years. Third, though it fails 
to present the precise number of absences, it can properly capture the general 
picture of the factory’s absenteeism problem. This is simply because the 
factory’s managers govern by relying not only on paper records of absences, 
but also on their understanding of what is actually happening in practice. In 
fact, due to the group leader’s multifarious tricks, which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7, the paper absence records are not in fact as precise as 
expected.  
 
Conferences at Jinjiang Factory could be classified into four types. The 
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meeting of party branch secretaries was one of the most important 
conferences. It was a scheduled monthly discussion focusing mainly on 
ideological education, new party member recruitment and so on. The secretary 
of the factory’s party committee chaired the meeting. Production issues were 
discussed at a meeting of the factory’s middle-level cadres. This was also a 
scheduled monthly meeting, attended by workshop directors and heads of the 
factory’s functional departments. The factory director was in charge of this 
meeting.  
 
Assessment meetings were also scheduled on a monthly basis. Here the 
factory’s economic planning department would release its assessment of the 
work of every workshop and functional department. Monthly bonuses were 
allocated on the basis of this report. The production-scheduling meeting (生产
调度会) was the fourth type of factory conference. It took place twice every 
week, once on Friday afternoon, called the “primary scheduling meeting” (一
级调度会), and once on Tuesday afternoon, called the “secondary scheduling 
meeting” (二级调度会). At the primary scheduling meeting, all the factory’s 
functional departments, such as the quality control department or even the 
security department, were represented, while at the secondary scheduling 
meeting the production plan was delivered and coordinated across sections of 
the various workshops. 
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The fixed frequency of all these conferences, excluding public holidays, 
meant that there were 132 factory conferences a year. The total number of 
conferences (of all four types) at which absenteeism was mentioned was 
calculated from the meeting minutes. Thanks to Jinjiang Factory’s Office of 
Retirement Services, many of these minutes were saved upon the factory’s 
bankruptcy. The earliest dates from 1978. In these minutes, it is worth noting 
that not all conferences that mention absenteeism should be included in the 
calculation. For example, in some meetings, it was mentioned only to note a 
relative decrease in worker absence rather than an increase. After eliminating 
such discussions, the proportion over the period 1978 to 1989 was calculated 
and the results are shown in Figure 7. 
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mentioning absenteeism was consistently higher than 0.5 (50%) and peaked at 
0.79 (79%) in 1981. As a result, it can be speculated that absenteeism in 
Jinjiang Factory had been so serious that it could not be treated lightly in the 
routine work. A noticeable change took place in 1982, when the proportion fell 
sharply to 0.62, and this downward trend continued until 1984.This change 
was probably due to the institution of new rules; in 1982, the factory enacted a 
new regulation aimed at reducing workers’ absences. This regulation decreed 
that anyone who needed to leave work for less than two hours must apply for 
an exit pass, noting the exact leaving and returning time. Subsequently, in 
1983, the factory implemented the “Factory Rules and Regulations for 
Workers and Staff Members” (厂规厂纪职工守则), further linking individual 
performance to the economic interest. However, these new rules and 
regulations were not effective for long. As is shown in the graph, the 
proportion returns to a slight increase between 1985 and 1989.  
 
Though the indicator used in this section is not ideal, it indirectly shows 
the widespread existence of absenteeism through a quantitative method. Why 
were workers in the Jinjiang Factory going absent? What excuses did they 
usually use to ask for leave? These questions are the focus of the following 
section.   
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6.2 Absenteeism in Practice  
In general, workers’ absenteeism in Jinjiang Factory refers to all illicit 
behavior in attempts to shirk duties and seek personal free time. Absence 
occurs due to either misbehavior in the workshop or personal matters. 
Absenteeism in Jinjiang Factory was by no means a rare or sporadic problem. 
Rather, it was widespread and frequent. 
Absence Due to Misbehaviors 
A variety of misbehaviors occurred in the workshop. Non-work activity during 
working hours was perhaps the most surreptitious form of absence – workers 
fulfilled their private needs without leaving their seats. A typical example 
would be female workers knitting during working hours. This phenomenon 
was especially common among those performing less demanding jobs. As long 
as they were able to meet their quantitative target at the last minute, devoting 
some time to private affairs  seemed acceptable in their eyes.  
 
As far as I know, some women workers always knitted during working 
time. This was especially the case for workers whose job was light and 
easy. I had a colleague who used to work in the Instrument Production 
Workshop and later transferred to the factory warehouse. In the warehouse, 
her daily work was just to distribute materials and instruments to different 
workshops. She needed to do nothing heavy and difficult. So she spent 
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most of her time on knitting sweaters for her husband and child. 
(Interviewee: Zhu Guiqin) 
 
Male workers did not do such handicrafts, but they had their own way to kill 
time. Whenever they felt tired or bored with their work, they wandered around 
their workshop with a cup of tea, approaching some of their workmates to 
share news, gossip, and rumors.  
 
Workers always liked to chuiniupi (chat) 195  with their colleagues. Yes, 
indeed, sometimes they just wandered in the workshop and looked here and 
there. You may think this was not a big deal. In fact, however, it was 
serious because it not only delayed the progress of the wanderer’s own 
work, but also affected others’ work. The water room where they fetched 
boiled water was their favorite place to get together. Everyone just stood in 
the room, holding their tea cup, talking, laughing and not in a hurry to get 
back to their work. (Interviewee: Cao Mingshen) 
 
The habit of chuiniupi among workers was not unique to Cao Mingshen’s 
workshop; rather it was widespread throughout the factory, reducing the whole 
factory’s efficiency. The seriousness of this problem can be seen from Tan Yi’s 
meeting minutes, which recorded the factory’s determination to counter 
                                                             
195 Chuiniupi is a dialectic expression in Sichuan province which can be translated literally as 
“boast”. However, when used by a local of Sichuan, it does not refer to the annoying behavior 
that the word “boast” really indicates. It actually means chatting with others.  
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chuiniupi with a series of specific measures: 
 
October 16, 1983. Meeting of the Party Branch Secretaries  
The illicit behavior not only includes arriving late, leaving early, or 
sneaking away. It also includes the following: chuiniupi, turning on the 
machine but not working, and wandering around in the workshop. The 
factory should establish disciplinary inspection groups on three levels. At 
the factory level, the deputy director in charge of human resources will be 
the group leader; at the workshop level, the deputy director of the 
workshop will be the group leader; and in the production group, the group 
leaders will take the responsibility. Anyone who is caught for the first time 
will be recorded and educated by the relevant leader; if caught for a second 
time, the offender will have to submit a written report; fines will apply for 
a third occasion. In addition, performance points of every relevant 
workshop will be deducted regardless of the reason for the breach.  
 
Taking a shower during working hours was another form of misbehavior 
causing absence. Besides the factory shower room, the Heat Treatment 
Workshop was another place where workers could take showers. Unlike the 
factory’s shower room, which had fixed opening hours, hot water would be 
available as soon as the workshop was in operation. As a result, workers could 
take a shower at any time during the day.  
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Workers worked in the factory as if they were at home. They had a weak 
sense of discipline. For example, many workers would come to my [hot 
treatment] workshop for a shower in the afternoon during working time. 
They usually came with their friends. Some female workers even took their 
children for a shower. For a period of time, can you imagine, my main job, 
as a secretary of the party branch of the workshop, was to sit in front of the 
gate and stop them from entering the bathroom. I remember once I heard 
someone showering when I passed by. I went in and forcibly chased them 
out. They nearly fought with me. Both the factory and the workshop did 
make some regulations [to tackle] this behavior, but it seems very difficult 
to eradicate this problem.196 
 
Indeed, this problem persisted and frustrated the management for a long time, 
appearing in Tan Yi’s meeting minutes and working diary several times over 
the years.  
 
July 5, 1982. Meeting of Party Branch Secretaries 
Workers were not allowed to take a shower before 3 pm. 
… 
March 10, 1984. Meeting of the Workshop Disciplinary Inspection Group 
                                                             
196 Interview with Tan Yi 
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Regulations on showering: workers were not allowed to take a shower before 
2:30 pm. Also, parents were not allowed to take their children for a shower 
during working time.  
… 
May 17, 1987 Sunday (Sunny) 
This afternoon, Zhang Ming brought his classmates to the workshop for a 
shower before the approved time. I took him to the office and asked him to 
learn the factory regulations carefully.    
Absence for Personal Matters 
Personal matters were another cause of workers’ absenteeism. This refers to 
both common personal issues and ad hoc ones. Generally speaking, these 
various personal issues arose because of two broad facts in Jinjiang Factory – 
the heterogeneous component of workers on one hand, and the isolated living 
conditions on the other.  
 
A typical example of common personal matters was the farm work of the 
demobilized soldiers. Unlike the Returned Educated Youths and transferred 
workers, the demobilized soldiers played a dual role. They were workers in the 
industrial enterprises, and at the same time peasants responsible for their 
family’s farm work. Every year during the peak seasons in spring and autumn, 
they usually had to ask for leave for at least half a month. No matter how 
 188 
crucial the production task was, this personal business had to be accepted as a 
reason for leave because, in these workers’ eyes, the crops at home were far 
more important than receiving a performance bonus for the same month.  
 
The demobilized soldiers were not the only group that had reasonable 
excuses; the transferred workers also had their own versions. Since they had 
been transferred from the east to the far away west, they had very few 
opportunities to go home for visits due to the limited number of days 
designated for annual home leave as well as the high cost of transportation. As 
a result, whenever they had a chance of home leave, they were desperate to 
extend the period as much as possible. As one transferred worker from 
Shanghai recalled, “I could only have 15 days for my trip home, but I 
fabricated a reason to be granted more days. I reported that I also needed to 
take a study tour in a model factory in Shanghai. Eventually, I got another 
three days as business leave.”197  
 
Ad hoc matters also led to workers’ absences. The high frequency of such 
instances was partially due to the workers’ unique working conditions. In the 
isolated mountain area, despite the existence of periodic markets in nearby 
towns, workers in Jinjiang Factory made full use of empty land within their 
resident sites, planting many different vegetables, such as garlic, spring onion, 
                                                             
197 Interview with Zhu Guiqin. 
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potato, and tomato. Some even fed chickens there. As recorded in Tan Yi’s 
conference notes, “(October 13, 1983, Meeting of Personnel Managers) As 
long as the chickens do not crow, feeding could be allowed.” Even though 
these planting and feeding activities were very limited and usually on a tiny 
scale, thye occurred frequently enough to distract some workers from their 
industrial work occasionally.  
 
The Province of Sichuan is situated in the great Sichuan basin. Besieged 
by winding high mountains, it is subject to a lot of rain from June to 
September. In this period, Sichuan’s weather is also very unpredictable. It is 
very common to have bright sunshine in the morning and heavy rain in the 
afternoon. On some days during this period, it rains two or even three times a 
day. Whenever the workers spotted any hint of rain, they usually rushed home 
for some pre-emptive work.  
 
Crops were not the only things that needed to be protected against the 
heavy downpours. Living in the humid Sichuan basin, people usually aired 
their quilts and clothes on balconies or on the bushes around the dormitories 
whenever it was sunny. In the event of a sudden change of weather, they had 




These changeable climatic conditions caused a lot of problems in the 
workers’ lives and the factory’s production. But to the workers, the silver 
lining was that it was a reasonable excuse to ask for a short leave, from which 
they might never return. Given the proximity of the factory and workers’ 
dormitories, it might not be fair to argue that the weather was an absurd 
excuse and should be forbidden completely. The vice deputy director of the 
factory explained their considerations:  
 
You may think that to approve their leave for changeable weather is weird 
or even ridiculous, but we had to take into consideration the reality. In this 
factory – and actually I think it may be similar in many Third Line 
factories – the production site was very close to the residential site. 
Workers would not spend too much time getting home. So if they knew 
that the weather was about to change, it was very natural that they wanted 
to bring their quilts and clothes back home. The changeable weather is one 
reality; the short distance between home and workshop is also a reality in 
this factory. So if you just forbade them from moving their quilts and 
clothes and let them be soaked, it appeared very unreasonable (bujiangli). 
After all, the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis (juti wenti 
juti fenxi).198  
 
                                                             
198 Interview with Yu Xuehui. 
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Yu Xuehui’s comments illustrate that workers’ sudden leave to get back 
to the airing quilts should be understood because of the changeable weather in 
Sichuan and, more importantly, the close proximity of their residential site and 
working place. In other words, in this case, the special spatial features of 
Jinjiang Factory had redrawn the boundary of acceptability of sudden leave.   
Conclusion 
This chapter introduces the problem of absenteeism in Jinjiang Factory from 
two aspects – the seriousness of absenteeism, and the factors that led to the 
workers’ absences. Using the factory’s meeting minutes, I show that during the 
late 1970s and the 1980s, the problem of absenteeism was a phenomenon 
existing throughout the whole factory rather than only one or two workshops. 
Workers’ misbehavior in working time and periodic impromptu personal 
matters were two main types of factor leading to workers’ absences.  
     
        In the sociological literature on absence, the question of gender has 
attracted scholars’ attention. According to this strand of literature, the factors 
taken as reasons for absence differ between men and women. Specifically, the 
“non-work pressures to go absent are likely to be greater on women than on 
men.” 199  As Pollert comments, “absence can be genuine escape for men 
                                                             
199 Edwards, Paul, and Colin Whitston, 1989, “Industrial Discipline, the Control of Attendance 
and the Subordination of Labour: Towards an Integrated Analysis”, Work, Employment and 
Society, 3:1 (March), p. 10. 
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whereas for women it may mean confronting a pile of work at home.”200 
Haccoun and Dupont’s work also offers some confirmation: women are more 
likely to spend a day’s absence on “obligatory activities” such as 
housework.201 On this point, the present work seems no different from these 
previous studies. Among the abovementioned factors, knitting, babysitting, 
taking care of airing quilts and so on were the usual reasons for female 
workers’ absences, while drunkenness, farm work and so on were the reasons 
leading to male workers’ absences. Some reasons were also used by both 
female and male workers, such as showering at work and going home for 
visits. In sum, at Jinjiang Factory gender might not cause any numerical 
difference between female and male workers’ absences, but it was indeed a 
variable related to the different reasons for absences.  
 
In the face of workers’ absenteeism, how did the grass-roots group 
leaders organize their production in a tolerating way? I will answer this 
question in the following chapter.    
                                                             
200 Pollert, Anna. 1981. Girls, Wives, Factory Lives, London: Macmillan.  
 
201 Haccoun, R. and S. Dupont, 1988, “ Une analyse des comportements de travailleurs 
masculins et feminins selon deux formes d’absence au travail”, Relations Industrielles, 43 (1) 
pp. 153–65. Cited in Edwards, Paul, and Collin Whitston. 1989 “Industrial Discipline.” 
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Chapter 7 Toleration in Practice (2): The Governance of 
Absenteeism 
 
The workshop was a battlefield. Whether you could win the war depended on 
your own talents. You needed to know how to unite this disparate group of 
individuals (三教九流) 
                    Fu Jinhai, December 22, 2013 
 
In the analysis of Chinese industrial relations, very few studies make the effort 
to investigate governance at the group level. Instead, the existing literature is 
more interested in the politics at more macro levels, such as the factory level, 
tackling questions such as how a factory disciplines its workers and how the 
relationship between businesses and governments affects conflicts and 
cooperation in the workshop. In these works, governance within groups is 
taken as a reflection of the factory’s governing system, and the role of group 
leader is simply that of policy implementer whose interests are convergent 
with those of his senior bosses. However, group governance is not as simple as 
these previous studies assumed. As the interviewee Fu Jinhai, the camshaft 
group leader in the Machining Workshop, said, the workshop was a battlefield 
and you had to know how to deal with different kinds of people.  
 
Among the scholars studying the governance of small production groups, 
Walder made perhaps the most significant contribution by highlighting the 
powerful role of the group leaders. According to him, group leaders were 
pivotal in the evaluation of workers’ pay rises and promotions, granting travel 
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permissions and approving requests for personal leave, paid vacations, home 
leave, travel supplements, housing assignments, extra ration coupons, loans 
and relief payments.202 Granting (or not) these necessities of life constituted 
the carrots and sticks by which the group leaders controlled and mobilized 
their member workers through the construction of a patron–client relationship 
with the activists who helped in the control in exchange for preferential 
treatment by their leaders. Walder refers to this system of control in China’s 
socialist factories as “principled particularism”.  
 
However, Zhou contends against Walder by pointing out that, before the 
reform of state-owned enterprises, the workers’ basic necessities had in fact 
been institutionally guaranteed. Therefore, given that the resources controlled 
by the lower managers were not as great as Walder claimed, the patron–client 
relationship might not be very effective.203 By taking the potential strength of 
“the weak” into account, Womack echoed Zhou and argued that Walder’s 
“over-concentration on state power overlooks the concrete limits on leadership 
discretion, ignores the informality of power in small-scale, stable situations, 
and produces a skewed and unrealistic view of workplace 
interrelationships.”204  
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Zhou and Womack’s criticism suggests that the leaders were not as 
powerful as they appeared and, for that matter, the workers were by no means 
powerless either. At this point, the constant absenteeism in Jinjiang Factory 
provides some evidence to this effect. This power parity between the group 
leaders and their workers makes the group governance seem more puzzling. If 
workers had their own way of resisting, then  how did group leaders maintain 
production in the face of constant interruptions? In this chapter, I show that 
rather than strictly enacted the regulations, group leaders in Jinjiang Factory 
gave their toleration to workers’ absences.  This benign and tolerating strategy 
was based on three building blocks: the reinterpretation of the absenteeism, the 
multi-actors’ exchange, and the tactics sustaining the exchange. It is worth 
noting that the focus on toleration is not meant to deny or replace Walder’s 
concept of principled particularism. Rather, it is intended to provide an 
alternative governance mechanism which is more likely and perhaps was more 
effective in factories like Jinjiang, which was isolated from the outside world 
but had many complex internal social interconnections. 
 
This chapter includes two broad sections. The first illustrates the concept, 
operating mechanism and basic features of toleration. The second introduces 
the normal tactics underpins the tolerating governance. 
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7.1 Reinterpretation of Absenteeism: the Exceptional Circumstances 
In Jinjiang factory, absenteeism was usually reinterpreted as the exceptional 
circumstances. This reinterpretation was derived from a consensus that 
everyone was unique in some way, and unexceptionally had his/her 
exceptional circumstances in day-to-day working experiences, which should 
be considered as reasonable excuses for absence in daily interactions 205 . 
Therefore, this understanding was exceptional because it recognized 
individual uniqueness, while it was also unexceptional because it emphasized 
the equity of uniquenesses among individuals. According to this understanding 
and reinterpretation, the multifarious reasons causing workers’ absences were 
in a way justifiable. It can be seen that this informal principle was 
philosophically in contrast with the formal institutions of the factory. If the 
formal institutions can be understood as a set of rules enacted to bring about 
the same behavior under the same standard, the reinterpretation is a concensus 
on a purely case-by-case basis. The essence of the former is “de-
differentiation”, while the latter is to reintroduce the differences between 
workers.   
 
Tolerance of workers’ absences was certain to delay the production of the 
group to some degree. To cover the absentees’ production tasks, group leaders 
                                                             
205 At this point, the unexceptional exceptionalism shares the philosophical basis of the 
Renqing (人情), which argued by Zhai Xuewei. See his work Face, Favor and Reproduction 
of Power, Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2013, especially p. 198-200. 
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had to seek help from other workers. In this process, a multi-actors exchange 
occurred between the absent workers, other member workers and the group 
leader. As the workers took turns to be absent, this exchange circulated 
constantly among members who were to cover and be covered by one another. 
As a result, though production was constantly interrupted by the workers’ 
numerous absences, group leaders were able to maintain their productions.  
7.2 Exchange Among Multiple Actors 
In the event of a worker’s absence, the multi-actors exchange took place 
between the absent worker, the member colleagues and their group leader. In 
this exchange, the absent worker was the “taker”, gaining tolerance and 
assistance from his/her leader and member colleagues, while the member 
colleagues were the “donor”, giving their assistance to both their leader and 
the absent worker. The group leader therefore usually acted as a coordinator, 
who gave to and took from the other two parties simultaneously. The most 
simplified equilibrium of the multi-actors exchange can be represented by 














Note: In the exchange identified by the solid arrows, B is the absent worker 
and A is the donor of assistance, while in the exchange identified by the dotted 
arrows, the give and take relations are reversed. “G” refers to the coordinating 
group leader, and “” denotes “gives to”. 
 
Figure 18 represents a typical reciprocal exchange. According to the 
classic literature on social networks, reciprocity takes place as the favor is 
returned to the same person who donates the help.206 In fact, however, this 
kind of reciprocity rarely occurred, because the workers’ absent behaviors 
happened in a very random way. As a result, the tolerance and assistance were 
not exchanged between group members in a typically reciprocal fashion, but in 
a form that I call “favor-pooling”. This involves two types of exchange, which 
were introduced by Ekeh: the “chain generalized exchange” and the 
“individual-focused net generalized exchange”. 207 A common feature of these 
two types of exchange is that the favor will be returned by offering help and 
assistance to a different member in the future. 
                                                             
206 Wasserman and Faust, 1994.  
 
207 Ekeh, 1974.  
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Figure 19 displays the equilibrium of the “chain generalized exchange”. 
In this exchange, everyone indirectly gives back to those who provided help. 
In other words, even though the donating worker may not be able to receive 
help from the taker directly, he/she will be repaid by others in the future. As a 
result, this equilibrium is not achieved in every exchange, but it is maintained 
and perpetuated with continuous exchanges going on between all group 
members as a whole. As the interviewee Fu Jinhai reported:  
 
Living in this isolated place, we could not count on others but only 
ourselves. As a result, you had to be thoughtful about personal matters. 
Saving the airing quilt, moving house, extending leave for farm work or 
visiting relatives, looking after the sick fellows and so on, all these were 
justifiable exceptional circumstances. This was our actual condition. 
Therefore, what our group leaders could do was to coordinate our 
production work among members. This time, you helped me; next time, I 
B C A A D 
G 
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helped others. Some of the help was directly mutual, while others were 
not, but we did not care too much because we knew we would need and 
receive the help some day from someone.208 
 
        Figure 20 illustrates the equilibrium of the individual-focused net 
generalized exchange. Here, the donor is not a single person, but a collection 
of individuals. This type of exchange was not unusual in Jinjiang Factory 
either. One typical example is the assistance rendered to demobilized soldiers 
for farm work at their family homes. As mentioned earlier, demobilized 
soldiers accounted for almost one third of the factory’s workforce. They were 
also the main force in front production lines. Many of these workers’ homes 
were located in nearby counties. Every spring and autumn, they needed to go 
home to work on the family farm. In order to shorten their leave and minimize 
production delays, the group leaders motivated some other member workers to 
help them with farming or production work.  
 
A second example of this exchange can be seen when moving house. As 
Tan Yi recalled in Chapter 3, every worker at Jinjiang Factory would move 
house several times: from a dormitory to a small apartment, then to a medium-
sized apartment, and later to a medium-large apartment. Some leaders might 
even have to move once again, from the medium-large to a large apartment. 
                                                             
208 Interview with Fu Jinhai. 
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Every time a worker needed to move house, the group leader would assign 
some other member workers to provide help. For some families with too much 
furniture, they even borrowed the factory’s trucks to help those moving.   
 






        The enforcement of these exchanges required the consent of donors. Put 
differently, why would member colleagues agree to donate their help? This 
can be understood from three perspectives. First, the production group was not 
big, and workers knew each other very well; some of them were even friends 
or relatives. The small group and well-acquainted relationships within it 
helped to reduce the “free rider” problem and made members more 
accountable to each other. Second, as mentioned earlier, workers at Jinjiang 
Factory were isolated from the outside world and placed in a relatively fixed 
job niche. In this context, interactions among members can be regarded as 
repeated games, in which players played a strategy of “tit-for-tat”. In these 
games, as predicted by game theory, playing the cooperative strategy is 
feasible at equilibrium because, in the long run, the benefits of cooperation can 
ABC D ABD C 
B ADC BCD A 
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exceed the gains from cheating. Third, the cooperative attitude was also 
maintained by group leaders’ power of surveillance and punishment, as 
interviewees Fu Jinhai, Fang Mingqi and Chen Mingzhen all reported:  
 
If someone refused my request, I would warn him/her that “if you refuse, you 
will not gain any help from me in the future!” As a group leader, we more or 
less controlled some resources they needed and they had to consider their 
decisions carefully.209 
 
Thus far, I have clarified the content and operating mechanism of the 
tolerating strategy in control of absenteeism. Four features of this unique 
governing system stand out from the analysis, on which I now elaborate.  
7.3 Characteristics of Multi-Actors Exchange 
is that it involved matters outside one’s de jure duties (分外事), or sometimes 
even matters that violated the factory’s regulations. Helping demobilized-
soldier workers with their farm work, tolerance of drunkenness during 
working hours, trading working hours within the group, building up the 
group’s private coffer, falsifying overtime hours, privately extending 
members’ holiday leave and so on were all visible favors that could be 
exchanged in the group. In this process, the factory’s regulations and 
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discipline implicitly functioned as a benchmark used to gauge the value of an 
exchanged favor. The more the favor violated the regulations, the higher its 
value and the closer the relationship between both sides. In other words, the 
group’s internal “loyalty” was displayed and preserved by the “betrayal” 
towards outsiders. This feature of the exchange distinguishes it from the 
principled particularism argued by Walder. According to him, “principled 
particularism is a mixed type: it has the structural attributes of a vertical 
patron–client tie, but the content of the tie is the impersonal one prescribed by 
the ideological orientation.”210 By contrast, the favor exchange based on the 
consideration of exceptional circumstances is entirely personal. This occurred 
because personal exceptionalism was exchanged for personal necessity, and 
the parties involved in the exchange ended up in a closer personal relationship.  
 
The unique content of the exchange gives rise to its second feature. The 
driver for an exchange was not purely rational and value-equivalent; it also 
included many irrational elements. Since the favor was usually something 
forbidden by the regulations, it was taken by the recipient as an extra 
consideration (额外照顾), exclusively given by the donor. In addition, as the 
substance of the favor was in fact illegal, it not only embodied the donor’s 
initiative, but also required some sort of personal sacrifice on the part of the 
donor, who bore the risk of being punished. In these circumstances, the 
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calculable portion of the debt was no longer as essential as it would be in a 
pure market exchange, while the feeling of gratitude played a greater role in 
the flow of interactions. With the feeling of gratitude, the recipient’s 
repayment need not be equivalent to what he/she received in value, but the 
recipient must demonstrate his/her eagerness to pay back. For example, if a 
demobilized soldier received help for his family’s farm work from colleagues 
who were Returned Educated Youths or transferred workers, there was no way 
for him to return the favor by providing the same help (farming), but he could 
return the favor by assisting his colleagues with moving house, covering their 
production work when they were sick or drunk, etc. In this regard, the favor 
exchange was not the equilibrium of value, but the equilibrium of interaction. 
As illustrated in Figures 19 and 20, equilibrium is not achieved in every single 
exchange; rather it is embodied in a stream of gives and takes whose value 
was difficult to calculate. Therefore, every single exchange of favors was not 
completely unique and independent. Instead, it usually had a long-lasting 
effect on both sides by accumulating their sense of cooperation, strengthening 
their confidence of trust etc. In addition, even the favor given in the name of 
exceptional circumstances was not completely out of the donor’s rationality. 
As many interviewees repeated, “Life could never be uphill all the time; it was 
sometimes downhill. When we put ourselves in the shoes of others, many 
troubles they encountered could and should be understood. After all, while the 
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regulation was rigid, the people were flexible.”211 This statement revealed that 
the workers’ empathy, rather than merely their rationality, also motivated the 
donation of favors. A by-product of this semi-rational exchange was the 
development of informal social relations within the group. In extreme cases, it 
could even give birth to personal loyalty or a sense of brotherhood between 
the donor and recipient. As one worker in the Machining Workshop said, “He 
[the group leader] had been really kind and generous to me (对我够意思), and 
I was willing to give my help whenever he needed it.”212 Of course, not all 
workers had such positive impressions of their leaders and were so determined 
to provide help in case of need, but it is hard to deny that the development of 
different forms of informal relations deepened the irrational elements of the 
favor exchange. In this sense, the exchange among multiple actors is a process 
of accumulation of “symbolic capital” within the group.213  By exchanging 
incalculable favors, the apparent economic debt is eventually transmuted into 
a moral-and-affective-like obligation to the leader and the member colleagues.  
 
The irrational aspect of this favor exchange distinguishes it from the 
previously argued gift economy, also known as the art of guanxi. The 
importance of guanxi in Chinese daily life has long been valued by political 
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scientists.214 In their eyes, guanxi is not only the means for receiving material 
gain, but also the end of interactions. Yang extends the understanding of the 
role of guanxi by arguing that it is the centrality of symbolic interest or capital 
in the conversion of values that distinguishes it from other forms of 
exchange.215 The symbolic interest, according to her, increases as the social 
investment or the incorporation of personal substance yields “an unbalanced 
state of indebtedness, gratitude, or obligation on the part of the guanxi target, 
or a moral advantage and superior symbolic status for the donor.”216  This 
observation provides an innovative way to understand the working mechanism 
of guanxi, but it was still in the straightjacket of rationalism. Like other 
scholars, Yang recognizes that the art of guanxi was essentially a tactic 
composed of calculated actions.217 The ultimate purpose of its use was the 
pursuit of both diffuse social ends and calculated instrumental ends. 218 
Therefore, for the donors, giving is intentionally for taking; for the recipients, 
their repayment, in whatever form, is for the restoration of their lost status or 
advantage towards the donors. In a word, such an exchange started from and 
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ended with the purely rational calculations of both sides. While it seems naive 
to claim the total irrationality of the exchange, it is unreasonable to reduce its 
process to a purely rational one. As discussed above, the exchange among 
multiple actors was partly based on the workers’ empathy. Therefore, for the 
donors, the decision to provide help – such as covering for sick colleagues or 
helping demobilized soldiers with farming – comes not only from their 
individual cost and benefit analysis, but also their understanding and 
consideration of the exceptional circumstances. For the recipients, they not 
only repaid the amount they gained from the donor, or merely for their 
restoration of lost status or advantage, but it was also affected by a feeling of 
gratitude as well. Thus it can be seen in Jinjiang Factory that the one-time 
“gift” from the donor could often be repaid several times by the recipient. 
Moreover, as relations between the two sides become closer and closer as their 
exchange continues, the irrational aspect appears more and more obvious. It is 
worth pointing out that the emphasis on the irrational aspect here is not to 
erase the rational elements entirely from the exchange. Rather, the point is 
that, without recognizing the irrational substance, it seems impossible to 
understand the sometimes unequal and incalculable exchanges that continually 
occurred in the daily activities of the production groups.  
 
The third feature of the exchange between group leaders and member 
workers was its spillover effect. This can be understood from two 
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perspectives. First, the exchange between the leader and the target worker 
would extend to other workers in the group. This was simply because 
sometimes the favor could not be given by the leaders without the assistance 
of other workers. Helping the demobilized soldiers to do their farm work, 
buying and selling working hours among members, covering shifts and so on 
all needed to involve more than one member worker. In these cases, the 
recipient workers did not only owe their leaders for the permission, but they 
also owed their colleagues for their direct donation of the favor. Over time, 
this extended exchange relationship further tightened the connections between 
member workers; meanwhile, it also helped the leaders guarantee the 
completion of the group task by balancing the production among workers. 
Second, one occurrence of the exchange between the leader and a certain 
target member worker could increase other workers’ expectations of similar 
exchanges happening in the future. The occurrence of the exchange sent out a 
signal that the leader was probably flexible enough to tolerate some 
exceptional cases. Thus, they could carry out similar exchanges as and when 
needed.  
 
The fourth feature of the exchange was that it applied to the member 
workers relatively equally. In other words, the group leaders’ consideration of 
exceptional circumstances was not a privilege of any particular workers. Farm 
work was not considered more urgent than taking care of a sick child; 
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occasionally arriving late for work was not necessarily less serious than 
privately extending holiday leave. Each instance was considered 
independently and could not be compared with another. Moreover, the 
members’ increased expectation of equal treatment raised the cost of the 
leaders’ unfair behavior. Unequal treatment, once discovered, would challenge 
the group leaders’ authority, as the workers who were unfairly treated would 
retaliate with a series of “weapons” introduced in the previous section. In 
some extreme cases, the group leaders could even be removed from power by 
their members’ open resistance. It was in this principle of relative equality that 
the rational aspect of the toleration lay. This feature also differentiates 
toleration from Walder’s neo-traditionalism. The latter is essentially a 
differentiating governing system, in which activist workers are treated 
preferentially, while non-activists are at a disadvantage.219 By contrast, under 
group leaders’ toleration, all workers are treated on an equal basis. In this 
sense, compared to the “elitism” argued by Walder, egalitarianism was more 
popularly employed in governing the production groups in Jinjiang Factory.  
 
In a word, group governance in Jinjiang Factory was conducted through 
the exchange of consideration of each other’s exceptional circumstances. The 
recognition and acceptance of the exceptional circumstances were irrational to 
some extent, while the undifferentiated principle was more of a rational choice 
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by the group leaders. A direct consequence of this exchange was the 
development of informal relationships between group leaders and their 
member workers. Meanwhile, the connections among the member workers 
were also strengthened thanks to the spillover effect of the exchange. Given 
that the workers’ job positions were closely associated with their background, 
the exchange among multiple actors and the interconnected social networks 
were tightly interrelated and mutually reinforcing. On one hand, the exchange 
helped develop and reinforce the informal social networks; on the other, the 
informal social networks provided a basis for the exchange to take place 
smoothly. In this sense, the multi-actors exchange and the interconnected 
social structure were two complementary elements in Jinjiang Factory.  
 
From the discussion above, it can be seen that group governance in 
Jinjiang Factory was a process to deformalize the formal relations, in which 
the group leaders’ control over their member workers evolved into the leaders’ 
maintenance and management of their social relations. At this point, the 
consent of production in Jinjiang Factory was distinguished from that argued 
by Burawoy. In his analysis, the workers’ consent of production was rooted in 
their personal material interest; it was the link between the factory’s regime 
and the workers’ income that created the workers’ willingness to “make 
out.”220 However, in Jinjiang Factory, as well as the personal material interest, 
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social relations also helped maintain production. In other words, the workers 
gave consent to work not merely because of the benefits offered; in many 
cases, it was also because of the social relationships in which they were 
involved. The material interest emphasizes the economic nature of the man, 
while the relational interest emphasizes the equal importance of his social 
nature.  
  
Indeed, workers’ exceptional circumstances could not be dealt with 
without the group leaders’ powerful rights in making decisions. At this point, 
some may question whether, as the lowest-level managers, the group leaders 
were powerful enough to meet the diverse needs of workers. In other words, 
even though they were kind enough to show their consideration and 
understanding to their members, they were not able to give what their member 
workers needed urgently. Indeed, according to the factory’s regulations, even 
an hour-long absence needed the permission of the workshop, not to mention 
extending a longer holiday. However, being powerless in front of the formal 
institutions did not necessarily impede the group leaders from seeking and 
seizing power by informal means. Although they had no formal rights to 
authorize leave, they could cheat their leaders by collaborating with their 
members when it became necessary; they were not allowed to adjust the quota 
time for each part, but they managed to find ways to balance the skewed 
interest among members. All these tactics were tacitly understood and 
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accepted by the group leaders and their members. They were absent from any 
of the factory’s de jure regulations, and some of them were even harmful to 
the factory’s interests. Even so, it is still unfair and arbitrary simply to equate 
these informal tactics to misbehavior or conspiracies aimed at resisting their 
higher managers, because these tactics were actually intended to complete 
their production task better, rather than the opposite.  
 
The example of Jinjiang Factory shows that the group leaders’ power 
derived from these informal rather than formal methods was so influential that, 
without knowing about it, we can hardly understand how daily production 
continued smoothly in the face of frequent interruptions. The consideration of 
exceptional circumstances was a way of governing rather than resisting, 
because it was meant to facilitate rather than disrupt production. It is precisely 
this informal origin of power that distinguishes this exceptionalism-based 
system of governance from what has been previously argued. Apparently, to 
make this system work, two essential resources must be sufficiently owned 
and effectively controlled by the group leaders: money and time. How, then, 
did they accumulate these two crucial resources by informal means? This 
important question is addressed in the next section.  
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7.4 Tactics for Dealing with the Exceptional Circumstances 
David Easton claims that politics is the authoritative allocation of values.221 In 
a way, this reminds us that the ownership of certain allocable “values”, 
material or immaterial, should be the basis of authority. Unauthorized by the 
formal institutions, the group leaders at Jinjiang Factory sought their allocable 
values – time and money – informally. Specifically, they were able to earn 
allocable time from three sources: parceling out jobs, falsifying attendance 
records, and exploiting “waiting for a job time”. The reallocation of members’ 
interests was worked out through the establishment of the group’s private 
coffer, the internal trading of working hours, and the adjustment of the quota 
time. By using these informal tactics, the group leaders helped their members 
to deal with the various exceptional circumstances. I now elaborate on these 
tactics. 
Tactics for Time Seeking 
Selectively Parceling out Jobs. The primary resource needed to deal with 
exceptional circumstances was the time that could be given to workers for 
their non-production needs. Obviously, the direct way to extend non-
production time was to shorten working time in the shop. However, the 
required number of working hours was not determined by the group leaders. 
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As previously mentioned, workers in Jinjiang Factory had to fulfill the 
required 208 basic working hours, which was calculated by adding the quota 
time of all processed parts. In this situation, the most effective way to reduce 
the working time in the shop was to increase the efficiency of unit production. 
For this purpose, the group leaders parceled out the “easier” jobs to the 
workers in need of leave. But what jobs were considered “easier”? Basically, 
keeping the workers’ skillfulness and their working conditions constant, the 
most influential factors were the unit time required to process the part as well 
as its target volume of production. Usually, the lower the time per unit, the 
easier the job would be; and the higher the target volume of production, the 
easier the job. As a result, the easiest job was the one with low processing 
difficulty and large target production volume.  
 
As already mentioned, except for the Heat Treatment Workshop, workers 
were assigned tasks based on types of work, such as lathing, grinding, drilling, 
milling and planing, rather than types of part. The time required to grind a 
certain part would vary depending on its type. Take the grinding work in the 
Machinery Workshop as an example. Figure 21 shows the blueprint and quota 
time card for a screw bolt, one part of the oil pump. Figure 22 presents the 
same set of information for the base of the oil pump’s delivery valve. 
According to the record on the quota time card, grinding a screw bolt took 
0.16 minutes (procedure code 40), while grinding a delivery-valve base took 
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0.24 plus 0.30 minutes (procedure code 60 and 70 respectively). It was 
therefore much easier to grind a screw bolt than a delivery-valve base. Indeed, 
the accomplishment of a single delivery-valve base accounted for more of the 
required 208 hours, but working on the much easier screw bolt appeared more 
likely to increase the efficiency of unit production. Therefore, as the 
processing volume increased, it would be faster to complete the required 
working task by doing the easier part.   
Figure 21: Blueprint and Quota Time for a Screw Bolt 












Figure 22: Blueprint and Quota Time for a Delivery-Valve Base 
  
Left: the blueprint. Right: quota time card from 1979.  
The columns on the quota time card are (left to right): procedure code, content 
of the procedure, name of the machine tool, time for preparation and finishing, 
quota time for each unit, remarks. These two documents were collected by the 
author in the abandoned Machinery Workshop in June 2013.  
 
A larger target volume of production could also help speed up workers’ 
processing progress because, as the quantity increased, proficiency could be 
enhanced. Another more important reason was the saving in preparation time. 
Alf Luedtke described the work of turners in a machine construction factory in 
Chemnitz-Saxony, Germany:222  
 
The turners, however, had to perform a kind of semi-manual labor. Their 
task was to give each piece its precise shape; therefore, they had to cut 
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notches and to turn threads or screw-joints. To be sure, they did not operate 
their tools directly by hand, but, similar to the almost artisan-like work of 
the molders or fitters, they prepared and adjusted the machine, and during 
the turning of the piece which was to be worked, they intervened, 
sometimes by hand, especially to file the piece to its final polish. The 
preparation of the lathe was relatively time-consuming. In order to achieve 
the optimal speed during the turning process, the gears had to be adjusted 
and calculated and each time composed anew. The slug then had to be 
centered; sometimes it became necessary to put it onto the lathe and trim 
some splinters by hand-filing. After having started the lathe, the turner had 
to switch to a mostly passive watchfulness, simultaneously having an eye 
on the transmission belt and the clutch, the speed of the lathe, and the part 
of the lathe that carried the cutting or turning tool.223 
 
        The work in Jinjiang Factory did not differ much from Luedtke’s 
description. From the quota time card in Figure 21, it can be seen that the 
grinding work for a screw bolt took 0.16 minutes, while its preparation time 
was up to 45 minutes – 281 times longer! In his description, Luedtke points 
out another advantage no less attractive than the time saving: the relatively 
easy and light work of “passive watchfulness”. The part with the larger target 
production volume was therefore much preferred by workers at Jinjiang 
                                                             




By parceling out the easier jobs, the group leaders could help their 
member workers deal with their exceptional circumstances and ensure their 
completion of the required task at the same time. Thanks to this tactic, the 
beneficiary not only acquired extra free time, but also had his/her basic 
interest guaranteed. On this point, group leaders in the Heat Treatment 
Workshop were in a different situation. Due to its feature of teamwork and 
equal distribution of working hours, the group leaders in this shop had more 
scope to give extra time to the benefiting worker.  
 
Falsifying the Attendance Record. In Jinjiang Factory, the duty of taking 
attendance records was in the hands of group leaders. The ownership of this 
power did not make the workers more disciplined; rather it became an 
effective tool for group leaders to deal with exceptional circumstances. By 
falsifying the attendance record, they were able to spare the necessary amount 
of time to the beneficiary workers directly. As one leader said: 
 
“The phenomenon of getting drunk during the lunch break sometimes 
happened. Needless to say, it violated the factory’s regulations and I should 
record the absence of those drunken workers in the afternoon. However, in 
practice, you could be more flexible. To me, I was usually more willing to 
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show them in attendance first, and educate them afterwards. People made 
mistakes, so as long as they did not make them frequently, I think it could 
be tolerated.”  
“How about the delayed work?” I asked. 
“As for that, I could ask for some help from others in the group, or just do 
it myself.”224  
 
        This group leader’s story provides a vivid illustration of falsifying the 
attendance record. As a matter of fact, this behavior went on in the groups on a 
much larger scale than the story seems to suggest. It also can be seen through 
the leaders’ tolerance of their members’ sudden absences. As mentioned 
above, workers at Jinjiang Factory had many reasons to interrupt their work 
for a short time – to look after their airing quilt, protect their crops, nurse 
babies, pick up their children and take a shower in the Heat Treatment 
Workshop. To tackle this problem, in 1982 the factory enacted a new 
regulation aimed at reducing the number of workers’ sudden absences – 
anyone who needed to leave work for up to two hours had to apply for an exit 
pass (Figure 23), noting the exact leaving and returning time. Applications for 
more than two hours were regarded as time off in lieu, which had to be made 
up by overtime worked later. The exit pass could only be issued by the 
workshop leaders. Unfortunately, this apparently strict regulation did not work 
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as well as the factory’s leaders expected. As stipulated, workers needed prior 
permission from their workshop to leave, but they did not need to report upon 
their return. This serious shortcoming left the group leaders a lot of room for 
maneuver for. As long as the group leaders were able to figure out a way to 
cover, it was not easy for the workshop leaders, let alone the factory leaders, to 
know a worker’s actual precise time of return. Not surprisingly, it eventually 
turned out that, although this new regulation was effective in controlling the 
total number of absences, it did not guarantee the workers’ timely return. In 
fact, leaders even had difficulty reducing the total number of absences. As 
mentioned in previous chapters, workers at Jinjiang Factory were 
interconnected by internal clanization. Despite the existence of certain 
boundaries between workers, the exchanges enabled by these networks of 
social relationships appeared extensive enough for some workers to secure an 
exit pass and get around the gatekeepers’ watch. To solve these problems, the 
factory leaders did take some measures, but many did not work. The following 
are Tan Yi’s conference notes on the exit pass between 1982 and 1987: 
 
July 5, 1982 Meeting of Workshop Party Secretaries 
The exit pass could only be issued by the Director or Party Secretary of each 
workshop.  
 
August 7, 1982 Meeting of Workshop Personnel Directors  
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If anyone needed the exit pass for time off in lieu, it could not be granted 
without the signature of the workshop leaders. Every workshop leader must 
apply this rule very firmly.  
 
October 6, 1983 Meeting of Workshop Personnel Directors 
The application for the exit pass needed an acceptable reason, such as time off 
in lieu or sick leave. In the application, the applicant must clearly state the 
return time. Upon return, the applicants needed to sign in at the factory’s 
gatekeepers.  
 
March 2, 1984 Meeting of Group Leaders in the Heat Treatment Workshop 
1) Group leaders took the shift to supervise the workshop production and 
discipline. 2) Anyone who needed the exit pass for time off in lieu should get 
his group leaders’ agreement first, and then submit the application to the 
workshop.  
 
June 28, 1987 Meeting of the Group Leaders in the Heat Treatment Workshop 
Any leave [taken] without [an] application would result in the deduction of 
group points, one point each time. If the group leaders could make up the 
application the next morning, the deduction could be exempted once. In 
addition, every group needed to submit the shift schedule to the workshop. By 
the end of each month, the salary officer collected all sorts of documents on 
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the leave issue, including the exit passes. The workshop discipline team was 
composed of Tan, Chen and He.   
 
November 29, 1987. Some Supplementary Regulations on the Working 
Discipline 
The exit pass, business leave and one-day sick leave could only be approved 
by the workshop leaders. Sick leave of more than one day was regarded as 
time off in lieu. Every workshop leader must be careful with and accountable 
for their authorizations.  
 
        In Tan’s conference notes, three points emerge from the factory’s 
regulations regarding the exit pass. First, the power of issuing the exit pass 
should be in the hands of workshop leaders; second, the ethics of leaders could 
not be overlooked; third, the group leaders were required to cooperate with the 
workshop leaders. Only the third point specified the role of group leaders. In 
doing so, the workshop made an attempt to equate the group interest with that 
of every individual member. However, there is no reason to believe that such 
an attempt was effective in reducing rather than increasing the cheating 
behavior of group leaders. In any event, the repeated emphasis placed on the 
issue of the exit pass at least revealed two things: on one hand, the problem of 
workers’ sudden absences was not effectively solved by the regulation of exit 
passes; on the other, the factory leaders had not remedied the weaknesses of 
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the regulation. Interestingly, although its ineffectiveness was common 
knowledge in the factory, the exit pass policy was cancelled following its 
introduction. All interviewees made similar comments, that “Indeed, it had 
some problems, but you cannot deny that it also had some positive effects.” 
 
Figure 23: Scanned Exit Pass 
 
This exit pass was collected by the author from the abandoned Machining 
Workshop in June 2013.   
 
Exploiting “Waiting for a Job Time”. If the above two tactics were direct ways 
of sparing time for the beneficiary workers, the exploitation of “waiting for a 
job time” was an indirect way to allocate free time among members. Basically, 
the time spent waiting for jobs is the unoccupied period created by the 
discontinuity of job provision. According to the factory regulations, workers 
unoccupied for this period should be reported to the workshop by their group 
leaders. During this period, in order to fully use the labor, the workshop would 
assign them to do some non-production work, such as cleaning the workshop 
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floor, sorting out documents etc. All these tasks were called “jobs without 
quota time” (无定额工作). In other words, no matter how much work of this 
kind was done, it would not be counted towards the required 208 hours. 
Obviously, workers waiting for job were very reluctant to offer their labor for 
these duties. The group leaders also had no incentive to abide strictly by the 
factory’s regulation to transfer their own labor to the workshop, even though 
this was temporary. Instead, they were more willing to give the workers half a 
day off, or even more, without informing their senior managers. In so doing, 
the group leaders effectively increased the possibility of securing the 
cooperation of these benefiting workers in the foreseeable future. Once 
exceptional circumstances came up for some other members, they were more 
likely to be mobilized to contribute more labor in the group to make up for the 
potential loss. In a word, by exploiting the “waiting for a job time”, the group 
leaders successfully expanded their governable time. This extra free time 
worked like a loan paid by the leaders and continually transferred and 
consumed among their members. In this way, the members’ many exceptional 
circumstances could be accepted without affecting the whole group’s 
production. It should be reemphasized that this continued exchange behavior 
should not be understood in a purely rational way. On the face of it, the regular 
give and take interactions appealed to the workers’ rationality. However, in 
fact the value of each give and take was not the same. Many instances of the 
workers’ help could not even be calculated. It was the value inequality that 
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reflected the irrational elements of this exchange. In other words, it was not 
out of workers’ purely rational calculations. In addition, this exchange system 
should not be regarded as an intentional design by the group leaders. It was 
more like a strategy evolved through the day-to-day interactions and shaped 
by the particular situations rather than a product of intentional design.  
 
In a word, parceling out jobs selectively, falsifying attendance records 
and the exploitation of time spent waiting for jobs were three implicit but not 
unimportant tactics, by which the group leaders were able to spare their 
member workers some extra free time, either directly or indirectly, to deal with 
the multifarious “exceptional circumstances”. However, time could not solve 
everything. In the factory, time usually meant money: tolerance of one 
person’s absence might harm the whole group’s interests; giving easier tasks to 
a certain worker might also lead to an imbalance in interests among the 
member workers. Therefore, as they sought more free time, the group leaders 
also needed to find effective ways to prevent their members’ interests from 
being jeopardized too much. 
Tactics for Balancing the Workers’ Interest 
Building up the Private Coffer. Needless to say, money was the most effective 
tool for balancing the interests of workers. But where could the group leaders 
obtain this extra money for their own disposal? In Jinjiang Factory, almost all 
 226 
the production groups had built up a private coffer (xiaojinku). Money in the 
private coffer could be accumulated in two main ways. The first and foremost 
was by holding back some portion of the group bonus. The group bonus came 
from exceeding production and should somehow be distributed among its 
members. However, the group leaders only distributed part of the bonus and 
kept the rest for the group’s “unexpected needs” (bushi zhixu). This sum of 
money was usually kept by the leaders in a semi-transparent way, which 
means that, even though the members knew their leaders would keep some 
money in reserve, they did not know how much was taken away. This 
ambiguity was maintained by the “double-blind” policy of bonus distribution 
under which the bonus was usually sealed in an envelope. The specific amount 
was strictly confidential and workers were not supposed to ask what it was. 
This meant that the workers could not find out the amount from either official 
channels or their own calculations. The second source of money was through 
falsifying overtime. At the end of every month, the group leaders were asked 
to report their group’s total hours of overtime, for which the workshop gave 
overtime pay to each group. In this process, the group leaders usually tended 
to report as many hours as they could. The difference in payment between 
reported and actual overtime was retained by the leaders. For this purpose, 
they falsified the overtime records as a matter of routine. It was not unusual, 
for example, to record an hour of actual overtime as one and half hours.  
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The workshop leaders were not unaware of these cheating behaviors, but 
they did not take them seriously. In their eyes, they were understandable and 
acceptable. Moreover, some of them even implicitly encouraged the creation 
of private coffers. As the Director of the Machining Workshop commented: 
 
Actually, we all knew they (group leaders) were building up their own 
private coffers. And we also knew where they obtained the money. But we 
did not take measures to forbid them. In the workshop, the group leaders 
were the ones who had immediate contact with workers. Their work was 
very heavy and complicated because they had to get along well with every 
member in the group. Even one troublemaker could be a headache for the 
whole group. As a result, besides their production work, the most important 
task for these leaders was to unite their members by whatever means. In 
order to do this, eating and drinking were unavoidable. You could not 
expect these leaders to pay out of their own pockets. Actually, in my 
workshop, we even had a budget for this private coffer money. It was 
usually given to the group leaders together with their group bonus.225  
 
As this interviewee’s comments showed, support from the workshop 
management might be the main reason for the development of the group’s 
private coffer. With the coffer, the group leaders grasped more available 
                                                             
225 Interview with Gu Jiwei. 
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resources, which provided them with more choices in dealing with the 
relations with their member workers. Perhaps, in this director’s eyes, food and 
drink were the main methods employed by the group leaders. In fact, however, 
they were just two of many. As their autonomy increased, the group leaders 
developed more tactics to balance their members’ interests, some of which 
even contradicted their senior managers’ interests. 
 
Trading in Working Hours. Trading working hours was an exchange carried 
out among different members in one group. It usually occurred when someone 
in the group could not complete the required 208 hours for whatever reason. 
The process could be summarized as having four steps: first, the group leader 
obtained a worker’s agreement to be the donor; second, the donor worker 
wrote his/her excess working hours on the recipient’s work-ticket (gongpiao); 
third, when the bonus was awarded, the recipient worker took the basic bonus 
for the completion of the 208 hours, while the donor worker took the rest; 
fourth, the group leader gave the donor worker a subsidy from the private 
coffer. In this way, the group members were able to minimize the loss of 
workers and the group. More importantly, in cases where the trade was due to 
the recipient’s long-term absence, it was also a way to disguise the actual 
length of the absence. In this sense, the trading of working hours within the 
group could also be a tactic for sparing more free time. A by-product of this 
mutual help was the strengthening of internal cohesion, not only between the 
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leaders and their members, but also among the members.  
 
Adjusting the Quota Time. Although the quota time was determined with 
reference to previous production records, it was impossible to be completely 
accurate. The condition of machinery, quality of materials, skillfulness of 
workers etc. were all possible factors that influenced the actual working time. 
If the quota time was longer than the actually required working time, it was 
called a “loose quota” (ding’e song); otherwise, it was regarded as a “tight 
quota” (ding’e jin). In day-to-day work, nobody had better knowledge of this 
than the workers themselves. Needless to say, everyone was more willing to 
work on the part with a loose quota, and no one wanted to be at a 
disadvantage. Having no right to change the quota time, group leaders usually 
had two ways to deal with the potential imbalance in interests. On one hand, 
they could move the easier work in turn among members; on the other, they 
could adjust the hourly rate of the excess bonus for different tasks. In Jinjiang 
Factory, the latter was more popular among group leaders. As one leader 
recalled, “If the quota time of one task was recognized as loose, we would 
lower its bonus of each excess hour, for example from 1.2 yuan to 1 yuan; 
otherwise, we would raise it.”226 This was taken by the group leaders as their 
unofficial adjustment of the quota time. In this way, the group leaders avoided 
potential disputes over imbalanced interests. More importantly, by matching 
                                                             
226 Interview with Fang Wensheng. 
 230 
the quota time with the adjusted excess bonus, group leaders were able to 
freely parcel out jobs according to some particular need without compromising 
others’ interests. This released more autonomous space for the group leaders. 
 
In essence, in dealing with the various exceptional circumstances, the 
group leaders sought to expand their autonomy outside what the formal 
institution allowed. With this autonomy, they were able to figure out some 
tactics to provide their members with extra free time, and protect their 
interests from being harmed. However, the employment of these tactics would 
inevitably damage the factory’s interests. Faced with this problem, the factory 
and workshop leaders appeared to be in an irreconcilable dilemma: on one 
hand, they were conscious of the negative effects of these tactics; while on the 
other, they also admitted the necessity of some of these tactics. As a result, 
they always took an equivocal attitude towards such behavior. In this sense, 
the acquiescence of the higher management also fostered the growth of a 
series of tactics within the group. But it was these tactics that strengthened 
connections within the group, by which the basic production could be 
maintained without being seriously affected by the continuous interruptions.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I illustrated the tolerating strategy through the example of 
absenteeism management in Jinjiang Factory. It embodied the group leaders’ 
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tolerance and consideration towards every member’s exceptional 
circumstances. In so doing, the leaders won the members’ recognition and 
support. More importantly, through the solicitation of others’ assistance, this 
tolerance and consideration was exchanged among members, through which 
the group’s internal cohesion was gradually strengthened. Of course, this form 
of governance could not function without substantial material support. In order 
to accumulate as many resources as possible, group leaders invented a series 
of tactics. These helped them to provide their members with more free time 
while maintaining their income at a certain level. In a word, it was the 
toleration that strengthened the group’s internal connections, and guaranteed 
the basic production in the face of interruptions. 
 
        The benign feature of governance at Jinjiang Factory was even more 
evident when compared to the neo-traditionalism and disorganized despotism 
in urban factories. Walder indicated that, in many urban SOEs, “Employees 
whose slack performance threatens the attainment of group goals will first be 
talked to informally by the group leader, and if no change results, the 
employee will be criticized and called on to justify his or her lax performance 
in a group meeting.”227 In addition, there is also a definite material incentive 
for other group members to report and criticize lax behavior.228  
                                                             
227  Walder, 1986, p. 108. 
 




        Zhao and Nichols found that the managerial control of labor attendance at 
the cotton mills of Henan province in the 1980s was even harsher. According 
to their observations, these mills introduced two mechanisms to tighten the 
management’s control: control over sick leave and the exercise of monetary 
sanctions against those who took leave, whether due to sickness or on 
compassionate grounds.229 
 
In terms of the comparisons above, it can be seen that toleration as a 
governing strategy in Third Line enterprises departs from the conventional 
wisdom of managerial control in at least three crucial aspects. First, most 
previous studies implicitly assume the vertical integration and homogeneity of 
management, while the toleration model assumes otherwise. In the analyses of 
neo-traditionalism and disorganized despotism, the interest of group leaders is 
either overlooked or taken to overlap with that of their senior managers. On 
the contrary, this study shows that the group leaders’ interest is not 
predetermined, but created and shaped in the course of their constant 
interaction with their senior managers and member workers. On the lowest 
rung of management, the group leaders have to complete the stipulated 
production task; as the head of a group, they have to seek ways to secure their 
members’ consent to work. From the perspective of their member workers, on 
                                                             
229 Zhao and Nichols, 1996, p. 10.  
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one hand they are managers who are supposed to strictly enforce the factory’s 
regulations on absenteeism; but on the other, they are also friends or even 
relatives who are expected to forgive breaches of the rules. With these multiple 
roles and expectations, group leaders resort to a strategy that is neither 
obedient nor defiant in nature: they complete the required production task 
through some vicious tactics that are detrimental to the factory’s interest. In so 
doing, they place their group interest above the factory interest. 
 
Second, in previous analyses, workers’ rule-breaking behavior is taken as 
an impediment to the management, while this study, as the example of 
absenteeism management showed above, considers it as a commodity 
exchanged between group leaders and workers for the purpose of labor 
control. Rather than passively accepting the formal institutions, workers and 
group leaders actively invent a series of hidden rules, tacit knowledge and 
informal tactics to minimize the potential tensions. In the case of absence 
management, one significant hidden rule was the multi-actors exchange 
mechanism employed in dealing with the contradiction between the 
production and workers’ absences. The tacit knowledge was the shared 
understanding of workers’ exceptional circumstances. The informal tactics 
referred to all the tactics taken by group leaders to seek more allocable time 
and money. It is these invisible and informal agreements that dominate the 
quotidian life of workers and their immediate managers.  
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        Third, in contrast to the previously argued governance that usually occurs 
between two parties, the toleration model presents a novel one taken place 
among multiple actors. In Walder’s neo-traditionalism, the group governance 
is mainly dependent on the patron-client link between group leaders and 
activists. In Lee’s disorganized despotism, managers employ coercive means 
over their all workers. The toleration model, however, operates between the 
coordinator, the favor donor and the favor taker. This governing strategy can 
be hardly realized between two parties because neither the coordinator nor the 
donor can independently provide the favor to the taker. The group leaders, 
who in practice are the coordinators, need the assistance of other member 
workers to satisfy the need of the taker, while the donor workers have to gain 
their group leaders’ permission, officially or implicitly, to provide their help. 
In so doing, the favor, usually in the form of free time and monetary income, 
is rotated among these three actors.     
 
Some may suspect that the gradual but drastic reforms of the 1980s might 
alter the governing strategy formed prior to the reform era. However, this 
change did not occur in Jinjiang Factory. By contrast, some of the reforms 
might even strengthen the existing form of governance. First, similar to what 
many scholars have presented, managers at Jinjiang Factory were not able 
freely to fire their workers. In other words, Jinjiang Factory workers during 
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the reform era still enjoyed job security. Ma Jie’s case, presented in the 
previous chapter, provides typical evidence on this point. Second, the 
development of the foreign-invested and domestic private sectors in southeast 
China provided workers with more opportunities in larger cities, which placed 
great pressure on the management to maintain its workforce. According to a 
deputy director at Jinjiang Factory, by 1984, 582 workers had left the factory, 
of which 81 were technicians.230 In a conference on human resources in April 
1984, the factory received as many as 146 applications to leave. As a result, in 
order to prevent more and more workers from leaving, managers had to 
respond quickly to workers’ demands. In essence, the 1980s reforms, which 
aimed to promote productivity in the factory, actually increased workers’ 
bargaining power. The toleration, as a governing strategy, was therefore able 
to remain.   
  
                                                             
230 Interview with Yu Xuehui.  
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Chapter 8 Conclusion  
 
In every respect, the Third Line Construction has undoubtedly been of great 
importance to the development of Chinese industry. It was so huge a project 
that it involved three-quarters of China’s provinces and millions of its citizens. 
In spite of its initial military and security motivations, the national movement 
had a general impact on the local economy, culture, education and technology 
of central and western China. However, this significant event has not yet 
received much attention from academia. Despite the numerous works on 
Chinese labor, the Third Line workers remain largely absent from the existing 
literature. Motivated by the empirical significance and theoretical overview, 
this study represents a first attempt to explore the politics and sociology of the 
Third Line workers by answering the following core question: What were 
industrial relations like in the Third Line Enterprises? How were they formed? 
In this study I have shown that, although the geographic isolation of Third 
Line enterprises cut off pre-existing social relationships among workers, it did 
not give managers greater leverage over their workers. Instead, managers had 
to adapt by tolerating workers’ rule-breaking actions. This toleration was 
rooted in three contextual conditions.  
 
First and foremost was their isolation from the outside world. Located in 
remote mountainous areas, the Third Line enterprises operated as independent 
and fully functional societies. This isolated living condition directly led to the 
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interconnected social networks and forced workers in Third Line enterprises to 
seek their friends and marital partners within the factory. However, this 
process did not occur at random. Usually, the workforce of Third Line 
enterprises was mainly composed of three subgroups: transferred workers, 
Returned Educated Youths and demobilized soldiers. Moreover, this division 
was further deepened by their job niches in the factory. In their constant and 
immediate day-to-day interactions, workers of each group frequently created 
certain group characteristics and drew boundaries between “us” and “them”,231 
consciously or subconsciously. As a result, even though each group of workers 
was not a completely closed circle, workers were more likely to build their 
social relations within the group they belonged to. Over time, the deep and 
strong ties within the group strengthened its internal solidarity. Ties across 
groups, despite being less common, nevertheless existed and made the workers 
of different groups interconnected in one way or another. In the face of the rich 
informal relations, the grass-roots managers were very reluctant to enforce 
formal regulations strictly on their member workers, which gave rise to the 
rampant absenteeism and forced the leaders to come up with a more flexible 
form of management.  
 
If the interconnected social networks had somehow unintentionally 
empowered the ordinary workers, the various means of control over 
                                                             
231 Crang, Mike, 1998, Cultural Geography, London: Routledge, p. 60. 
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production were deliberately sought by workers to increase their power. 
Thanks to their permanent employment status and immobility across positions, 
workers were able to learn how to control the pace of work and maintain their 
income at the same time. For example, they could reorder the sequence of 
processing, recalibrate the quota task among different parts, and make use of 
any uncoordinated actions or plans in the factory. All these autonomies were 
self-discovered through routine day-to-day working experience in the shop, 
serving as a set of informal and tacit knowledge beneath the seemingly well-
controlled formal institutions. In these circumstances, the group leader’s 
authority was never fully-fledged but was in fact constrained by the workers’ 
self-empowerment. Therefore, instead of rigidly exerting their power on 
member workers, group leaders were more willing to resort to a flexible 



















    
 
     In order better to illustrate how the toleration manifested itself in day-to-
day management, I take the governance of absenteeism at Jinjiang Factory as 
an example. As discussed in the previous chapter, the strategy of tolerance 
towards the management of absenteeism was based on three building blocks. 
First, it was a reinterpretation and justification of a worker’s absence as being 
due to his/her exceptional circumstance. Being drunk during working hours, 
going home for farm work or looking after children, taking care of airing a 
quilt or protecting crops from bad weather and so on were all typical examples 
of exceptional circumstances used to justify absenteeism. Since it was difficult 
to rank these exceptional circumstances in terms of urgency and importance, 
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Second, in order to cover the absentees’ tasks, group leaders initiated an 
between multiple actors. One crucial feature of this exchange was the group 
leaders acting simultaneously as the favor donor and taker. They donated their 
consideration and tolerance to the absent worker, while having to seek the help 
of other member workers to complete the production tasks. The second feature 
of this exchange was that it was not reciprocal in the classical sense of the 
word. That is, the favor would not necessarily be returned to the same person 
who donated the help. Instead, the exchange took place in the form of “favor-
pooling” among member workers. In this process, those who offered help did 
so out of their gratitude for the assistance they had previously received from 
their group leaders and other member colleagues through the favor pool, and 
those who received help would engage in favor-pooling by providing help to 
others in the future. This non-reciprocal flow of social capital allowed the 
exchange among multiple actors to continue and therefore made the toleration 
strategy work. In this respect, toleration and its operating mechanism – the 
tripartite exchange – were not fully based on rationality but had many 
emotional elements.  
 
        Of course, this multiple-actor exchange could not work without some 
necessary resources. The tactics to sustain the exchange were the third 
building block of the tolerance strategy. In previous chapters, I introduced two 
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types of resources that group leaders sought to accumulate. The first is time. 
Generally speaking, group leaders expanded the time at their disposal by 
exploiting production processes in three ways: selectively parceling out jobs 
among member workers, falsifying attendance records, and taking advantage 
of “waiting for a job time”. The second resource crucial to the group 
governance is money, which was also accumulated in three ways in the course 
of production. Group leaders built up their private coffers, coordinated the 
trading of working hours among different member workers, and privately 
adjusted quota times. None of these tactics were permitted by the factory’s 
formal regulations, but they were the living dynamics beneath the quiet 
surface in the workshop. These tactics were desirable because they could be 
used by group leaders to mobilize their members in completing the work; they 
were undesirable, however, because they damaged the interests of the factory 
as a whole. It was this paradoxical effect that defined the formation of grass-
roots managers’ governance: the interest of the group was always above the 
interest of the factory. In this sense, the group leader was never an accountable 
client of their senior bosses. Therefore, any analysis of industrial relations in 
China from the patron–client perspective232 is questionable without clarifying 
how such managerial dilemma has been solved or how its existence affects 
day-to-day operations.   
                                                             
232 On the patron–client tie in SOEs, see Walder, Andrew G. 1986. Communist Neo-
Traditionalism; for a village perspective, see the representative work by Jean Oi, 1989, State 
and Peasant in Contemporary China. 
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8.1 Varieties of Industrial Authority 
What is the novelty of toleration as a model for a system of industrial 
governance? Basically, it differs from two others – neo-traditionalism and 
disorganized despotism – in three respects. First, in the practice of the 
tolerance strategy, the numerous and constant absences were seen by group 
leaders as a resource to unite members and strengthen the group’s internal 
interest, while in the other three governance regimes, absenteeism was simply 
seen as an obstacle to management and production. As argued in previous 
chapters, through the reinterpretation and equal tolerance of absences due to 
personal exceptional circumstances, group leaders were able to win their 
members’ trust and support; through the exchange of favors, group members’ 
interests were deeply connected in the favor pool. In this respect, rampant 
absenteeism was not necessarily an impediment to the group management. 
Instead, it was exploited as an instrument to complete the group’s production 
tasks. In previous studies on China’s industrial governance, however, 
absenteeism is always negatively portrayed. In neo-traditionalism, it is 
understood as immoral and treacherous behavior; 233  in the despotic 
workplaces, it is also strictly forbidden due to its adverse impacts on 
production.234 
 
                                                             
233 Walder, 1986. 
 
234 See, for example, Lee, Ching Kwan, 1998, Gender and the South China Miracle: Two 
Worlds of Factory Women, London: University of California Press; Lee, 1999.  
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Second, a strategy of tolerance emphasized the independent interest of 
the production group and the group leader, while the other two governing 
regimes simply viewed the group leaders as the lowest policy implementers 
and ignored their autonomy. I have shown in previous chapters that the 
governing principle of toleration and its underpinning tactics were beneficial 
to the group but harmful to the factory. They were not enacted by the factory’s 
top-level policymakers but invented by the group leaders in response to the 
social, political, and production environment. Therefore, the interest of group 
and group leaders was not predetermined but figured out by the leaders and 
their member workers through day-to-day interactions. In this sense, the 
interests of the grass-roots management and its upper management did not 
overlap as previous studies have assumed. Thus the bipolar opposition 
between managers and workers according to the Marxist functionalist 
approach is also problematic. 
 
In view of the discussion above, it can be seen that tolerance as a novel 
industrial authority was not only a response to macro-political, social and 
economic structures, but also an adaptive product of the micro day-to-day 
interactions among agents. These complicated dynamics jointly affected the 
power parity between the two main groups of actors discussed in this work, 
group leaders and their workers. My empirical evidence indicates that, in 
Third Line enterprises, leaders were not so strong and workers not so weak. It 
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is this relatively equal power distribution that made mutual adjustment a 
viable option, which eventually gave rise to a strategy that prioritized the 
interests of the group as a whole. If we categorize industrial regimes in terms 
of the power parity or disparity between group leaders and member workers, 
we may be able to hypothesize three categories of regime for the future test, as 
summarized in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Categories of Industrial Regimes 
Strength of Member 
Workers 
Strong Weak 
Strength of Group 
Leaders 




Weak Responsive Mode N.A. 
 
The balance of power between group leaders and their member workers 
was more likely to produce the accommodating mode of management, such as 
the tolerance in the Third Line enterprises argued in this study. In factories of 
this kind, the group interest as a whole was exogenous to the factory interest 
and the former was usually placed above the latter. Under the suppressive 
mode, group leaders were more powerful than their workers, and they tended 
to employ suppressive means in dealing with workers’ misbehavior, such as 
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the case of neo-traditionalism in urban SOEs235 and the despotic regimes in 
foreign-invested firms and other small private workplaces.236 These regimes 
were the most likely in which to find the group interest convergent with the 
factory interest. Finally, if workers were more powerful than their leaders, 
group leaders faced big challenges from their members and tended to be more 
responsive to their members’ demands. Under the responsive mode, ordinary 
workers’ interests were taken seriously, which could even result in adjustment 
of the factory’s policies related to the introduction of new production and 
techniques. Chen has done some preliminary work on this type of management 
regime in village enterprises.237  
 
The varieties of industry authorities imply that industrial relations are 
highly contingent on their contexts. Even in factories of the same ownership, 
such as urban SOEs and the Third Line enterprises, the internal political 
dynamics could be so different that any argument established in one context 
needs to be reconsidered and revised in another.   
                                                             
235 Walder, 1986. 
 
236 See, for example, Lee, Ching Kwan, 1998; Pun, Ngai 2005, Made in China: Women 
Factory Workers in a Global Workplace, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005; Pun, 
Ngai and Chris Smith 2007, “Putting Transnational Labor Process in Its Place: The Dormitory 
Labor Regime in Post-Socialist China.” Work, Employment and Society, 21 (1), pp. 27–45; 
Chan, Chris King-Chi 2010, The Challenge of Labor in China: Strikes and the Changing 
Labor Regime in Global Factories, London and New York: Routledge; Wallis, Cara 2013, 
Technomobility in China: Young Migrant Women and Mobile Phones, New York and London: 
New York University Press.  
 
237 Chen, Calvin, 2006, “Work, Conformity, and Defiance: Strategies of Resistance and 
Control in China’s Township and Village Enterprises”, in Jacob Eyferth (ed.) How China 
Works: Perspectives on the Twentieth-century Industrial Workplace, London and New York: 
Routledge; Chen, Calvin, 2008, Some Assembly Required: Work, Community and Politics in 
China’s Rural Enterprises, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center. 
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8.2 Does dependency lead to obedience?  
It has been widely accepted that, prior to the market-oriented reforms, the 
obedient nature of the permanently employed workers in Chinese SOEs was 
due to their organized dependence. On this point, Andrew Walder makes the 
most forceful assertion. According to him, the organized dependence was an 
institutional feature of Chinese state-owned enterprises, which included three 
sub-aspects. First, workers were assumed to be immobile and economically 
dependent on their enterprises; second, they were politically monopolized by 
the party and the management of the factory, and third, they were personally 
supervised by their immediate leaders, with many conceivable needs and 
benefits.238 As a result, the danwei (work unit) – the collective name of all the 
workplaces – turns out to be a locus of the state controlling techniques that 
combined disciplinary and normative forms of control.239  
 
On the surface, workers at the Third Line enterprises do not seem 
different from their urban counterparts. Living in a remote area isolated from 
the outside world, they could even be more dependent on their workplace. 
                                                             
238 Walder, 1986, p. 13.  
 
239 Yang, 1989. These insightful and comprehensive claims have been recognized in many 
other studies. Lu argued that danwei was a state-planned social organization coordinating 
between the government and society by controlling all the resources that the individual needed 
– see Lu Feng, 1989; Li briefly summarized that the danwei was the state organizational 
governance over society – see Li, Hanlin. 1993, “China’s Danwei Phenomenon and the 
Mechanisms of Conformity in Urban Communities”. Sociology Research 5: pp. 23–32; see 
also his book Zhongguo danwei shehui: yilun, sikao, yu yanjiu (Chinese Danwei Society: 
Discussion, Thinking and Research), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press. 
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However, as previous chapters have shown, in stark contrast to what previous 
studies have argued, the greater dependence of the workers in Third Line 
enterprises did not make them easier to manage. Absenteeism was a serious 
problem for the factory’s management. I have argued that this puzzling 
phenomenon can be explained by two featured social dynamics. First, the 
connivance of absenteeism was due to the labeled clanization; second, it was 
tacitly allowed because of the group leaders’ full awareness of the members’ 
hidden autonomies in the production process.  
 
These two pieces of novel ethnographical evidence heuristically enrich 
our knowledge of Chinese labor politics in two ways. First, the labor division 
in the Third Line enterprises shows that, unlike the claims of previous studies, 
the heterogeneity of workers cannot be neatly determined by their skill 
profiles, level of education, or places of origin,240 or by their occupational or 
socioeconomic status.241 Instead, the division is also embedded in the sub-
identities, such as “支内职工” (transferred workers), “返城知青” (Returned 
Educated Youth) and “退伍军人” (demobilized soldiers). Even though these 
multifarious sub-identities were created unintentionally through several state-
mobilized movements, they are intentionally differentiated by the 
government’s socioeconomic policies. As shown in earlier chapters, in Jinjiang 
                                                             
240 On the role of places of origin, see the representative work:  Perry, 1993. 
 
241 See for example, Perry, 1994. In this article, Perry mentioned the difference between the 
permanent employment workers and the temporary workers.  
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Factory these three groups of workers were subject to very different training 
systems and wage policies. This fragmentation was perceived and further 
solidified in the immediate day-to-day interactions. These sub-identities were 
so hard transcended that they had powerful political and sociological impact 
on relations between management and labor. 
 
Second, this study shows that the ordinary workers were not passive 
recipients, but active agents capable of exploiting the formal policies for 
personal gain. On the topic of Chinese labor, previous studies are constrained 
by a dichotomous analytical framework. In these analyses, Chinese workers 
are either obedient or resistant. However, the experience of workers in Jinjiang 
Factory shows us that they were neither fully willing to comply with orders, 
nor radical enough to stir up collective protests. Instead, they were located in 
between, seeking strategies and tactics to expand their personal benefits. As 
described in the previous chapters, workers in Jinjiang workshops explore 
their hidden autonomies in production. These behaviors are not obedient in 
nature because they are usually damaging to the factory’s interests; nor should 
they be regarded as resistant, because they do not intentionally challenge 
authority. The key issue in the workshop, therefore, is not how to produce 
docile workers or how to deal with sporadic, more-symbolic-than-meaningful 
collective resistance, but how to seek out and respond appropriately to those 
covert, flexible and resilient misbehaviors. In this respect, a certain industrial 
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authority is endogenous to the dynamics of daily production practices. 
 
Does dependence lead to obedience? The present study indicates that this 
question cannot be answered in a general way. Without in-depth knowledge of 
how the different types of social networks were interwoven in the factory and 
how the power relations were reconstructed by active agents in the workshop, 
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Appendix: The Social Relations of L’s and C’s Families in the 
Factory 
L’s Family (Returned Educated Youth) 
L’s family had three brothers, LZS, LZH and LY. LZS worked in the 
Department of Quality Control; his wife ZKX worked in the factory’s hospital. 
LZH worked in the Department of Human Resource, and his wife WLF 
worked in the Department of Design. LY was once the director of the 
Workshop of Casting and Forging.  
 
        LZS had one daughter and one son. His daughter, LYH, worked as a 
grinder in the Workshop of Machining, and her husband WWD was once the 
director of Workshop of Preparation. LZS’s son, LYY, worked in the 
Department of Finance, and his wife LCY worked in the Department of 
Design. LZS also had a brother-in-law, LRS, who worked in the Workshop of 
Machining. Like LZS, LRS also had one daughter and one son. His daughter, 
LSJ, worked in the Workshop of Machining. LRS’s son, LSW, worked in the 
Workshop of Machining as well.  
 
        LZH has a cousin, ZY, who was an electrician in the Workshop of 
Machining. LY’s brother-in-law, ZT, was once the director of Department of 
Human Resource. Z’s wife, XF was the factory’s statistician. XF’s nephew, 
XY worked in the factory’s Union and his wife XGR was a worker in the 
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Workshop of Machining. The social relations of L’s family can be shown by 
the following figure: 
 
 
Notes: In this figure, “=”denotes marriage relationship; “…” denotes the 
relationship of siblings; “_” linking different names indicates people across 
generations, but not necessarily the parents-child relations. “W” is short for 
“workshop”, while “d” is short for “department”. 
 
 
C’s Family (Transferred Workers) 
CZY was once the vice director of Jinjiang Factory. His wife, JGE, worked in 
the factory’s warehouse. They had three daughters, CJH, Chen JL and CJG. 
They also had two sons, CJP and CJN. 
 
        CJH worked in the Assembly Shop and her husband, ZJZ, was a worker 
in the Workshop of Instrument. ZJZ’s father ZGS worked in the factory’s 
Instrument Office. ZJZ’s mother, ZXF, was the factory’s accountant. ZJZ had a 
sister, ZLM, who worked in the workshop of Matching. Her husband, SYS, 
worked in the Assembly Shop. S’s father, SZ, was once the vice director of 
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Department of Logistics.  
 
        CJL and her husband worked in the Workshop of Heat Treatment. CJG 
worked in the Workshop of Matching, while her husband HJJ worked in the 
Workshop of Instrument.  
 
        CJP was a fitter in the Workshop of Instrument and his wife, CJQ worked in 
the Department of Sales. CJN was a driver in the Department of Transportation 
and his wife, ZH worked in the Workshop of Instrument. ZH’s father, ZQS worked 
in the Department of Transportation as well and ZH’s mother, LBM, was a worker 
in the Workshop of Matching. ZH also had a brother, ZB, who worked in the 
Workshop of Machining. The social relations of C’s family in the factory can be 
shown by the following figure:  
 
 
Notes: In this figure, “=”denotes marriage relationship; “…” denotes the 
relationship of siblings; “_” linking different names indicates people across 
generations, but not necessarily the parents-child relations. “W” is short for 
“workshop”, while “d” is short for “department”. 
 
